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ABSRACT 
This thesis is an investigation of talk in a therapeutic setting. It takes discursive 
psychology as the main influence theoretically, and also draws on the rigorous 
analytical techniques of conversation analysis (CA). The data was collected in 
various family therapy settings in the U. K, both residential and non-residential via 
videotapes made during those sessions. These recordings were made by therapists 
for their own use initially, and were not produced especially for this project. 
Videotapes were transcribed according to standard CA conventions, and 
subsequently analysed. One of the primary research questions has been to examine 
empirically mental state language as used in the therapeutic setting. Secondly, it has 
been to examine accounting practices and the production of versions of events as 
'fact'. Thirdly, the aim has been to consider the practical implications of asymmetry 
as a participants' concern. As a unifying and over-arching analytic interest the use 
of reported speech in each of these other aspects has been investigated to assess its 
role in their production. The conclusions of the thesis demonstrate that participants 
themselves orient to one another's minds as accessible and reportable entities, and 
that speech is treated as reflective of inner thought. Furthermore, where speech is 
reported in the therapeutic setting, it is frequently used to validate and to evidence 
claims about other people's 'psyche'. 
Key Words: Discursive, psychology, conversation, therapy, reported speech, mind, 
construction, accounts, asynunetry, versions. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This thesis is the result of an investigation of a particular kind of institutional interaction, 
that of family therapy. However, it was never my intention to scrutinise the effectiveness of 
the practice of 'doing therapy' per se. I have approached this investigation first and 
foremost as a discursive psychologist, not a therapist. There are many schools of therapy, 
and many books have written about the intricacies of their practice. I began this project 
with a resolve not to learn all that I could about the theories that each approach espouses, 
but to come to the therapeutic 'couch' as it were with no other agenda save that of the 
unmotivated looking which characterises this kind of ethno-psychology. The data that I am 
using are videotapes of therapy sessions conducted at NHS child and adolescent mental 
health units in the UK. In line with the ethos of discursive psychology, my analysis draws 
significantly on conversation analytic techniques, and is based on detailed analysis of 
transcripts of these therapy sessions. 
Theoretical Framework 
Within the framework of discursive psychology, the starting point for this work is an 
analysis of the materials themselves. Broadly speaking, this is a discipline which studies 
language as a medium of social interaction, and one of its characteristics is that the 
researcher starts from the premise of 'unmotivated looking', of not having an agenda save 
that of finding in the data what is of interest. By drawing on general concerns highlighted 
by other works in institutional settings as a reference point my aim has been to explore 
how these, and other issues are worked out in a therapeutic setting. By making detailed 
transcripts of videotaped therapy sessions, I apply the methods of discursive psychology 
(DP) and conversation analysis (CA) to make sense of how the business that goes on is 
achieved. One of the main objectives of therapy is to reach a point where the clients are 
able to use alternative descriptive frameworks in talking about their problems, making 
discursive psychology a compatible theoretical approach. Whilst this doesn't necessarily 
matter, I think it does make the analysis accessible to those within the 
counselling/therapeutic professions. In much of the early DP research, a focus on how 
people formulate descriptions of themselves, of others and of events to do business, was a 
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central concern. DP is also particularly interested in how accountability is managed through 
talk; a crucial issue in any arena of therapy which tackles the problems of an individual not 
just as something intrinsic but also as relational. Just as therapy is treated as the 'talking 
cure' of the medical world, so DP treats 'talk as the core' of any psychological enquiry. 
Research Questions 
This is an investigation of how a certain type of business achieved through talk is 
situationally compounded in the institutional context of a family therapy clinic. According 
to Hutchby and Wooffitt, mundane conversation is a "technical category in which the 
order, size and type of turns are free to vary" (1998: 148). By contrast in institutional forms 
of talk, there tends to be a significant narrowing and re-specification of the range of options 
that are operative in conversational interaction. Thus, the turns that make up speech 
activities such as blamings and accounts occurring in 'mundane' conversational 
environments according to this definition would have greater freedom of size and shape, 
whereas these turn characteristics are likely to be compounded by the institutional 
situatedness of the interaction. For the purposes of this research, one of the avenues of 
investigation is to look for those characteristics of accounting practices which belie its 
institutional setting, and to look at how those characteristics may be 'therapy specific'. 
Another aspect of research interest is to determine the use(s) of reported speech in this 
setting, how it is used, by whom, and to what end. Whilst formulating another person's 
words, or even directly quoting them is as common an occurrence in everyday life as one 
can find, it is those particularities that emerge in therapy with which this thesis is engaged. 
Finally, the issue of asymmetry will be investigated in terms of its relation both to family 
relationships, and to relationships between therapist and client. 
Methodological Approach 
The methodological approach for this research draws on the theoretical framework of 
discursive psychology and conversation analysis described earlier. As a deductive rather 
than inductive research method, conversation analysis differs from techniques in which a 
hypothesis is first made and then tested using large collections of data, instead, it employs a 
methodology in which exemplars are used as the basis on which a generalisable description 
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is built. Although such generalisations are subject to the specific logic of testing in DP and 
CA when collections are built and deviant cases explored, this work takes a naturalistic 
approach to data collection, video recordings of therapy sessions occurring in NHS clinics 
form the basis of the data set. These sessions have not been set up specifically for the 
purposes of the research, and are conducted in their usual settings. 
The videotapes are used to make detailed transcripts using conventional technical methods 
for this kind of work. Both the videotapes and transcripts are used for the analysis, although 
to comply with current ethical restrictions, the videotapes will be destroyed once the 
research has been written up and will therefore not form part of the final dissertation. 
Additional ethical approval has also been given for the use of short extracts of anonymised 
audio and visual tracks in academic presentations where individual participants give their 
consent. Both the videotapes and transcripts are analysed - the transcript being a 
convenient tool of reference to the recorded interaction. Repeated listening and observation 
of the original tapes are central to this technique. Within this methodological framework, a 
naturalistic approach is central, as the analysis relies heavily on extracting participant's 
own methods within the interaction, rather than on the analyst's imposed categories and 
descriptions. In simple terms, the first stage of analysis broadly involves identifying what 
participants are doing in and through their talk in this setting. The second stage involves 
breaking down these broad ideas to discover how they are done. The use of conversation 
analysis is a rigorous method and a valuable descriptive resource for explaining this 
activity in detail. 
Overview 
Although there has been substantial research on therapy generally, a large amount of it has 
focused on outcome measures. Success has been measured using questionnaires and other 
post-therapy feedback measures. Whilst these techniques remain valuable, there is a desire 
amongst those working as therapists and counsellors to have a better understanding of the 
process itself. Alongside these other approaches, the application of an in-depth qualitative 
discursive psychological approach will, I believe, be very helpful in answering the more 
specific question of how therapy works. Whilst this thesis is predominantly concerned with 
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the analytical interests of DP and the broader issues that this field of research has 
developed, a by-product of this kind of detailed work, is that those aspects of institutional 
conversation that appear to be therapy-specific can be better understood for what they are. 
In this way, what actually goes on within a therapeutic interaction can be better understood 
in terms of how it works as a sequential, organised piece of conversation. 
This thesis in particular has as one of its major concerns, the practices of using reported 
speech in therapy, and how that both constitutes and facilitates the goals of the therapeutic 
encounter. However, there are other key areas that are also addressed. Chapter 4 is the first 
analytic chapter, and deals with the use of inability accounts by clients in therapy as ways 
of excusing inappropriate or socially undesirable behaviour. In most instances there has 
been within the family unit what we would as lay persons call a 'breakdown of 
communication'. By this, we tend to mean that there are problematic issues within the 
family, that the family group themselves cannot seem to be able to resolve without the 
assistance of a professional outside body. On the whole, most parents do not receive any 
special training to help them resolve conflicts with their children, but tend to work out their 
problems more by trial and error than by planning and expertise. As a generalisation, the 
role of the therapist is to listen and advise, and to help the family to understand one 
another's viewpoints, perhaps even to make some concessions or to compromise on certain 
behaviour. 
I have made it my aim not to analyses how 'well' a therapist is performing, but to look at 
the activity of talk itself, in this instance an activity that is situated in the therapeutic 
appointment for the particular purpose of 'sorting out' the family's problems. As my 
approach to this analysis has been to put the data first and to discover what is happening in 
the interaction from that, I have not started from the neat premise of looking for any 
particular action. My reasons for this are to avoid the problem of circularity, and also 
because one doesn't really know what one is looking for until you find it. By this I mean 
that a hypothesis being a statement that can be tested, is something that has already been 
conceived as a possibility if not a probability. The danger with having pre-determined ideas 
that are investigated to prove their veracity, is that this almost precludes the discovery of 
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other ideas that have not previously been conceived by the investigator. Circularity happens 
when the investigator 'proves' the statement that they conceived to be true in the first place 
by means of scientific investigation. 
My own preference, and that of the discipline of DP which I support, is that one should 
approach the data with an open mind and to honestly look at it without prior expectations 
or preconceptions. In this way it makes it a more conducive environment for the researcher 
to discover new phenomena that they had not even previously thought of. The result of this 
is that in some respects the analysis is more a collection of 'noticings' than a systematic 
line of enquiry. This collection of noticings does however still have an internal coherence. I 
have restricted my analysis to a limited number of themes, so as to retain some sense of 
unity. My analytic interest has been more focused on the client's accounting and sense- 
making practices than the therapist's, although the exception to this is chapter 5 in which I 
look in detail at a particular discursive device which appears to be used predominantly by 
the therapist - that being to report, or 'reflect' back to the client something that they had 
said earlier. This chapter is entitled 'you said', which encapsulates the elemental 
ingredients in this particular discursive activity. 
In chapter 6,1 move on to look at the construction of 'versions' in therapy. Again I draw 
heavily on the use of reported speech as a particular focus for the way that versions are 
constructed. The particular areas that are considered in this analysis are the construction of 
versions of truth and importance. Finally, chapter 7 takes a step further into the heart of 
what DP is really all about, by looking at an aspect of the way that constructs of 'mind' and 
'thought' are used as a resource for both clients and therapists alike. This chapter in 
particular takes a closer look at what psychology is all about, and at how reports of other 
person's states of mind can be 'known' by others. The way that the data has led this chapter 
is to see how the particular issue of what someone is reported to have said (or not said) is 
used to evidence claims about what someone else is thinking. 
In this chapter the thesis comes full circle. The title 'What d'you think', is an extract from a 
piece of data in the thesis. It is an argument into which the reader will, I hope, be drawn by 
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degrees from accounting practices, through reported speech, into the conceptions of 
versions of reality, and finally into the deeper issue of how the relationships between 
thought and language, talk and reality are in themselves created and maintained via our 
everyday conversational practices. 
Conclusions 
In conclusion I will begin by addressing the issue of how accountability is managed 
through talk; a crucial issue in any arena of therapy which tackles the problems of an 
individual not just as something intrinsic but also as relational. One of the key ways that 
this analysis demonstrates accountability is through the construction of 'versions' of events 
that are contested and evidenced. Those kinds of accounting practices which belie its 
institutional setting, are those which appear to be produced as ways of protecting the 
speaker from the kinds of personal change that may be required as a result of imputed 
accountability. 
The use of reported speech is examined as part of accounting practices as well as in 
substantiating claims about other person's thoughts and feelings. One of the primary 
conclusions in this regard is that it can be empirically demonstrate that people use reports 
of what other people have said as one of the key ways of evidencing their claims about 
what that person thinks. The conclusion of this thesis draws together all of the themes that 
have been investigated, and highlights some of the practical implications of this research 
for clinical practice, and for the discipline of psychology. 
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CHAPTER 2 
THEORIES AND ISSUES 
The purpose of this chapter is to outline some of the particular issues within previous 
research that are pertinent to my own investigation. There is also a need to outline various 
key theoretical approaches with which others have approached their analyses. For the sake 
of relevance and brevity I have constrained this review to those issues that have the most 
direct bearing on my own work. I have structured these elements into three parts: therapy 
and postmodernism, asymmetry, and voicing. 
First of all, therapy is looked at in the new light of postmodernism, with regard to how 
more recent theories of the practice of counselling have altered both its professional 
practice and the way that it is viewed and taught on a wider scale. The issue of 
postmodernist views of therapeutic practice is raised because the theoretical basis of DP as 
a discipline is very sympathetic to this approach. Secondly, asymmetry and institutional 
talk is reviewed as a separate topic. Analysts' concerns with 'power', 'knowledge rights' 
and 'institutional roles' are important to recognise as issues within a setting where 
accounting practices amongst other things are being investigated. Not only is this a setting 
where there is potential to explore the relationship between 'expert' counsellor and clientý 
but also those relationships between adult and adolescent, parent and child. Of particular 
interest in this regard is the idea that a professional stranger may have greater entitlement to 
claim 'knowledge' of a client's psyche than they do themselves. Finally, voicing and 
reported speech are reviewed as issues within the context of the relevant literature. 
Chapters 4 and 5 of the thesis in particular concentrate on specific aspects of how voicing 
is used in therapy, and so it is pertinent to consider ahead of time, what the general issues 
are within this area of study before we examine their use within the particular context of 
the data that I have been using. 
The rationale behind highlighting these particular features to start with is that whilst the 
investigation of therapy per se is not my primary interest, it is still important to recognise 
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some of the major changes that have been happening within this field over the last decade. 
In particular, the move towards postmodernism in the thinking and practice of some will 
mean that analysis of the kind that I ani engaged in will be of particular interest to those 
groups of practitioners. The reason for this is that discursive psychology is itself very 
rooted in social constructionism as a way of understanding human interaction. The link 
between therapy as a social construction and asymmetry is one which warrants an 
investigation of the theoretical background of asymmetry and power as a topic in its own 
right, thus the inclusion of this area as a major component of this chapter. According to this 
perspective, any authority that a person has is not something pre-existent as intrinsic to the 
individual wherever they are, but rather something that is worked up as relevant during the 
course of an interaction. Therefore, the connection between the social constructionist 
approach to therapy and the construction of power and authority within an institutional 
context is apparent. Finally, the inclusion of the sub-section on voicing relates to the central 
feature of its use within the data that is examined here. In particular, it is used to present 
what different people have said as a way of managing topic as a client's concern rather than 
a therapist's imposed interest. This will become apparent in those chapters which relate to 
this issue in particular, but for now I simply wish to justify the necessity of reviewing 
voicing as a topic in its own right at this stage, so that in later analytic chapters where 
voicing is considered in new ways, a foundation will already have been laid. Its connection 
with social constructionist approaches to therapy and to asymmetry lies in its use primarily 
in managing topic. 
My primary concern throughout, has been to approach this research with rigor and 
thoroughness as a discursive psychologist, rather than as a pseudo-therapist. I deliberately 
chose not to attempt a comprehensive review of therapy literature in preparation, nor to 
examine the different theoretical bases of each brand of therapeutic practice according to 
merit or effectiveness. There may be those who disagree with my reasoning for doing so, 
and yet I believe that my judgment on this matter was well founded. My concern to not flu 
my mind with therapy theories before I approach the data was that I would not then come 
to it in the 'unmotivated' fashion that I had determined. A therapist I am sure would look at 
my data in quite a different light, noting perhaps how 'well' the therapist managed the 
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interaction, or observing certain recurrent themes in a clients talk which may belie a 
particular state of mind. However, without what I regard as that kind of 'colouring' of my 
own vision, I feel far better equipped to see what it is that I am looking for. I have as a 
researcher wished not to have my 'therapy-tinted spectacles' on when I was observing 
these interactions. 
Having said that, I do not come to my data as neutrally and unmotivated as this ideology 
might suggest. Obviously I cannot escape, at least to some extent, being influenced by my 
own world-view; I can't stop being western, educated, white, middle-class, female, and I 
do not pretend not to be. I can however resist the temptation to make any assumptions 
about the activities of my participants on the basis of any one of these or any other category 
that I think is relevant. I choose as far as is possible to make nothing of these social 
categories, nor of any other contextual features of the situation, save those things which the 
participants themselves make relevant in the course of their conversations. 
In view of this need for a moment of reflexivity, it seems a good time to discuss my reasons 
for labeling the extracts that I use in the way that I have. As an analyst, there is potentially 
a wide range of different ways of identifying various speakers in the extracts of talk that I 
quote. For example, I could simply refer to them by a random alphabetical letter, or initial. 
I could refer to them by relational terms such as mother, father or son, or alternatively I 
could use pseudonyms such as Mary, John and Bill. The method that I have chosen to use 
however, reflects my concern to be true to the participant's own understanding of the 
nature of the interaction and their relationship to the others in the group. Because of this I 
use the 'client' as the central term of identification. This relates to the purpose and function 
of the whole interaction, after-all this is a therapy clinic. The term 'client', although never 
actually used by any of the other participants, I believe is descriptive of who he is here and 
now for the purposes of the interaction, and in relational terms to the therapist. He is also 
the person who has been recommended for family therapy, and therefore the rest of the 
family are there by virtue of their relationship to the client. I have chosen therefore to refer 
to them relationally, for example 'father', 'mother', 'sister', because they are present in that 
role in this interaction. By the same logic, I have kept the term 'therapist' for the therapist. 
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I believe that this solution is one that makes the extracts accessible and understandable to 
the reader, whilst still retaining an empirical integrity. 
Therapy and Postmodernism 
The world of therapy is itself undergoing a process of self-reflection and analysis of the 
effectiveness of its own practice. A large part of this process has been precipitated by the 
social constructionist movement. Sophisticated therapists, seeking to understand better their 
own profession, have been studying what this might mean for themselves. Laura Fruggeri 
is one of those practicing therapists who also writes on the effect that the social 
constructionist movement has had on therapy. She suggests that many previously cognitive 
therapists are now moving towards a systemic-constructionist perspective (Fruggeri, 
1992: 40). Since the 1960's, systemic theory has incrementally distanced itself from the 
reductionist pragmatic perspective. Simultaneous with this move has been the emergence 
of an influential critique of the old-style 'directive, instrumental and control-oriented' 
therapeutic models (Dell, 1982; Keeney, 1983; Hoffman, 1986). 
In moving away from reductionism, a new non-instrumental framework for working 
practice has begun to emerge, although many therapists, clinicians and other practitioners 
find themselves in the challenging position of being half-way between the old and the new. 
This process in itself has caused a degree of confusion over the identity and role of the 
therapist, as Fruggeri explains, "the concept of non-instructive interaction involves a 
revision of the causal paradigm through which the phenomenon of psychotherapy is 
explained" (1992: 42). In effect this paradigm shift removes one of the constituent elements 
of what psychotherapy has always been about, causing the therapist to now be required to 
"deal with the intrinsic non-neutrality of their way of being in the relationship" (Marzari, 
1991: 1). In other words, the old-style reductionist approach to therapy was intentionally 
directive, and instructive. However, with the new insights that the postmodernist movement 
has brought to light therapists are no longer comfortable with this mode of operation. 
Instead, there is a growing recognition that the therapist herself is not a neutral agent of 
change, but that her interventions are constitutive of what occurs in the therapeutic 
encounter. 
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The therapist can no longer be regarded as having access to objective knowledge of 
pathological mechanisms, nor as being unilaterally determining of the therapeutic 
relationship. Lynn Hoffinan is herself a family therapist, and like Fruggeri, is engaged in 
her own search for an acceptable and applicable methodology for clinical practice, taking 
into account the 'revolution' in thinking over recent years within the social sciences; 
challenging even the idea that we should call ourselves scientists at all. To her, the 
professional relationship is itself at the core of the debate, what she refers to as that 'super 
sacred coW (Hoffinan, 1992). Her central concern is how relations of domination and 
submission are built into the very assumptions on which therapeutic practice is based. 
Rather than imposing 'expert' answers informed by the therapist's own theoretical 
background implicitly or explicitly onto the client's narrative, Hoffinan proposes that that 
the therapeutic conversation should be a collaborative effort whereby. the client is able to 
introduce meaning and association, and the therapist takes on a more empathic role. As a 
proponent of this reflexive approach, Hoffinan appears to be looking for a way to remove 
the 'therapist as expert' completely, claiming that instead of making choices for people, 
clients should begin to have access to the thinking of the persons that they consult. 
The responsibility that the therapist now has, argues Fruggeri, is for his or her "power of 
construction7 (1992: 47). The thrust of constructionist theorising has led those in the 
profession to revisit their concept of what therapy is, concluding that it is something which 
cannot be abstracted from the social context in which it takes place and by which it is 
determined. Therapy has become, or perhaps always was, a socially defimed context for 
problem solving, evolution and change, and thus, the 'therapy-ness' of the interaction 
emerges as a process of interpersonal construction. The question that remains is that of the 
tension for the therapist between his identity as 'expert' and the theoretical principle that 
relational change cannot be unilaterally accomplished. The question that Fruggeri is left 
asking, along with many others is what exactly is it that "makes a conversation that 
Particular type of conversation that changes all other conversations? " (1992: 49). 
Perhaps the best person to consult about the construction of therapy is Ken Gergen, one of 
the forerunners, and most eloquent exponents of social constructionism. Gergen suggests 
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that when a client presents a narrative of life events or problematic issues, the therapist's 
job is to respond to that narrative in some way. There are various options that the therapist 
can take in their response, one of which may be the advisory option. Whilst this may be 
helpful and appropriate in some instances, for the chronically or seriously disturbed client, 
Gergen argues that this may not be the best approach (Gergen & Kaye, 1992). Instead, two 
alternatives are presented, the modernist, and the postmodernist approach. 
In the modernist view, which has been well represented in traditional forms of 
psychotherapy, an attempt is made to establish a structure of systematic, objective 
knowledge which will enable society to make increasingly accurate predictions about cause 
and effect relations. The effect on a practitioner working with this world-view is to replace 
the clienfs narrative with a scientific narrative, transforming the clienfs dysftmctional 
account with a professional and hopefully more usefid account. The client is furnished with 
an alternative reality which holds hope for the future. Despite this seemingly positive 
approach, there are those postmodernists who find the predominant pathologising of the 
profession particularly problematic, and claim that mental health practitioners have little 
justification for their claims to knowledge of pathology and cure. As Hoffinan suggests, 
perhaps such practitioners are little more than "professionals disguised as experts" 
(1992: 22). 
The positivist approach has not only been confined to the practice of therapy, but has also 
been determinant of the way that research in this area has been conducted. John Kaye is 
one who has been at the forefront of criticizing this approach, and has been keen to express 
a deconstructive critique of the logical positivist assumptions that govern much of the 
thinking about psychotherapy research. He asserts that the research that is conducted on 
this basis is, "predominantly verificationist and reproductive in orientation rather than 
formative or constructive. " (Kaye, 1995: 44). Whilst he acknowledges the usefulness of 
experimental methodology in outcome research, he points out its limitations in process 
research, indicating that research within this frame will either necessitate the reduction of 
the phenomenon being studied to quantifiable terms, or the selection for study of only those 
aspects of the phenomenon that can be converted into measurable terms. The end result of 
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this therefore, can only be to present a partial picture of psychotherapy. As Tomm claims, 
this can unfortunately often leave clinicians frustrated and they, "frequently complain that 
the fmdings of family researchers are trivial and useless in practice" (1983: 39). 
Kaye puts forward a strong and convincing argument that it is the predominance of the 
empirical epistemology and the privileging of particular methodologies within therapeutic 
research that has, "inappropriately limited the scope of inquiry" (1995: 47) and that the 
almost universal adoption of the logico-empiricist paradigm has, "contributed to an 
impoverished as well as erroneous construction of the therapeutic process. " (ibid p47). 
Another proponent of such a change of thinking about therapy research is Steven Frosh, 
also a researcher/practitioner. Frosh argues that there needs to be a development of theory- 
based research methodologies that are 'clinically meaningful' in order that research 
findings can directly contribute to the development of clinical theory (Frosh et al, 
1996: 144). Frosh suggests that the most important area for research at this moment in time 
is to find out what those factors are in therapy that facilitate change, indicating that studies 
which rely on symptom checklists and questionnaires are unable to get at these important 
issues of effectiveness in therapy. Instead, he proposes that 'theory-based' methods such as 
discourse analysis and narrative analysis will be more serviceable. 
It is in focusing particularly on process rather than outcome research that John Kaye also 
proposes the great need to adopt not just new methods, but to rethink our basic assumptions 
about the way that we perceive the process of psychotherapy. He suggests that to 
understand the process of psychotherapy, an interpretive rather than determinate approach 
is needed. The interpretive approach which is proposed by poststructuralist theorists is 
based on the premise that what we claim to be fact emerges from acts of interpretation and 
construction, therefore truth is relative to a conceptual system and cannot be fully 
objective. This form of inquiry is derived from hermeneutics, originally developed for the 
elucidation of biblical text as a way of interprefing the meanings embedded within it; a 
framework of interpretive inquiry, made up of reconstitutive, elucidatory and generative 
inquiry. These together point to both the illumination of meanings that organise knowledge, 
and to the creation of meanings which will extend our knowledge. 
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The concern that both Gergen and Kaye and others like them have with the modernist 
philosophy, is that there is a lack of regard for the complexity or uniqueness of an 
individual clienfs narrative and that it will eventually be replaced by a narrative "created 
before the client's entry into therapy" (Gergen & Kaye, 1992: 171). Gergen even goes so far 
as to suggest that "the ultimate aim of most schools of therapy is hegemonic", with each 
school of thought seeking to eradicate or overthrow the others (ibid p 17 1). The main line of 
attack in the postmodernist approach, is to undermine the status of the therapist as a 
scientific authority who has privileged knowledge of cause and cure, and instead to seek to 
place the therapist's narrative alongside the many other possibilities available within the 
culture. This collaborative relationship between the client and therapist thus becomes a 
context for the creation ofjointly constructed meaning. 
The postmodem criticism of the modernist approach from the point of view of the client is 
that he/she will suffer from the fixedness of narrative forinulations, justified by claims to a 
scientific base and unhelpful in application to novel life experiences. It is this 'fixedness' 
claim the postmodernists, that means that even before seeing the client, the therapist 
already has in mind an 'a priori' narrative. The cffect of all this is that because the 
therapisfs narrative is simply a decontextualised, abstract formalisation, the client's life 
options become severely truncated. The ultimate challenge therefore, for the postmodem 
practitioner is "not so much that of transforming meaning, but of transcending if'. (ibid 
p175). 
A slightly different approach to this problem, and a viable alternative to the 
modern/postmodem argument, is the concept of the 'generative metaphor' supplied by 
Wittgenstein (1953). Embracing fife in this way, one can appreciate that words gain their 
meaning not through their capacity to picture reality, but through their use in social 
interchange. It is thus by virtue of their use that words gain their meaning rather than the 
other way round. From this 'language games' approach, stories about oneself can only gain 
utility if they can be achieved within the confines of a particular 'game'. Utility is therefore 
idenfiflable only in terms of the relative success of turns of talk as 'moves' within these 
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arenas - in terms of their adequacy as reactions to previous moves or as instigators of what 
follows. (Gergen & Kaye, 1992: 177-8). Because of this, the usefulness of a 'new 
narrative', a new set of descriptive practices, can only be measured by its applicability by 
the client to a variety of situations in life outside of the therapeutic relationship. 
According to this approach, it is the singularity of a narrative which restricts its 
functionality, and therefore a narrative multiplicity is vastly preferable. Using this approach 
it is suggested that the therapist should invite the client to explore a range of 
understandings of the self without committing to any single one. The justification for 
approach is that from the postmodem viewpoint it is the relationship that takes priority over 
the individual self, that the self is only realized through its relatedness. As Gergen & Kaye 
put it, "it is not independent selves who come together to form a relationship, but particular 
forms of relationship that engender what we take to be the individual's identity" (ibid 
p180). 
Gergen & Kaye reject both the notion of the individual self, and the use of narrative 
reconstruction as the replacement of one narrative by another. They suggest some ways that 
clients may be encouraged to see things from other people's perspectives or to imagine 
different ways of being, so that they may, "transcend the restraints imposed by their 
erstwhile reliance on a determinate set of meanings" (ibid: 183). Personally, I welcome to 
some extent the escape from a singular determinant narrative that postmodernism offers, 
both in the 'dysfimctional' one presented by the client, and the superseding one of the 
therapist, and am glad to embrace the logic of adopting alternative viewpoints from other 
sources; however, I still believe that without some form of plumb-line against which to 
measure human activity in all its diversity, an inevitable collapse of any concept of 'right' 
and 'wrong' will ensue. 
Using Discursive Psychology to Analyse Therapy 
Before I address the theories and issues pertinent to this investigation I will begin with a 
general overview of the Idnds of research that inspired the analytical approach that I have 
taken. It is fundamental to the thesis in terms of the mode of analysis that we start by 
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reviewing the kind of work that has already been carried out by discursive psychologists, 
and in fact how DP as a discipline co-exists alongside other approaches within psychology. 
Beyond the situatedness of DP itself within the whole field of psychology, is its place 
within the social sciences in a broader sense, particularly in relation to the arena of 
conversation analysis whose inception was amongst sociologists. There is a particular body 
of work which has been conducted by conversation analysts, discursive psychologists and 
other theoretically fraternally related researchers who share an interest in those institutional 
hybrids of everyday interactions (see Boden & Zimmerman, 1991; Drew & Heritage 1992; 
Edwards 1997). These institutionally situated research projects, be they in doctor's 
surgeries, political speeches and interviews, telephone help lines, courts of law or 
wherever, are obviously important in relation to this project. 
Whilst my primary interest is in the engineering processes of everyday mundane 
conversation, and how these microcosms of life are built together to create the fabric of 
society, I have a set of data which was collected from a particular institutional context that 
being the child and adolescent mental health clinic. This was by no means an accident, nor 
was it in any way just because it was an easy option, or a convenient data source. Indeed, 
my choice of this setting as a place of inquiry was a deliberate choice influenced by the 
merits that it has to offer. It must of course be remembered that the people who go there are 
functioning members of society in other social roles and capacities for the other 167 hours 
of the week that they are not 'in therapy', and as such conduct their affairs and their 
conversations with one another in more-or-less the same way as everyone else. So, what 
they bring to their hour of 'therapy talk' is by-and-large a set of practices for 
communication that they would routinely use in every other setting. However, this is 
different. Therapy has a particular task to perform, one which all the participants have 
entered into with some degree of understanding of what their own role in it ought to be. So, 
whilst on one hand we could say that people are people wherever they are, on the other 
hand the situation does have an impact on the kind of business that is conducted. 
The primary purpose for there being such a thing as therapy is to address some problem 
with an individual, using the tool of conversation, with a view to making them 'better'. In 
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addition to this grossly simplified caricature of the activity of therapy, we have in our case 
the added ingredient that this is family therapy. Family therapy has at the heart of it a social 
model which believes that there are more than intrinsic, personal reasons for an 
individual's behaviour, but that there is an aspect of the social environment in which that 
individual lives (be it simply at the local level of close family relationships, or the wider 
influence of the society and culture in which that individual has been brought up) which in 
some way is also partly responsible. So, when a family come to their sessions, everyone 
knows who the 'client' is, who the individual with the problem is. The rest of the group are 
there because of their relationship to this individual. However, with the least bit of 
knowledge about why they are at family therapy rather than just sending the individual for 
therapy, there is always the specter of blame which may now be shared among them. And 
who is it that has the authority to decide where any such blame should be distributed? Tle 
therapist. The expert. The professional. 
So, right from the outset there appears to be an asymmetry between the client and his 
family, and the professional therapist. There are those who have come for help, and the one 
who has the job of giving that help. Let us start right here then, by looking at the issue of 
asymmetry, and in particular how talk may differ (or be the same) in an institutional 
setting, from mundane conversation. 
Asymmetry and Institutional Talk 
Much research in the social sciences has conducted to investigate the nature and effects of 
asymmetric relationships. These studies are wide ranging in their subject matter, 
participants and locations, but share a fascination with the idea that some people appear to 
have more power over others, be that due to education, status, age or whatever. 
Historically, the category 'power' has been a discrete area for study, particularly within 
sociology. However, another way of looking at the concept of power is to think of it not as 
something that is 'owned' by certain members of society due to extrinsic factors such as 
wealth or status or position, but as something which is a flexible resource, something that 
anyone can 'draw upon' or make relevant in whatever context they find themselves. As 
such, it would be the consequence and accomplishment of that situated interactional event, 
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and not merely a predetermined entity. According to this view, 'power' can only rightly be 
regarded as a collaboratively achieved phenomenon. With this in mind, Silverman 
(1998: 59) advises that researchers should avoid the temptation to start an investigation by 
having an a priori notion that 'power' is a category that can be picked up and used during 
the analysis. Instead, it is better to proceed inductively, and to 'discover' where, if at all, 
participants themselves make such a category relevant. In practice this would amount to a 
sequential analysis of transcribed talk, whereby power or asymmetry may emerge as issues 
which the participants themselves orient to as relevant to their current interaction. 
The issues of power and asymmetry are closely bound up in the research with analysis of 
talk in institutional settings, although the difference between what counts as 'institutional 
talk' and what counts as 'mundane talk' needs some teasing out, and yet perhaps no 
amount of 'teasing' will fully resolve the issue. According to Sacks, Schegloff & Jefferson, 
4conversation' "occupies a central position among the speech exchange systems" 
(1974: 701). In line with this school of thought John Heritage claims that in order to fully 
understand the asymmetries in institutional discourse, we first need a detailed knowledge of 
the workings of mundane conversation (1894: 240). Hutchby and Wooffitt define mundane 
conversation as a "technical category in which the order, size and type of turns are free to 
vary" (1998: 148). By contrast in institutional forms of talk, there tends to be a significant 
narrowing and re-specification of the range of options that are operative in conversational 
interaction. The institutional discourse can thus be recognised by a range of particular 
speech exchange systems. These are not dissimilar from ordinary conversational forms of 
speech, but are tailored specifically for the business in hand, usually at the expense of some 
of that 'freedom' that is characteristic of mundane talk. An appreciation of limitations on 
free access to size and types of turns is ftindamental to understanding how power and 
asymmetry become interactional achievements in situated talk. Another way of 
categorizing talk in terms of the relative freedom that participants have in their access to 
turn types is by distinguishing formal forms of talk from informal. According to Atkinson, 
"roughly speaking, it appears that the more that people are permitted to say what they want 
to say, the less formal (and less intimidating) will the procedures be declared to be, and 
vice versa" (1992: 211). This definition, however, is one that discursive psychologists 
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would find difficult to accept, as it relies too heavily assuming what participants intentions 
may be. I prefer to use for the moment, the conversation analysts' definition in which the 
order, size and type of turns can be used as a technical indicator. So, what are the factors 
which constrain the size and shape of turns available to participants? One factor may be the 
role of the speaker. 
All talk is produced for the occasion of its use, which includes not only the setting or 
situation, but also the person or persons with whom we are conversing (or who may be 
'listening in'). However, talk is not only situated within, and sensitive to, the particular 
setting in which it is conducted, but also by the particular roles that participants take on in 
those settings. In effect, recipient design takes into account contextual features such as the 
task to be accomplished and features of how participants' roles may normatively interact in 
that situation. The conversational effect of these 'external' features as Drew and Heritage 
point out, is that there seems to be a "direct relationship between status and role, on the one 
hand, and discursive rights and obligations, on the other" (1992: 49). 
In his research on talk radio, Hutchby examines some of the effects of participant roles, 
pointing out that whilst some participants are not excluded from certain types of turns, they 
may be constrained by restrictions to the accessibility of certain communicative action 
resources by features of the setting, and of their social identities. So, power is not so much 
an intrinsic quality of an individual, but rather a function of, "Merential distributions of 
discursive resources" (Hutchby, 1996: 484). With this in mind, one of the benefits of taking 
a conversation analytic approach to the notion of 'power' is that it becomes possible to 
examine the effects that social roles and social identities can have in constraining those 
types of turns that participants have access to. 
One problem with confining issues of power and asymmetry to discussions of institutional 
discourse, is that sin-fflar issues in mundane, or 'ordinary' talk tend to be overlooked. It is 
often assumed that mundane conversation is free from a so-called 'imbalance of power'. 
Nevertheless, this does not appear to be empirically defensible. For example, the adult 
child relationship is one which is predominantly portrayed as prototypically asymmetrical 
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(see Aronsson & Evaldson, 1993). Taking a stereotypical view of most adult/child 
interactions for a moment, there is an assumption that even in the most mundane of 
situations, the adult has greater 'power' than the child. Yet Sacks develops a scenario 
whereby a child reverses this presupposed power imbalance by asking various adults the 
same question until they get the answer they want. Then, on returning to the original adult 
with the favoured response, the child assumes a more 'powerful' position, having gained 
additional adult support for their request. (Silverman 1998: 19 / Sacks LCI: 77). 
Whilst at first this example may appear to be anomalous in terms of our general perception 
of adult/child power relationships, in fact it is in many ways no different. The newfound 
power that the child acquires by gaining the desired response is only borrowed from that 
adult who supports their request. The only way that the child gets power in this scenario is 
by association with an adult, rather than of themselves. Whichever way one looks at this 
exwnple, it appears that there is still some kind of intrinsic authority tied up in the role of 
adult, compared with that of a child; an intrinsic authority which may be borrowed by a 
child in effect by association, but not one which is pennanent. 
I believe that this approach to power in asymmetric relationships as some kind of currency 
is distracting. I propose that it is far more fluid than that. Hutchby & Wooffitt (1998), 
suggest that even in mundane conversation, there can be asymmetry. The example that they 
give is that if one person asking another for their advice, in which case the person asked is 
immediately placed in the position of 'holder of knowledge' and thus in many respects is 
granted a more 'powerful' position at least for that part of the interaction. Indeed, Sacks 
also maintained that the process of arguing about opinions is in itself a basically 
asymmetrical activity, in whatever context it occurs. (Hutchby & Wooffitt 1998: 167 / 
Sacks 1992, V2,348-53). In his work on 'technical competition', Sacks (1992, ibid), 
discusses the matter of topic introduction in mundane conversations. The asymmetry found 
in these settings is a function of whose topic is taken up by the other interactants. In other 
words, where a topic is introduced, do the other participants in the interaction 'take up' that 
topic, and 'talk to it' or do they develop another sequence about something else? 
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If we consider this idea of 'holder of knowledge' for a little longer, and revisit the 
discussion about adult/child relationships, we can now imagine a different kind of scenario 
whereby. a child may hold intrinsic rather than borrowed power. In the previous example 
the child only had power by association with an adult, however if we consider power in 
terms of knowledge, then a child may indeed hold intrinsic power. Take for example a 
classic scenario where a parent will ask their child how to operate a DVD player or to run a 
particular computer program. In this environment power is not a quality that either 
individual always has in relation to the other by virtue of their social roles, but rather it is a 
factor of the particulars of the interaction that they are engaged in, and the particular 
subject about which one has more knowledge than the other. So, degrees of power and 
social role do not necessarily go hand in hand. There are clearly issues relating to personal 
knowledge that also impinge on any mundane interaction. The question remains however, 
as to how far personal knowledge affects institutional settings that are far more rigidly 
structured in terms of social roles. 
According to Sacks, Schegloff & Jefferson, ordinary conversation "obviously occupies a 
central position among the speech exchange systems" (1974: 701). By 'other speech 
exchange systems', they refer to meetings, interviews, debates and ceremonies as examples 
(ibid). The problem with making distinctions between institutional and mundane 
conversation, is that they can begin to be seen as two completely different ways of talking. 
As Maynard points out in his analysis of doctor-patient interaction, much of what goes on 
in clinical settings "involves sequences of talk that have their home in ordinary 
conversation" (Maynard, 1991: 449). One could say therefore, that parts of a doctor-patient 
interaction for example are institutional, focused on the business in hand and following a 
particular form of speech exchange system, whereas other parts of the interaction such as 
greetings and closings should be viewed as peripheral and consisting of a 'mundane' style 
of speech exchange system. By dividing up the interaction in this way the institutional part 
of the whole interaction can be isolated from the peripheral chit-chat. 
This kind of approach denies the fact that if there wasn't the so-called-chit-chat in opening 
and closing the interaction, the interaction would not be what it is. My suggestion is that 
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those parts which are deemed to be less institutional in form are actually just as institutional 
as the rest. A doctor may smile warmly and invite the patient to take a seat, perhaps making 
general comments about the weather or some other nothingness. However, on seeing the 
same person in the street the next day, those two people may not even greet one another; 
they have no other basis for relationship than in the context of the surgery. The openings 
and closings, and perhaps other aspects of the consultation may appear to take a different 
form than the rest, and yet they are just as much part of the business as the asking of 
questions, recording information and making diagnosis. The interaction needs those bits as 
much as the others to work. Therefore they have to remain analytically integral to it; and 
not be separated out as peripheral concerns. In criticism of Paul ten Have's work (1991) in 
particular, on what he refers to as microanalytic research on institutional asymmetry, Doug 
Maynard's claims that by concentrating too much on the way that participants 'do the 
institution', some analysts have neglected to look at how they 'do the interaction' 
(1991: 458). He argues that, "even in clinical or other institutional discourses, there is an 
interactional order whose operation is relatively independent of the social surround" (ibid, 
1991: 457). As Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson explain, there has been much emphasis on 
e outcomes" in social sciences research, "but not the organization and operation of the 
system that allowed or produced such an outcome" (1974: 698). Inevitably all research on 
actual conversation will be 'situated', that is, "it always comes out of, and is part of, some 
real sets of circumstances of its participants" (ibid: 699). Nevertheless, there is an intrinsic 
interactional order that is common whatever the setting. It is the investigation of aspects of 
tWs ftmdamental interactional order that is the central interest of this thesis, with a 
secondary regard to its clinical situatededness. 
Another way of looking at the issue of institutional versus mundane conversation might be 
that by assuming a symmetrical model in ordinary conversation and a massively 
asymmetrical model in medical discourse, other characteristic features of ordinary 
conversation which also get done in the course of medical consultations are lost. Instead, 
maybe we should consider these kinds of interactions as a whole in terms of their 
situatedness despite what appear to be the different forms of speech exchange system (SES) 
within the interaction as a whole; embracing what we had thought of as parallel 'types' of 
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SES, and accepting them as unitary. By this I am suggesting that we could imagine such a 
thing as a doctor/patient speech exchange system for example, which has within it both 
mundane and institutional facets. But let us return now to our discussion of asymmetry, and 
consider in a little more detail the idea that we started to unfold, that being the notion that 
asymmetry may not be fixed to roles, but may be more fluid than that, relating more to 
access to knowledge about the topic at hand than to intrinsic qualities of the speaker. 
Knowledge and Power 
Access to knowledge, and the notion of differing knowledge states has been an important 
issue in the study of asymmetrical relationships in talk. Like those conversation analysts 
that we have already mentioned, Paul Drew argues that asymmetries are the result of 
certain communicational. moves through which access to equal participation in talk may be 
hindered for one or other of the speakers (Drew, 1991). One of the ways that this happens 
is by one participant being regarded as 'expere relative to the other. In institutional settings 
it is access to specialised technical knowledge in relation to members of the public or lay 
clients that warrants this attribution. A classic example of this is of doctor-patient 
interactions, whereby clinicians and patients will have different ways of assessing and 
describing problems. For example, the patient will have a greater background or personal 
knowledge of their own symptoms, but the doctor has technical, medical knowledge with 
which to make diagnosis and prescribe treatment (Aronsson & Rundstrom, 1988). 
The issue of validity of different forms of knowledge is subject to debate, and not just as a 
theoretical point. Indeed there is an acutely political edge to much of the work on power 
imbalances in everyday life. For example, Starr claims that it is a matter of 'cultural 
authority' that gives those in the medical profession the power to judge the needs of a 
client resulting in what he refers to as a "medical reality" (1982: 13). It is not a new idea 
that those who have more 'power', by virtue of expert knowledge in some area are in a 
stronger position to say what constitutes reality. The result of a society which upholds 
scientific knowledge above all other types of knowledge, is that medical personnel may be 
seen as 'gatekeepers" over therapy, surgery, prescriptions etc (Friedson, 1970: 116), and 
thus a patient is likely to simply acquiesce to the doctor's perspective and advise because of 
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their position. The discussion of the polifical underpinning of this view is extensive, and 
not something that I wish to discuss at this point, save to say that in the context of the 
current discussion about 'knowledge', there are important implications within a society that 
deffies scientific knowledge above all others. 
Another way of looking at the differences between types of knowledge that participants 
bring with them to the therapeutic interaction in particular, according to Buttny (1990), is 
that the therapist has 'specialist knowledge' and the clients have 'commonsense 
knowledge' about how to solve their problems. However, not only is this asymmetry a 
function of access to knowledge, but states of knowledge are also attributed to role 
identities by others. In effect, there are certain category-bound assumptions about 
knowledge states and access to knowledge that affect the way participants orient to one 
another in their conversations. These assumptions are sometimes referred to as 'knowledge 
schemas', which are "participants expectations about people, objects, events and settings in 
the world, as distinguished from alignments being negotiated in a particular setting" 
(Tannen & Wallat, 1987: 207). 
To take a rather different example, in Watson's (1990) work on police interrogations and 
murder confessions, the credibility of a suspect's confession is based on first hand 
experience or personal knowledge. Therefore, the status of the type of knowledge 
possessed, and how that is produced in talk is very much part of how 'power positions' are 
created and debated. It could be argued that it is by virtue of these exogenous factors that 
participants do not share the same knowledge, and because decisions are made on the basis 
of such knowledge, some participants may be placed at a disadvantage. In ordinary 
conversation, knowledge asymmetries are not necessarily associated with one knowing 
something that the other doesiYt, but that whether one is put at a disadvantage by the other 
is an interactional accomplishment. 
To understand what is meant by 'interactional accomplishment', a good example to use is 
that of 'caller' and 'called' in a telephone conversation. With regard to these identities, 
neither the person who has called, nor the person who has been called may make those 
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categories relevant during their conversation, but those categories are nevertheless still 
available to be drawn upon at any time and made relevant for particular local interactional 
purposes by the participants. One participant may 'use' that category to sustain an 
interactional asymmetry, for example by claiming, "look I called you, I didn't have to 
Therefore, asymmetries are generated in talk through occasioning the interactional 
relevance of exogenous structural categories. So, asymmetry may be regarded as a property 
of the action structures of sequences, for example, participation in the action sequence of 
an argument may be constrained by the type of knowledge that its' participants possess; but 
access to types of knowledge does not prevent participants from involvement in the 
argtunent, it only constrains parficipation. 
Another way of looking at asymmetries in talk is to examine the sequential structure of the 
turns within the talk. For example, Drew (1991) follows LineWs (1990b) observation that 
asymmetry can be seen as a 'sequential property'. A classic example of the kind of 
asymmetry created as a sequential property of the talk is that of the question/answer 
sequence. Hutchby (1996) indicates that the asking of a question places constraints on the 
discourse options available to its recipient, and whilst individual questions constrain, 
sequences of questions constrain even more. As Maynard points out, there are sequential 
features of everyday talk, such as questionlanswer sequences and the perspective-display 
series, which are also common in institutional interactions. However, the sequential 
organisation in institutional discourse "can invoke concentration and specialisation of 
sequential mechanisms" (Maynard, 1991: 4 82; Heritage 1984: 239). One way that this 
happens, is that some of the 'contingencies' surrounding the way that sequences are built 
up, such as receipt markers for example, are diminished (see Atkinson, 1992). The effect of 
this is to make the talk generally more rigid, but at the same time also more predictable. 
A feature of sequential organization that he particularly emphasises is based on 
observations made by Harvey Sacks regarding asymmetry between first and second 
positions in arguments. First position (the speaker puts forward their own view on a matter 
first) is much weaker than second position, from which the recipient is able to challenge the 
first speaker without necessarily having to put forward their own position. The intrinsic 
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strength of maintaining second position can lead to the strategic manoeuvring of opponents 
as they attempt to gain this advantage and ensure that the other is kept on the defensive. In 
Hutchby's talk radio data features of both the setting and roles of the interactants create a 
situation whereby a caller to the program will automatically be placed in the weaker first 
position in the argument sequence. 
A similar feature of talk generally, which Watson (1990) draws attention to as relevant to 
how institutional talk becomes typically an asymmetrical activity, is that of the difference 
between invited and volunteered stories. The differences would be the same whatever the 
context, but the nature of institutional settings is often that one person is likely to be 
seeking particular, relevant information from another, whether it be a doctor, attorney, 
therapist or police officer. One of the characteristics of an invited story that makes it 
distinctive, is that the materials to be addressed in its telling are provided by the requester 
of the story, whereas in a volunteered story the materials are provided by the teller. 
Therefore in the invited story, the teller is constrained as to the content of the story to tell 
by what the asker asks. As Watson states, "invited stories constitute felicitous devices for 
the maintenance of the pre-allocation of turns and tum-typee'(1990: 279). 
Cuff and Francis some years earlier, were also interested in examining the hallmarks of 
invited stories. In their 1978 paper on the features of invited stories in marriage breakdown, 
we can find some indicators of how the pre-allocation of turns that Watson reports may 
come about. According to Cuff and Francis, there is something about the acceptance of an 
invitation to tell a story which in turn also involves the story-teller in granting certain rights 
to the inviter about its telling. In effect, "the teller might be seen to be according to the 
inviter rights of 'interviewing' and hence the right to ask appropriate questions in order to 
obtain 'more story', 'more details' etc. (Cuff & Francis, 1978: 124). 
This explanation of how rights to turns and turn-types may be restricted by the invitation to 
tell a story may help us considerably in thinking about the therapy session as a whole. 
Certainly in first sessions, and often in many other sessions, therapists are prone to invite 
their clients, by use of open questions, to tell their own story of what has led them to where 
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they are now. If at the outset of a session, the therapist 'invites' such a story, then a large 
part of what follows in the client's turns could legitimately be seen as an answer to that 
invitation. More importantly, the turns taken by the therapist are now also within the remit 
afforded to them of a kind of 'interviewer' seeking clarification and detail about the story 
given. The following interjections made by the requester of the story, in whatever form, 
thus serve to keep the content of the story focused on information which the inviter 
requests. 
In this explanation, the acceptance of the invitation to tell a story is the crux of the 
exchange, whereby subsequent turns are then constrained to be of a particular Idnd; in other 
words, the ensuing turn-types have been largely pre-allocated by the preface of a story 
invitation-acceptance sequence. It is perhaps this constriction and specification of what 
kind and in what way turn-types are produced that contributes to the institutional or 
'formal' nature of these conversations. 
Much of the talk in therapy is thus organized by a participation framework which consists 
of the therapist asking questions, and the clients giving answers. As Buttny observes, "(t)he 
therapist appears to exert considerable control over tum-Wdng - eg by directing questions, 
by cutting short critical descriptions, and by drawing out underlying assumptions" (Buttny, 
1990: 241). The significance of the therapist being in the position of question asker, or 
story inviter for the majority of the session, is that she is almost constantly in 'first 
position'. The principle of the sequential effects of first position turns on second position 
turns is part of the larger issue of conditional relevance (see Schegloff & Sacks, 1973), 
which determines that the first part "leads to or constrains the subsequent action" (Buttny, 
1990: 224). Therefore, purely from a sequential point of view in the therapeutic situation, 
we can see that an asymmetry between therapist and client is created in the talk simply by 
virtue of the fact that the majority of the client's turns (predominantly second part turns) 
are constrained by their conditional relevance to the first part turns of the therapist. In 
effect, the client is thus almost always ijq the weaker position. 
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Per Linell even goes so far as to show that the distribution of these kind of first and second 
position turn types can be calculated numerically in any conversation (1990b: 156). 
Although it must be acknowledged, that he does not refer to these actions by the same 
terminology, he prefers instead to talk in terms of this type of dialogue dynamic as an 
interplay between 'initiatives' and 'responses'; the study of the balance between these two 
being what he refers to as 'IR analysis'. In essence, responses are 'context-determined', 
and initiatives are 'context-determining. According to this model, every conversational 
contribution exhibits both responses and initiatory features, and is therefore both context- 
shaped and context-renewing. This is the perspective adopted here. As Markova puts it, in 
appropriately medical guise, all utterances have both "diagnoses and prognoses built into 
their meanings" (1990: 140). The point being, that every utterance, or turn, is both subject 
to the conditional relevance invoked by the preceding turn, and will in its own right create a 
conditional relevance which will constrain the range of appropriate responses that will 
constitute the subsequent turn. Therefore, there is a strong influence over what we might 
call discursively constituted power which is determined by preferential access to 
sequentially 'superior' turn positions. 
In some cases, this preferential access may be strongly related to a particular role, such as 
that of a teacher or therapist; whereas at other times, perhaps where role allocations are not 
so prescriptive of turn-type privileges, there is a greater fluidity of discursively constituted 
power. This type of thinking is shared by Wrong, who notes that asymmetry exists in each 
individual act-response sequence. He prefers, "the actors continually alternate the roles of 
power holder and power subject in the total course of the interaction" (Wrong, 1968: 673). 
Perhaps this is where our answer to what differentiates mundane from institutional talk lies. 
Rather than defining the characteristics of institutional forms of talk just by their 
64 concentration and specialization of sequential mechanisms" (IFIeritage, 1984: 239), perhaps 
we can also identify features of differential access to, and appropriation of what we have 
referred to as 'privileged' turn-types, be they attributed or claimed by interactants. 
To summarise, asymmetries can be seen in differential knowledge states, access to 
resources, privileges to participation rights, and participant status. So it would seem that 
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asymmetry is actually a feature of the talk itself, and power a manifestation of 
advantageous participation rights that one speaker may have over another. It is not 
inherently any quality of the speaker her/himself, but a collaborative product of a particular 
sequence of talk which produces an imbalance in participant access to turn type, length and 
order. Neither is it a static phenomenon. It is not an intrinsic feature or characteristic of any 
one participant, but rather, a fluid, sequentially negotiated feature of talk which is claimed 
and attributed turn by turn. It is a negotiated outcome, which can only be 'taken' if also 
'given' (Wittgenstein, 1969). If knowledge is power, then in the same vein, as Wittgenstein 
points out "knowledge is in the end based on acknowledgement" (1969: 378). We can see 
now that 'power' is in fact a discursive achievement, affected by the differing potential that 
participants have to enable or constrain one another's actions, and an 'asymmetric 
relationship' is a construct that is located within specific instances of talk. 
In conclusion, I don't believe that the traditional distinction made by CA between mundane 
and institutional discourse, allows for a proper appreciation of the reality of asymmetries 
occurring in mundane conversation as readily as in 'institutional' conversation. I believe 
that the distinction in itself is fallacious. My reasoning is that the fundamental premise that 
mundane conversation is the foundational type of speech exchange system is inherently 
flawed. Whilst the notion seems logical at first glance, I cannot imagine a time when there 
was only mundane conversation in the world. It is a fact of life that business-focused talk at 
times takes president over relational-focused tak and always has. Although in some ways 
this is a rather unsophisticated distinction to make, I believe it is serviceable. If institutional 
talk is thought of as predominantly task or business focused, we can fit all types of what we 
think of as 'institutional' into this category. I can think of no precedence of institutional 
talk that could be described as relationally focused (ie primarily concerned with 
relationship issues between the interactants). 
So, I propose a new classification system if we ought to have one, that being 'task' v. 
'Lrelationship' rather than 'institutional' v. 'mundane'. But then, where do we place family 
therapy in such a classification system? On the one hand family is veraciously 
'relationship' focused, and yet at the same time, the family unit has been transported to the 
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alien environment of the therapist's counselling room, for a clear purpose, the task of 
sorting out an apparent difficulty. So, here, and perhaps in not many other places can we 
find that the relationship is the task. 
Finally, one of the key issues that concerns this thesis as a whole, is that of the use of 
reported speech. It is a topic that is prevalent throughout the interactions in family therapy, 
and in the data that I have collected. Because of its particular importance, I would just like 
to spend a little time looking at some of the issues surrounding the interactional use of 
reported speech in therapy. 
Voicing and Reported Speech 
Reported speech is a regular feature of the substance of conversations. As Bakhtin is so 
famously quoted as saying, 'in real life people talk most of all about what others talk about 
- they transmit, recall, weigh and pass judgement on other people's words, opinions, 
assertions, information; people are upset by others' words, or agree with them, contest 
them, refer to them and so forth' (1981: 338). These activities of 'passing judgement on', 
&contesting', or 'agreeing with' what other people have said is necessarily preceded by 
some kind of report of what was said; what is generally referred to as 'reported speech. 
This phenomenon is no less the case in the therapeutic setting, people still talk about what 
other people have said. These reports are used at times to substantiate claims about what 
another person thinks or feels; or what their attitudes are; at other times they are used to 
incriminate, argue, judge, compare or reflect. In this data, we will see that even therapists 
themselves report on what colleagues have said, or what other family members of their 
clients have claimed. One of the most common uses of reported speech by therapists is 
what is known as 'reflecting back' on what the client has previously said in the current or 
prior session. In short, reported speech is common in therapy, but the question is, what does 
it do in therapy that helps to make 'therapy' happen? As Buttny reminds us, our analytical 
goal is to "show how participants' social interaction reflects and constitutes their situated 
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context" (1998: 46). The analytic goal of much of this thesis is to look at how the specifics 
of the use of reported speech in therapy both reflects and constitutes that situation. 
Ilere are various general characteristics of reported speech, that distinguish it from other 
conversational devices; amongst these are shifts in intonation, using pronoun changes, and 
use of vocative and deixis (Holt, 1996). All of these distinguishing elements make it 
reasonably straightforward to identify instances of reported speech in the data, but doesn't 
tell us anything about what it does. My working definition of what reported speech is, is 
that it is any utterance that quotes, paraphrases, or makes specific reference to a prior 
conversational sequence or turn as constituting part of the current turn. In effect, reported 
speech is a tool for making relevant an element or elements of prior conversation in the 
current interaction. As Holt points out, "it can be used by the author to fulfil a range of 
tasks in the current interaction" (2000: 427), and to "simultaneously a report of a previous 
thought or locution and part of a new sequence used for a different purpose" (2000: 433). 
One can imagine the turns of conversation being like bricks being built into a wall - each 
fitting sequentially, one after another. The use of reported speech is like making a model of 
a brick that had been used in another part of the wall, or even another wall altogether, and 
using it in building the current one. The brick is not the original, nor is it an exact 
representation of the original. It is made to fit into the new wall, but its difference in texture 
and colour makes it stand out from the bricks around it. It is not just a more-or-less 
accurate version of the original, and may even be a complete counterfeit. The fact is, copy 
or counterfeit, it is 'passed off' in the new wall as being authentic. Even with reported 
speech that is claimed to be a verbatfin recall of a prior locution, such recall is unlikely to 
be wholly accurate, a situation that lead Tannen to refer to all reported speech as 
"constructed dialogue" (1989: 154). As Holt explains, by using reported speech "speakers 
can comment on the utterances they report while simultaneously appearing to simply 
reproduce them" (2000: 427). It is not easy to find modem analysts using 'reported speech' 
as a unitary term, as much has been made of the distinction between 'direct' and 'indirect' 
reported speech (see Coulmas 1986; Li, 1986; Bauman 1986). 
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So, what difference does this make to helping us understand reported speech in therapy? 
Well, in reported speech the speaker structures their utterance in such a way as to suggest 
that their words are simply a reproduction of what someone else has previously said. The 
primary interest here, is that in doing so the speaker makes a substantial footing shift. 
Goffman (1981) first introduced us to the notion of footing by drawing to our attention the 
previously unquestioned categories of 'speaker' and 'hearer". He dissected the speaker's 
traditionally unitary role into three parts, principal, author and animator. The implication of 
Goffman's re-specification is that these independently distinguishable roles could be 
attributed to or claimed by different people. 
The concept of footing is important because the words that a person uses are treated as 
reflections or signifiers of what he/she believes, and as such persons are held responsible 
for what they say (Leudar & Antaki, 1996: 11). Therefore, footing provides a way of saying 
the words without being held accountable for the beliefs assumed to be 'behind' the words. 
Because footing is so often bound up with issues of fact construction and accountability, a 
display of footing can be an attempt to show who should be blamed and whose version of 
the world is at stake (Edwards & Potter, 1992; Potter, 1996). In practice it seems that, 
especially where difficult or controversial topics are being discussed, by quoting the words 
of another, a speaker can distance themselves from being the 'principal' and 'author' of the 
belief, and position him/herself as merely the animator. As Potter explains, "when people 
manage footing they are often displaying their alignment with and differentiation from 
others" (1996: 38). 
Reported speech can take different forms in talk; one of the most powerful is direct 
reported speech. As Coulmas explains, 'In direct reported speech the reporter lends his 
voice to the original speaker and says (or writes) what he said, thus adopting his point of 
view, as it were. Direct speech, in a manner of speaking, is not the reporter's speech, but 
remains the reported speaker's speech whose role is played by the reporter. ' (1986: 2). 
Clarke & Gerrig argued that quotations are 'a type of demonstration' (1990: 764); that is, 
they differ from descriptions in that they depict their referents. In other words, a description 
is apparent as the speaker's own words, their own way of verbalising something. However, 
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to use a quotation as a quotation is a kind of piece of theatre, in that the speaker 'takes the 
part' of the person to whom they are referring. Similarly, Li had also previously made the 
point that 'a direct quote communicates a more authentic piece of information than an 
indirect quote in the sense that a direct quote implies greater fidelity to the source of 
information than an indirect quote' (Li, 1986: 41). The most significant aspects which 
make direct reported speech distinctive are, 'that the pronouns, special and temporal 
references, and verb tenses are all appropriate to the reported speaker/context rather than 
the current one. ' (Holt, 1996: 222). In direct reported speech, personal, spatial, and 
temporal deixis are all from the point of view of the reported speaker (cf. Banfield, 1973; 
Li, 1986). 
The Effect of Using Reported Speech in the Current Interaction 
Reporting what someone else has said is a way of 'making relevant' a particular topic, or to 
provide a context for what is happening in a current interaction (Buttny, 1998). It is 
"simultaneously a report of a previous thought or locution and part of a new sequence used 
for a different purpose" (Holt, 2000: 433 emphasis added). This brings us back to our 
illustration of building a wall using copies of bricks from other places in parts of its 
construction. Clearly this is not a neutral activity, the very fact that particular parts or 
elements or prior sequences are chosen to be reported over others is in itself an act of 
discrimination. 
As Buttny & Williams claim, reported speech is reproduced for "the reporting speaker's 
own purposes" (2000: 112). In other words, there is an element of agentic choice made by 
the speaker in which 'bits' of prior conversations they choose to introduce into the current 
interaction. This is the crux of understanding the function of reported speech in any given 
occurrence. Of course in all conversation there is an element of choice in that there are 
potentially millions of alternative things that could be said at any one time. 
In the case of reported speech this aspect of choice is heightened by being relevant to a 
former conversation and its constituent parts. This leads us to reflect upon the question of 
why certain parts are reproduced rather than others. One principle which seems to apply 
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with both 'live' and reported speech, is that the speaker should avoid telling their hearer 
things that they already know, or in other words, things that are not 'newsworthy'. For 
example, a person would not generally describe every detail of how they got dressed and 
brushed their teeth, nor what they had for breakfast etc. unless there is some clearly 
interesting 'point' in doing so. In effect there ought to be something 'tellable' in what you 
are saying. So, when we start to think about how reported speech may be reproduced 'for 
the reporting speakers own purposes', we can start to think about both what is tellable in 
the segment of talk that the speaker has chosen to reproduce, and what the purpose of its 
tefling is. 
One of the uses of making a footing shift by using reported speech is that a speaker can 
present someone else's words without necessarily making an evaluation. The speaker can 
present the prior utterance in an assumed role as 'mere animator' and leave the evaluative 
implication to be made by the hearer. This enables the speaker to lend an 'air of objectivity' 
to the account. In fact "Summarizing or glossing what was said would not make such a 
clear distinction between the reported speaker's point of view as displayed in his or her talk 
and the current speaker's attitude toward the utterances being discussed" (Holt, 1996: 230). 
Reported speech inevitably says something about both the current and the reported speaker. 
Buttny claims that where reported speech is used (for example in narratives), not only must 
what was said be reported, but also some context for the reported speech to indicate also 
'what actions were done'. 
As Sacks pointed out, one of the reasons for providing such 'contextual framing!, is to 
provide the listener with information about "how to read what they are being told" (1992: 
274). Obviously, the reporting of someone else's words, even if done via direct reported 
speech is still a way of producing a version which is designed for the current interaction. 
The choice of what is reported out of all the other things that person has said is one factor, 
and prosody is obviously another key factor. It should be borne in mind that direct reported 
speech is not a more-or-less accurate way of communicating someone else's words, like 
cognitive work on human memory might suggest but is a designed and performative 
interactional device. Prosody can easily be altered or emphasized dfferently in reporting, 
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and the words themselves, embellished or altered for effect. The point is that reported 
speech is not the speakers 'best effort' to accurately represent what happened on a prior 
occasion, but an interactional action unique to the current interactional setting. In general 
terms, the usefulness of reported speech in conversation, is that it is an economical device 
which can be used to explicitly and implicitly convey various elements of news delivery at 
once. It both performs tasks in the current conversation, as well as portraying a previous 
one. 
In closing, the purpose of this chapter has been to outline some of the particular issues 
within previous research that are pertinent to my own investigation. I have outlined some of 
the most relevant theoretical approaches and issues that have the most direct bearing on my 
own work, namely therapy and postmodernism, asymmetry, and voicing. The following 
four analytical chapters draw on this theoretical underpinning in the areas that they each 
address in particular. Chapter 4 'Inability accounts', and chapter 5 'You Said, and Chapter 
7 'What d'you think? ' all use the foundational work on reported speech and voicing as a 
starting point for their analytic content. The issue of asymmetry comes to the fore 
particularly in Chapter 6 'Versions' as well as in the other 3 chapters just mentioned. The 
coverage of therapy and postmodernism in this chapter acts as a backdrop to the whole 
thesis. 
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CHAPTER 3 
IýETHODS 
Conversation Analysis, Discourse Analysis and ethnomethodology share a theoretical and 
analytical concern with the centrality of talk in social life. They do not treat talk as a 
window onto other sorts of phenomena such as attitudes, knowledge, motives or identity, 
but analyse talk as a social action in its own right. As such, talk constitutes, rather than 
reflects what it describes. Ethnomethodology is the study of people's common sense 
methods for understanding and living their lives. It emphasizes the central role of discourse 
in how people construct and orient to aspects of social life such as roles and rules. 
Conversation Analysis is basically an ethnomethodological enterprise, concerned with how 
the orderliness of social interaction is achieved in talk. In particular, it deals with the detail 
of singular actions such as an account, a refusal or a blaming for example. This involves a 
concern with the sequential organization of talk, which encompasses far more than just the 
mechanical analysis of turn taking; notions such as occasioning and conditional relevance 
are reflective of a central concern for analysts with the essentially rhetorical and 
constructive nature of discourse. "The policy is to treat anything that occurs an talk-in- 
interaction as possibly orderly - to dismiss no detail a priori as disorderly, trivial, or 
irrelevant' ' (Hutchby &Drew, 1995: 186). 
Discourse Analysis focuses largely on the deconstruction and reformulation of a variety of 
social and psychological issues such as attitudes, attribution, causality, knowledge and 
identity to name a few. It is this approach to hitherto unchallenged areas and approaches to 
psychology which is known as discursive psychology. Discursive Psychology is the 
application of discourse analytic principles to psychological topics. In cognitive 
psychology for example, the content of discourse is considered to be a reflection (albeit 
often distorted, incomplete or imperfect) of how the world is perceived to be. DP however 
begins with talk not as an outcome of cognitive processes but as a domain of action. In DP, 
it is the business of talk that defines the nature of the world which it describes, including 
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the mental states, perceptions, motivations, dispositions and thoughts of individuals 
concerned. Both 'reality' and 'mind' are constructed by speakers through their talk. 
Discourse is situated in two ways; it is both occasioned and rhetorical. By 'occasioned' we 
mean that talk is oriented to but not determined by its sequential position. What is meant by 
the use of the term rhetorical is that claims and descriptions are often designed to counter 
potential alternative versions, and to resist attempts to disqualify them as false, partial or 
interested. This means that evaluative discourse is shaped not merely by how people 
generally think about things, but by the contingencies of argument and the alternatives in 
play at the time that an evaluation is produced. 
Not only is discourse situated, it is also action-oriented. Discourse performs actions of 
various kinds, such as agreements, invitations, blaming, accounts and so on. Using attitudes 
as an example, rather than treating such a thing as an inner self-existent entity, discursive 
psychology focuses on the practical realm where evaluations are part of 'getting things 
done', and as such reformulates the concept as a situated action. The essence of DP is to 
study how versions are assembled and stabilised as factual and independent of their 
producer, in other words, how such construction of facticity happens as a discourse 
activity. So, rather than facts existing prior to descriptive practices, discursive psychology 
seeks to invert this assumption by arguing that action is primary, and reality and cognition 
are secondary. In practice, discursive psychologists focus on analysis of what actions 
speakers are achieving in the course of their discourse, and how they produce versions of 
external reality and of psychological states. In ethnomethodological terms, mind and reality 
are the topic of DP rather than its resource. 
The data used by discursive psychologists is usually 'naturally occurring'. By this, what is 
meant is that the materials that are analysed are ones that occurred or would have occurred 
anyway, for some reason other than as a product of the research itself. The preference for 
these materials is based on the idea that talk performs social actions. Therefore if a 
recording of an interview where to be used, the analytic interest would be on how the 
interview is performed as a social action, rather than simply trying to ignore the 
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situatedness of the responses and extract them for analysis separately. Audio recordings are 
usually transcribed according to the conventions used in conversation analysis. 
Psychology and the Research Question 
According to introductory texts to psychology, the job of the psychologist is to "explain 
what humans do and why they do it"(eg Woods, 2000: 1). In an amusing anecdote about a 
psychologist meeting someone for the first time at a dinner party, Gross identifies a typical 
response that we are all probably fwnihar with. After answering a question along the lines 
of 'and what do you do for a living? ' a common reaction is something like 'oh, I'd better be 
careful what I say from now on' (Gross 1987: 1). This response is predictably the case when 
you say you're a conversation or discourse analyst. Gross suggests that a common 
misconception of the 'uninitiated' is that the psychologist is some kind of mind-reader. It is 
interesting however that these would-be new friends are quickly put on their guard about 
what they say. There is a common-sense notion already prevalent that what we say is 
reflective of how we think, indeed of who we are. 
Although there may be some debate even amongst psychologists themselves about what 
psychology is, the fundamental root can be identified in the word itself The word 
psychology is derived from two Greek words, psyche (mind, soul or spirit) and logos 
(discourse or study), which, when put together give us a semantic definition, 'the study of 
the mind'. Whilst the Greek word 'logos' is used in this sense to mean 'study', its more 
common translation is word - i. e. meaningful utterance, statement, declaration, discourse, 
or reason. As a term of psychology it was used by the Stoa to signify the divine power of 
function by which the universe is given unity, coherence and meaning (logos spermatikos - 
seminal word, which, like seed, gives form to unformed matter). Mankind himself is also 
said to possess logos, both inwardly (logos endiathethos - reason) and expressed in speech 
(logos prophorikos). Where the word logos has been translated into Hebrew it becomes 
dabar, the root of which signifies 'to lie behind'. This translation accords with a common 
feature of Hebrew psychology, that a man's 'dabar' is in some sense both an extension of 
his personality, and possessing a substantive existence of its own (Douglas et al, 1987: 703). 
According to this deflinition logos as word can exist inwardly in the form of reason, and be 
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expressed outwardly on the form of speech. Thus, the 'word' can exist in both realms, 
either as something that is thought, or as something that is thought and subsequently 
verbalised. 
For the most part it appears that this is the commonsense understanding that people work 
with in their everyday interactions. However, the relationship between thought and 
language is something that has been the focus of considerable attention, most notably 
Vygotsky, the nineteenth century Russian student of literature, aesthetics and philosophy 
turned psychologist. He stated that "experience teaches us that thought does not express 
itself in words, but rather realises itself in them7' (Vygotsky, 2002: 251 emphasis added). 
Vygotsky constantly refers to the 'verbal thought', indicating the interdependent 
complexity of the relationship between the two, the word and the thought not existing as 
separate entities, but finding their meaning in being inextricably connected. His final 
-word' on the matter is that, 
"consciousness is reflected in the word as the sun in a drop 
of water. A word relates to consciousness as a living cell 
relates to a whole organism, as an atom relates to the universe. 
A word is a microcosm of human consciousness" (Vygotsky, 2002: 256). 
The revolution that Vygotsy precipitated in relation to how we, as psychologists, 
understand and make sense of the relationship between thought and language, is reflected 
by discursive psychologists such as Edwards, who concedes that this approach "creates the 
possibility of a much more thoroughly social and cultural conception of mind" (1997: 44). 
But what has all this to do with method? Well, the answer is simply that we cannot divorce 
method from its theoretical underpinnings; and in the case of DP, the method of 
investigation is hugely influenced by the philosophy behind the science. 
The method of inquiry that I use has not been selected as the most appropriate way of 
answering the research question, from a range of possible alternatives. Rather, it is 
necessitated by the values and theoretical convictions that are the foundations on which DP 
is built. The research question is not therefore something that we 'come up with' and try to 
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answer by thorough scientific procedures, but rather by looking at something that happens 
we seek to find out how it happens. All social research ultimately derives its vision from 
some theory and set of related concepts about how social reality works. For the 
conversation analyst Sacks, we start to 'see' the mechanisms of social fife by focusing 
relentlessly on what people do and analysing how they do it. The method of investigation 
closely follows the theory that underpins it, so that in DP just as in Sack's conversation 
analysis, we, as scientists and researchers proceed with our investigations in an inductive 
manner. As Sacks puts it bluntly, we "make a bunch of observations and see where they 
will go" (1984: 27). So, observation comes first rather than the research question. We 'find 
out' what is going on in any given social interaction by looking and looking and looking, 
until finally we begin to see. 
Ethnogaphy 
One of the first influences on discursive psychology is ethnomethodology. Rather than 
emphasising a scientific testing position, the ethno-researcher takes a position as learner. 
Tle ethnologist 'watches and wonders', as Agar portrays, 
"When you stand on the edge of a village and watch the noise and motion, 
you wonder, "who are the people and what are they doing? ' when you read 
a news story about the discontent of young lawyers with their profession, 
you wonder, 'whaes going on here? ' Hypotheses, measurement samples, 
and instruments are the wrong guidelines. Instead, you need to learn about 
the world you understand by encountering it firsthand and making sense of it" 
(1986.12) 
So, perhaps we ethnographers could be called the ultimate 'people watchers'. But 
ettmography is not just about watching, not just about observation. 'Ethnography' as a term 
is a composite of two words, 'ethno' meaning 'folk' or 'ordinary, and 'graph' which 
derives from 'writing'. Ethnography thus refers to the "social scientific writing about 
particular folks" (Silverman, 2001: 45). Ethnomethodology, on the other hand, is the study 
of ordinary people's methods, or mundane practices. In other words, the common sense 
methods that we aH use to make sense of our everyday experiences (Garfinkel, 1967). It is 
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this aspect of research which involves 'making sense' that Agar and Garfiinkel refer to, that 
is at the heart of ethnomethodology. However, the crucial issue when discussing 'sense- 
making' is that it is not that 1, as a researcher use my own terms of reference to impose a 
structure on what I see; it is not that I interpret what I see other people doing according to 
my own sense-making ability. Rather, the essence of ethnomethodology is that we as 
researchers employ the participants' own sense making practices. As Goffinan explains, 
"the student of society can therefore use for his purposes the same models that members of 
society use for theirs" (1961: 283 emphasis added). In other words, we use the same models 
or methods for interpreting social action as researchers that the people we study use 
themselves. Ethnomethodological study is about seeking "to describe methods persons use 
in doing social fife" (Sacks, 1984: 21). The ethnographer seeks to identify the methods that 
people themselves use, and to put those methods into words, to describe that world of 
social order. As Maynard succinctly puts it, "The ethnographer, in general, is in the 
business of describing culture from the members' point of view" (1989: 130). 
Conversation Analysis (CA) 
In discussing ethnography, I have already made reference to conversation analysis, and to 
its founder, Harvey Sacks. Both ethnomethodology and conversation analysis are crucial 
components of what has become known as discursive psychology. Although their roots are 
within the social sciences, they evolved more through sociology than psychology, and yet 
the basic tenets of analysis remain compatible. A primary characteristic of conversation is 
that it is fiffly interactive. Its participants take turns to talk, making it a fundamentally 
sequential activity. Conversation analysis, to the linguist, could be thought of as a kind of 
pragniatics. Pragmatics is the study of actual language used in specific situations (in 
contrast to other forms of linguistics which rely on 'invented' sentences and aRe). The 
reason that CA is pragmatic is that it differs from other approaches to the study of language 
in that it focuses on how speakers design their talk to convey particular social actions 
(Nofsinger, 1991: 5). For example, let me take Tennyson. In a conversation with his friend 
Argyle he is reported to have said, 
Tennyson: People say you are writing your autobiography. 
Carlyle: Do they? Do they want to make away with myself that they talk like that? 
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Tennyson: Why don't you try your hand at a great novel? You have seen life enough. 
Carlyle: No, no. I write a novel! I know nothing of human character. (Roberts, 2000.546) 
We could analyse this in many ways, but as a conversation analyst, we would look at what 
is said in the first turn not just as a grammatically complete sentence or even as simply a 
statement, but to look for what social action it is performing. Could Tennyson be fishing 
for more information? Could what appears to be 'just' a question in his next turn in fact be 
a suggestion, or an attempt at persuasion? We can see clearly that in real-life interpersonal 
conversations, far more is going on than we can find just by literary appreciation. 
Hutchby & Wooffitt define conversation analysis as "the systematic analysis of the talk 
produced in everyday situations of human interaction" (1998b: 13). The central assumption 
of CA is that ordinary talk is a highly organised, ordered phenomenon. It starts by 
considering that the way things are said is not accidental, but are "designed in their detail to 
be sensitive to their sequential context and to their role in the interaction" (Potter, 1996: 58). 
Conversation analysis adopts the concepts of indexicality and reflexivity first used by 
ethnomethodologists. Indexicality is the idea that the meaning of a word or utterance is 
dependent on its context of use. In conversation analysis, indexicality is manifested in a 
concern with how utterances relate to the conversational sequences to which they belong. 
Reflexivity refers to the fact that descriptions are not just about something, but also do 
something. In other words, descriptions are constructive, not just representative of the 
world (Garfinkel, 1967; Wieder, 1974). In conversation analysis, reflexivity emerges in the 
close attention paid to various kinds of interactional work that utterances and whole 
sequences accomplish (Potter, 1996). So, if for example we are looking at a transcript of 
conversation, we need to transform our view of 'what happened' "from a matter of a 
particular interaction done by particular people, to a matter of interactions as products of 
machinet3P (Sacks, 1984: 26, emphasis added). It is the discovery of this 'machinery' that 
constitutes what CA is intrinsically all about; the 'how' of conversation. As Hutchby and 
Wooffitt explain, the aim of CA is to "reveal the tacit, organised reasoning procedures 
which inform the production of naturally occurring talW' (1998: 1). 
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The recurring themes that we are seeing come through again and again in our investigation 
of what CA is all about are 'organisation', 'machinery', 'procedures', 'sequences' and 
'orderliness'. What may appear at first in any given extract of real talk to be messy and 
disorganised, on careful inspection turns out to be incredibly ordered and predictable. 
There are certain 'rules' by which conversations ordinarily run, patterns of turns and 
responses which can be identified, and finely orchestrated turn-by-tum sequential activities. 
In short, even tiny extracts of talk can contain within them all the elemental seeds of 
conversation, and social order itself. CA is not fundamentally about discovering anomalies, 
nor so called 'big issues' in social relations, but about investigating at the lowest level, a 
pervasive orderliness and cohesion, where even previously unsuspected details turn out to 
be critical resources in seeing what is getting done in and by talk (Silverman, 1998: 187). It 
is these 'unsuspected details' that would probably be overlooked if anything other than the 
&unmotivated looking' of CA were used methodologically. 
Discursive Psychology (DP) 
Discursive psychology is an approach that draws on ethnomethodology and conversation 
analysis, as well as rhetorical and discourse analysis (Edwards & Potter, 1992). It focuses 
on the action orientation of talk, and studies in particular the relationship between so-called 
psychological states and the external world as common sense discourse practices and 
categories; the major concern being an epistemological one. Discursive psychology is 
largely concerned with the nature of knowledge, cognition and reality; focusing particularly 
on how descriptions are made, how facts are constructed and how cognitive states are 
attributed. With each of these 'key' areas, the interest is very much in how 'psychology' is 
constituted by and through talk. With these underlying interests, the discursive psychologist 
does not assume that utterances are simply reflective of inner cognitive states, but that any 
utterance should be examined as a situated activity. By this we mean that every piece of 
talk occurs in a particular sequential environment relating both to what has already been 
said prior to its production, and to the perceived future trajectory and implications of talk in 
the current interaction. It is sensitive to the context of its production and is produced for the 
particular 'occasion' of its use. 'Occasioning' in the conversation-analytic sense of the term 
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is the upshot of talk that is embedded in a sequence of interaction, be it mundane or 
institutional. 
The context of production however, is not determinative of sequence, but rather is an 
oriented to feature of talk-in-interaction. For example a question may set up the normative 
relevance of an answer, but an answer is not inevitable or necessary; an answer may in fact 
be deferred or withheld altogether. Likewise, the fact that talk is produced in the 
environment of a school classroom, does not determine its nature as pedagogic. 
Institutional activities such as 'teaching' or identities such as 'teacher' are categories which 
are not intrinsic to the place or person, but are 'made relevant' by being invoked and 
oriented to (Schegloff, 1997). So, when we think about the issue of context, as Potter 
confirms, "the crucial issue is the role of participants' orientations" (1998: 30). However, 
with so many possible contextual description available for any given situation, the question 
remains as to how a researcher is to determine which of this is analytically appropriate. The 
answer as Potter explains, is that we need to uncover what "element of the context is 
consequential" (1998: 3 1), what Schegloff refers to as 'procedural consequentiality'. 
Another feature of DP is that it is pervasively rhetorical (Billig, 1987,1991). Claims and 
descriptions offered in talk are often designed to counter potential alternative versions, and 
resist attempts to disqualify them as false, partial or interested. In evaluative discourse, this 
means that what people say is not shaped merely by how they think about things, but also 
by contingencies of argument and the possible alternatives available at the time that the 
evaluation is produced (Edwards & Potter, 2001). Analysis in discursive psychology 
therefore has to take into account the sequentially occasioned, situationally oriented and 
rhetorically designed nature of discourse. One of the key aspects of DP as with CA, is its 
action-orientation. By this we mean that talk performs particular social actions such as 
blaming, inviting, agreeing, doubting etc. Often these actions are performed via what often 
appears to be ostensibly factual, descriptive discourse. One particular kind of discourse 
activity is the construction and production of versions as stable, factual documentation, 
independent of their producer. This is what makes DP a 'constructivist approach', in that it 
does not distinguish between an external 'reality" and a description which tries to convey 
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that reality. Conversely, discursive psychology treats the activity of description and fact 
production as something that is inherently constructed and constructive. That is, that in 
creating versions reality is at the same time created in and through the vehicle of its 
creation. It is part of the project of DP to study the ways that discourse itself can and is 
used as a mode of categorising attributes which are so called 'inner states' such as 
competencies, dispositions, character, emotions, motives and mental states. However, as 
Potter cautions us, discourse and conversation analysis is not "merely a reformulation of 
participants' knowledge" but rather its job is to "emphasise the systemically emic nature of 
such work" (1998: 32). 
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CHAPTER 4 
INABELITYACCOUNTS 
In this chapter, I begin by examining various methods used by clients in therapy to explain 
or justify their behaviour. The fact of being in therapy in itself represents a mutual 
understanding (if not agreement) that the client either has personal problems which they 
cannot overcome without input from a professional source, or that their behaviour is not 
socially acceptable, and is in need of modification. The context in which accounts are 
produced therefore is one in which some sort of explanation is an a priori concern. 
Within the context of the thesis as a whole, this chapter looks at accounting practices from 
a discursive psychological point of view. By that I mean in particular that the descriptions 
of events used by the participants have actions beyond mere describing. In the case of 
inability accounts there is a weighting in the data that follows which indicates that there is 
an interplay between the desire to achieve something and the ability to accomplish it. In 
terms of accounting, the analysis that follows shows something of how claims to inability 
are used to circumvent the accountability attached to certain socially unacceptable actions. 
This chapter as a whole is concerned primarily with the use of accounts. By account, I am 
borrowing a working definition from Scott and Lyman who describe it as "a statement 
made by a social actor to explain unanticipated or untoward behaviour" (Scott and Lyman 
1968: 46). In a similar vein, after having done extensive research in the area of accounts, 
Richard Buttny also concludes that "it is generally agreed in the literature that an account is 
a particular kind of response used to modify a problematic evenf' (Buttny 1990: 224). 
When John Austin originally defined accounts in 1961, he noted that there are two types; 
firstly excuses, which admit negative character of event in question, but deny full 
responsibility for it. Secondly there are justifications, which are those accounts which 
accept responsibility but deny the negative character of the event in question (see also 
Austin, 1962). We will look at instances of not only these two rather crude categories of 
accounting practice in this chapter, but also at the subtleties of other occasions and actions 
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that accounts produced. In particular, because of the emphasis on inability accounts, the 
analysis focuses on those practices, in very general terms, which adn-ýt the negative 
character of an event, but deny full responsibility for it. It is this issue of responsibility 
which crops up often, and leads to some interesting 'mitigating' accounts from clients. 
Accounts, as explanations or particular kinds of responses are not simply a device for 
managing responsibility for individual behaviour, but by their very nature are a social 
phenomenon. Responsibility and accounting only make sense in a social environment 
where individuals need to manage their relationships by finding ways to present themselves 
in a better light. At this very interpersonal level, accounts have been shown to have various 
functions, they can be used to 'save face' (Goffinan, 1967), to manage impressions 
(Tedeschi & Reiss, 1981) or to maintain relational alignment (Stokes & Hewitt, 1976; 
Morris & Hopper, 1980). From a cognitive perspective, they are fundamentally a way of 
seeking to influence the way people think about, or perceive you. In conversational terms, 
they are responses to blame allocation turns, or blame implicative sequences. However, in 
this chapter a rather different approach is represented. The analysis here seeks to examine 
the more complex, situationally unfolding accounting practices that are not generally 
captured in most of these studies. 
There is clearly a link between blame and account, as the nature of an account according to 
the definitions we began with, is to explain 'untoward or unanticipated' behaviour, 
although not all accounts occur as responses to blame. Atkinson and Drew (1979) use the 
term slightly differently; they use the term 'accounts' to identify a specific type of defence 
in which reasons are offered in response to blame allocation. In their defences, witnesses in 
court cases generally do two things, 1) avoid self-blame and 2) avoid disagreeing with the 
information in the prior question. In the latter case, we could characterise this activity with 
the formulation 'yes, but'. Using Austin's initial definitions, he would use the term 
'justification' to explain this action of agreement plus mitigation. Another aspect of 
Atkinson & Drew's work in this area is that they consider accounts as elements within 
sequences where they have particular sequential roles. The sequential aspects of where 
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accounts occur within conversational dynamics as a whole is also considered in this 
analysis. 
One way to explain this relationship between blame and account is by the conversation 
analytic notion of 'conditional relevance' adopted from the adjacency-pair model 
(Schegloff & Sacks, 1973). In this model, the blame made by the first speaker is equivalent 
to the first part of the adjacency pair. The first part of the pair then leads to, or makes 
relevant a particular kind of second part; in this case, an account from the second speaker. 
The criterion for conditional relevance is that if the second speaker, following this blame, 
does not offer an account, the absence of that account will be noticed by the first speaker. 
One of the limitations of the conditional relevance approach is that it presumes that 
accounting is always the product of blame, rather than being active in formulating what it 
is that is problematic to use in the account. By this I mean that, logically one could imagine 
a hypothetical situation whereby one person blames another for some act that is deemed 
inappropriate. The action of blame may well then be followed by the counter-action of 
accounting for that act. However, rather than being the product of a clear preceding action 
of blame, there are instances where one can see the characteristics of an account act being 
done in a turn, and in looking back at the prior turn, what was said in that turn may not look 
like a blaming action. So, the turn that includes the accounting action is thus one that also 
formulates the preceding turn as a potential blame action, or preliminary to a blame action. 
It is thus the evaluative significance of the problematic event or issue which creates the 
conditional relevance for an account as a response. It is important therefore to examine how 
individuals make relevant certain aspects of the problem to use in their account. We will 
look at this in more detail later with examples of actual data, but for now it is enough to say 
that a speaker producing an accounting turn will utilize certain ways of describing a 
problem, and draw attention to certain things as relevant factors rather than other 
potentially relevant things in their account, thus 'constructing' a version of the event in 
question that is suited to supporting the claims that they are making. 
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Both blaming and accounting practices reveal an underlying system of moral reasoning for 
unacceptable actions (Brown & Levinson, 1978; Buttny 1987). Therefore it is Rely that 
different people will have different and even competing accounts based on different folk 
logics for the 'same' event. Recurring blame-accounts sequences can thus become a kind 
of stale-mate, with each opposing party utilising a Merent aspect of folk-logic to frame 
and justify their own account. In doing so, mutually exclusive and antagonistic accounts 
can be produced for the same event. This account-dichotomy is eloquently portrayed in the 
words of a poem by Philip Larkin, 
'Embrace me, and I shaH be beautiful'- 
'Be beautifuL and I wifi embrace you- 
We argue for hours. (Larkin, 1949) 
This extract of poetry also raises another interesting issue as we examine blame as a 
conversational action within the context of therapy, and that is its relation to the necessary 
change of behaviour that is implied by the blame. As responses to blame, accounts may not 
only act as a form of defence in the immediate, but also as a defence against the longer 
term implications regarding a change of behaviour in the person in question. The issue is 
not only what people think of the speaker, what their impressions are, or what their 
relational alignment is, but also, the kind of change of behaviour that is implied by the 
blaming action which precipitates the accounting turn in response. Thus, as Buttny points 
out, accounts are also used to "defend against the change implied by the blame" 
(1990: 225). Although there have been many studies of blame-account sequences, Semin & 
Manstead (1983: 122) claim that there needs to be far more research on accounts in 
naturalistic contexts, where the relation between the offence and the account can be 
examined. It is this relation between offence and account in the context of therapy that is 
the focus of this chapter. 
There are different ways that accounts are produced which apparently mitigate the 
responsibility of the person blamed for a particular offence. Remember, accounts don't 
deny that the thing happened, they either provide justifications or excuses (Austin, 1961). In 
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other words, "language can be used to re-present action" (Buttny, 1990: 219). One thing 
that accounts can do, is to present a prior action in a new way, so as to make the speaker's 
own involvement in that action as morally and socially acceptable as possible. A common 
way of avoiding blame is to pass it on to someone else. This approach is age-old, first 
appearing in the Garden of Eden when God asked Adam whether he had eaten the firuit 
from the Tree of the Knowledge of Good and Evil. Adam's reply was to pass the blame to 
Eve, answering, "You gave this woman to me. She gave me the fruit from the tree" [Gen 
3: 121. However, in the event of not wanting to get someone else into trouble in the process 
of avoiding blame oneself, another effective method can be employed. This method 
portrays an event in such a way as to claim that no-one was responsible, or blame-worthy. 
One way that this techniques typically verbalised by using the idiomatic expression, 'it just 
happened'. 
'It Just Happened' 
As Drew and Holt point out, idiomatic expressions are robust in that they "have a special 
resistance to being challenged with concrete, empirical facts" (Drew & Holt, 1988: 411), 
and are thus a valuable discursive resource in resisting accountability. The notion of 
eresistance' is a therapeutic one, and there are various different ways which it may be 
exhibited, one of which being the use of idiomatic expressions such as 'let's cross that 
bridge when we come to it' This was also highlighted by Silverman (1997) in his analysis 
of counsellors working at an AIDS clinic. 
One of the strong features of idioms is that they appeal to a sense of 'what everybody 
knows'. Thus, to attempt to refute the claim encapsulated in the idiom means not only to 
attend to the speaker's individual claim, but also to the more general concern of what is 
common knowledge. In part due to this inbuilt resilience, idioms used in mitigating 
accountability therefore also have a topically terminal character. Compliance with such 
terminal uses of idiomatic phrases in argumentative or accusatory sequences often has the 
effect that a change of topic will be ensured. In the following extract, we can see an 
example of the use of this particular idiomatic expression being used by a client to account 
for his untoward behaviour. 
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Ext l. Gl/1566-1608 
1. Therapist But you've been doing a lot of things that you want to, you (. ) got 
2. involved with burglaries, [you've (been doing drugs) 
Client [No. I didn't want to do them], I didn't 
want to do them. (05) It just happened. 
Ile first thing that we can see from this extract is that in fact the use of the idiom, 'it just 
happened' does in fact have this topically terminal quality that we would expect. This 
quality is a product of the difficulty of trying to refute something which is 'well known by 
everyone' rather than simply someone's individual opinion. As such, it encapsulates the 
essence of the argument in a metaphorical rather than empirical nutshell. In this case, the 
use of 'it just happened' as an idiomatic expression used within the sequential context of 
accusation and defense, appears to be a robust devise for resisting accountability. 
Furthermore, as Potter and Edwards point out, idioms are also found in places where they 
follow a "disaffiliative response" (1992: 115). In the turn that extract I begins, the therapist 
rejects what had gone before (a complaint by the client that he was not able to do the things 
he wanted to) by asserting 'but you've been doing lots of things that you want to'(Iine 1). 
'But' here, as a turn-inifial component is contrastive with what has gone before; in other 
words, in disagreement with what her client had said immediately before. Disagreement of 
this kind is a clear signal of disalignment with a conversational partner. It is precisely here, 
in this environment that the production of the hard-to-chaflenge-with-specific-facts idiom is 
produced. The final intonation by the speaker in this turn further consolidates the fact that 
this is meant to be a terminal point. 
Desire and Intent: Doing What You Want 
In terms of thinking about how morality is something that is implicit in blaming actions, we 
can also see that in extract I this appears to be the case. 
Ext l. Gl/1566-1608 
1. Therapist: But you've been doing a lot of things that you want to, you (. ) got 
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2. involved with burglaries, [you've (been doing drugs) 
Client [No. I didn't want to do them], I didn't 
want to do them. (0.5) It just happened. 
What the therapist's turn in this extract takes the form of an accusation, in that she claims 
that not only has her client been 'doing lots of things that he wants to do' (line 1), but also 
that those things that he wants to do are things like burglary and taking drugs (line 2). Her 
main 'line of attack' in her argument is that he wants to take drugs and commit burglaries. 
The antisocial and unacceptable nature of these activities is treated as not in question; the 
client has actually been in trouble with the police on both counts. 
Ext 2. Gl/ 2251 
Therapist: But you're the one that's in trouble with the police, 
The issue that is highlighted is one of volition. How this ties in with morality is crucial to 
understanding the production of this account. According to Emerson "(a)n act's 
wrongfidness derives from the actor's responsibility (in terms of intent and foreknowledge) 
for if' (Emerson, 1969: 143). The whole literature of ethics is also balanced on this 
premise, that to justify or condemn actions, one must also take into account intent (Lillie, 
1955). It is exactly this claim to 'lack of intent' which the idiom 'it just happened' appeals 
to. The crux of the client's account is that he didn't want to do those things that the 
therapist has mentioned 
The client emphatically refutes the therapist's claim by stating in overlap, 'No, I didn't 
want to' (line 2), and again repeating, 'I didn't want to'. To say 'no' in this way in overlap 
is very forceful to start with, indicating strong disagreement. The use and recycling of the 
word 'want' is also a strong way of refuting a claim in a prior tam. It is this word that he 
chooses to extract from the therapist's turn and re-produce within a negative formulation of 
the same phrase that she uses. This again is a powerful action, which emphasises that it is 
this particular element of her accusation that he is rejecting. The repetition of the whole 
phrase, 'I didn't want to do them', also underlines very strongly that he is seeking to 
emphasise the point. It is in this environment that 'it just happened' comes as the terminal 
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account. The whole turn, therefore as a combination of actions, initially strongly denies the 
previous accusation, and goes on to replace the explanation given with an account which 
crucially excludes to element of volition or intent from the reasoning for the action. In all 
of the client's response, he does not try to deny the actions themselves, but rather appears 
to attempt to provide a justification for why he acted the way he did 
In contrast, in the following extract, taken from a later session with the same client, he uses 
the opposite argument to explain why another friend is always in trouble with the police. In 
this instance, the person in question is portrayed as someone who 'loves' getting in trouble. 
Here, the issue of volition is presented in the form of an extreme case formulation (see 
Pomerantz, 1984), where the individual not only 'wants' to do it, but 'loves' it. 
Ext 3/ G2: 807-814 
1. Client jus- right he used to be in a lot of trouble cos he used to hang about 
2. with a lad called Chris Roberts and he was just pure bad he just loved it 
3. he Loved bein' in prison cells, in- he loved getting chases off the police 
4. he loved robbin' cars and thrashin'em like up and down the roads and 
5. stuff an' 
6. Therapist: Mm 
7. Client- And then was just like he was just like led on he was like a dog to a 
8. bone 
The repetition of the word 'loves' in this extract serves to emphasise the speaker's point in 
a similar way to his repetition of the phrase 'I didn't want to' in the previous extract. In 
both cases to the emphasis is very much on whether the person in question had intended on 
doing what they were doing. The use of the word 'love' however goes ftirther, by claiming 
that not only did he intend to do what he did, but he enjoyed it. The use of listing, 
particularly those in three parts as in this extract (lines 34 'loved bein' in prison cells ... 
loved getting chases off the police .... 
loved robbin' cars is also a common way of 
emphasizing a point for rhetorical effect, and creating sense of completion (see Jefferson, 
1990; Potter, 1996). 
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Finally, in the last two lines of this extract, we find the use of another idiomatic expression 
'he was led on like a dog to a bone' (lines 7-8). The client is discussing a friend who has 
got involved with another lad called Chris Roberts. It is Chris who loves to get into trouble 
with the police, but the other friend is not portrayed in this way. In contrast, he is 'led on', 
he isn't presented as wanting to get involved, but rather he just can't help it. He is 'like a 
dog to a bone'. The idiom in itself is a powerful rhetorical tool as we have already 
discussed because of its common sense appeal, however there is also something very apt 
for the client's argument in his choice of this particular phrase. A dog being led to a bone 
suggests a basic instinct in operation, the innate drive of hunger, coupled with our everyday 
knowledge of dogs and bones going together in the same way that cups and saucers or 
knives and forks go together. The case that the client is making in defence of his friend, is 
that he can't help getting into trouble, he doesn't want to (therefore he's not a bad person), 
he is just inextricably drawn into it. 
The use of contrast in both extracts I and 3 serves to emphasise that the person in question 
is not volitionally involved in crime (and therefore blameworthy) but rather they are 
accidental or unwitting victims of circumstance. The term 'contrast structure' is sometimes 
used to describe this kind of activity, and was first used by Dorothy Smith in her 1978 
article, 'K is mentally ill'. She noted that descriptions of K's behaviour were preceded by 
"a statement which supplies the instructions for how to see that behaviour as anomalous" 
(Smith, 1978: 39). In other words, a contrast was set up between what would be expected as 
'normal' behaviour, and K's unusual or even pathological, behaviour. In our examples, a 
contrast is set up between wanting to do something and it 'just happening' (ext. 1), and 
between loving getting in trouble and being 'led into it' (ext. 3). In both cases the 
anomalous behaviour is reported first, and the mitigating account second. With the reports 
about K, the descriptions were designed in a contrastive format to demonstrate deviance 
form the norm, whereas in our examples it is the opposite way around, with the contrast 
structure being utilised to present an image of the persons in question as not deviant. 
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InabiUty Accounts 
Inability accounts can be used in therapeutic situations to mitigate culpability for socially 
undesirable behaviour. To claim inability in contrast to unwillingness, serves to lesson or 
avoid personal responsibility or blame for that action or actions. Claiming that one 'cannot' 
do something or couldn't avoid doing something is quite a different thing from saying that 
you don't or didn't want to. In the latter case the speaker concedes that they had a choice of 
possible options that were open to them in a given situation, and they actively and 
deliberately chose to take the particular course of action that they did. 
Inability accounts have only so far been analysed in the context of rejections of invitations, 
where the person rejecting the invitation says that they are 'not able' rather than 'not 
willing' to accept (see Drew, 1984). In other words, a rejection of an invitation can be 
inferred from an inability account. The inability report of the person doing the rejection, 
provides an attribution for the inviter, that being that she cannot accept because "a factor 
internal to her serves to externalise responsibility for her rejection of the invitation" (Potter 
& Edwards, 1992: 107 emphasis altered). 
in terms of making attributions about whether constraints on oneself or another are due to 
internal or external factors, Kelley's attribution theory has formed a key part of social 
psychology (Kelley, 1967). The basic premise of this model is that we observe people and 
try to work out what cause might be responsible for a particular action. According to the 
principle of 'covariation', "an effect is attributed to the one of its possible causes with 
which, over time, it varies" (Kelley, 1967: 108). The model assumes we have more than one 
opportunity to observe a particular person and assumes that we have observed other people 
in similar situations. Roger Brown (1986) defines attributional reasoning as an everyday, 
quasi-scientific form of common sense explanation for actor-action-situation events. 
Building on Heider's (1944) general distinction between dispositional and situational 
causes, Kelley points to 3 categories of explanation used in attempting to interpret 
someone's behaviour. 
9 Attribution of the actor (the person engaging in the behaviour in question) 
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* Attribution to the entity (the person with whom the actor is behaving) 
Attribution to the circumstance (the particular setting where the behaviour occurs) 
Using two fictional characters, we can illustrate each of these alternatives in a simple 
scenario - Susan walks out of a restaurant leaving her friend Bob that she was having a 
meal with. The event could be attributed to Susan, the actor (she is an hysterical person), 
Bob, the entity (he had been rude and insulting), or to the circumstances (the bread in the 
restaurant was mouldy). As Kelley concedes, "each of these explanations is reasonable; the 
trick is to decide on one as the explanation" (from Deaux, 1984: 95). By using the phrase 
'it just happened' as we have been looking at in the last few extracts, the client claims that 
fault does not he with the actor (himselo and it's not the entity's fault (his friend that 
everyone says he should stop hanging round with because he makes him get into trouble). 
Neither is it attributing cause to the circumstances (although he may be accountable for 
being in the circumstance in the first place). 'It just happened' resists all three of these 
elements, with some apparent success. 
According to this model, external factors, such as situational constraints over which the 
actor has no control, are generally used to excuse one's own undesirable behaviour; 
whereas internal attributions (such as personality or character) are more typically used to 
make attributions about someone else's behaviour. This is known as the 'fundamental 
attribution error' (Ross, 1977). I'm interested in how these two concepts work 
interactionally in a therapeutic environment, and when and where one may be used rather 
than another. A person may say 'I would if I could, it's not that I don't want to, it's just that 
certain external factors mean that I am constrained, and unable to do what you have asked'. 
This type of accounting practice that takes the form of a claim of inability, has the effect of 
acting as a kind of blame-proofmg resource which may mitigate responsibility or 
culpability for particular non-desirable or reprehensible behaviour. 
Expressions of inability are found to be a recurrent feature of accounting practices in 
family therapy talk. Familiar phrases such as 'I would if I could', 'I wish I could but I 
can't' and 'I couldn't help it', are typical exemplifiers of this practice. Speakers can use 
inability accounts to defend morally reprehensible behaviour whilst still retaining personal 
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integrity. This is done by avowing willingness, laudable intent or positive attitude, despite 
conceding negatively appraised behaviour. So, making a good inability account appears to 
include certain recurrent elements; 
"I wanted to stop the bad thing happening (willingness/volition) 
"I tried to do something about it (effort) 
-P The situation was impossible /it's not just me that couldn't do it - no-one in 
the same position would be able to. (universality) 
However, as Edwards & Potter point, internal causes such as the effects of alcohol, may 
also be deployed as external, situational causes when contrasted with the person's 
intentions or tendencies. As they explain, "their status as internal or external causes is a 
function of their discursive deployment in action sequences such as blarning or mitigating, 
excusing or accusing" (1992: 99 emphasis added) The vital factor therefore, may be 
intention rather than internal/external 'location'. Conversely, reporting another's activity in 
the form 'he could, but he doesn't', conveys capability but inaction, thus implying moral 
deficiency. The production of such descriptions is indefensible unless legitimate incapacity 
or inability can be successfully brought off as the 'reason' for inaction. Responsibility and 
accountability are closely linked to blame and punishment, as Buttny points out, 
"(r)ecurring blames may give rise to accounts as a way to defend against the change 
implied by the blame" (Buttny 1990: 225). In therapy in particular, incapacity or inability 
repertoires are very useful resources to draw upon where flat denial of the accusations is 
not a plausible option. 
The opposite of this is that you do something and then say, 'yes I did it but I didn't want 
to'. This is most likely to be used where the thing that was done was not good. In essence 
what is preserved is that a person says what they want to do is always the good, or 
preferable choice, in some socially desirable way. Morally, a person is always 'in the right' 
so to speak if their will and intention was to do the right thing (or not to do the wrong 
thing), whether they did or not. In a therapeutic environment the management of blame and 
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change can be a central issue, one which may be tenaciously resisted by the parties 
involved. 
Inability and Intent 
From what we have discussed so far, we can see that in terms of the responsibility and 
therefore the accountability a person has for their actions, the issue of intent is particularly 
pertinent. However there is also another common approach taken in accounts which serves 
a similar purpose in mitigating blame, the claim of lack of ability. As Heritage (1988) 
points out, accounts often explain a failure to do a proposed action by citing the 'inability' 
to do so rather than 'unwillingness'. It is this element of inability which implies 'no fault', 
and thus allows the person to avoid face- threatening situation. In this next extract, we can 
see the use of the formulation 'it just happened' again. And once again it is also presented 
within a contrast structure. In this case, the contrast that the client makes is between not 
meaning to 'screw his life up' (lack of intent), and it just happening. The contrast is also 
done intonationally, by placing an emphasis on the word 'mean' (line 2). This in itself 
projects contrast even if the second part of the contrast does not follow. Interestingly, this 
time, the therapist completes her client's sentence in line 3, pre-empting his cut off in line 2 
of 'it jus-' and offering a suggestion sentence completion with rising intonation as a check 
on whether she had correctly presumed what he was going to say. 
Ext. 4 /G2: 790-795 
1. Therapist: Why are you doing it? 
2. Client: I don't mean to screw my lifes up it jus- 
3. Therapist: Just happens? 
4. Client: Yeh it just like happens it jus- I dunno it just my mind goes blank 
5. everything goes blank, it happens, then the next mornin'I'm like 
6. oh crap, realised I've done it and oh crap shouldn't have done that 
There are various features of the client's second turn in this extract that I would like to try 
to tease out. Firstly, there is an agreement with the sentence completion offered by the 
therapist with a modified repetition. This is then followed by another cut off as he begins 'it 
jus-' (line 4) and 'I dunno', a contraction of 'I don't know'. Semantically 'I don't know' 
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suggests an expression of some kind of inner cognitive activity, in this case perhaps about 
reasons for his behaviour. There have been various pieces of work conducted on these 
phrases. Beach and Metzger (1997) looked at 'I don't know' as one way of claiming 
insufficient knowledge, and at the interactional uses of doing so. They showed that 
displaying uncertainty in this way can 'head off' other actions. As Potter suggests, one of 
the things that 'I dunno' can do is to "soften the link" that may potentially be heard lying 
between the action and "noxious motivations" that might arise from a related categorization 
(1998: 39). In this case, there may well be the possibility of making a link between the 
client's actions, his motivations, and a negative characterization; so the idea that 'I dunno' 
softens this link is an appealing one (for further discussions of I dunno see Potter 1996, 
1997,1998). The strange thing about the fact that it is the therapist who completes the 
idiom, and that it is done with questioning intonation, is that this appears to negate the 
effectiveness of what would normally be a topically terminal devise. One explanation lies 
in the fact that it is offered rather than stated. 
As an offering therefore the 'action' performed by the phrase is altered. Intonationally, it is 
not just a suggestion, but also perhaps a request for more information. This is similar to the 
situation where a first speaker states something and a second speaker repeats the same 
phrase but with questioning intonation. The effect of doing so is to reflect back to the initial 
speaker their own words in a way that demands a confirmation or clarification. Although 
in this case the client had not completed the phrase 'it just happened' it appears to be clear 
to both parties that this was what he would have said without the cut-off. Thus, the 
therapist's turn is possibly a suggested completion, or perhaps instead/also a reflective 
repetition. In either sense, the questioning intonation requires a confirmation. The issue is 
whether it also requires an elaboration, or account. From the client's response it appears 
that an account is warranted; not this time for whether he intended to do it or not, but about 
why 'it just happened' is a valid argument. Without trying to second-guess either party's 
intentions, what we can do as analysts is to look at what actually is said. By looking at what 
the client actually says after his agreement, it appears that he at least treats the preceding 
turn as warranting a more elaborate answer than just a minimal agreement response. 
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What follows, in this example is in fact an elaboration of what 'it just happens' means for 
him in practice. The phrases 'I dunno' and 'my mind goes blank' (line 4) are both what 
could be called 'cognitive representations'; ways of talking that imply that they are 
reflections of some inner cognitive activity (or in this case, lack of activity). Let's 
remember, the contrast in this extract is between meaning to perform an action and not 
meaning to, for it to somehow 'just' happened without intent. The key issue is intent. To 
validate this claim to lack of intent, the client used images of cognitive activity. Intent itself 
is understood in our social order as cognitive, therefore to argue that cognitive activity was 
not involved is to support a case for lack of intent. What is even more interesting is that the 
way that he supports this explanation is by the use of yet another idiomatic expression, 'my 
mind goes blank' (line 4). What we now have is one idiom being used to confirm and 
support another idiom! Carrying on with our analysis of the same extract, let me just re- 
state the second part of it for convenience. 
Ext. 4(b) /G2: 790-795 
1. Therapist: Just happens? 
2. Client: Yeh it just like happens it jus- I dunno it just my mind goes blank 
3. everything goes blank, it happens, then the next mornin'rm like 
4. oh crap, realised Fve done it and oh crap shouldn't have done that 
On line 3, in the midst of the client's account, he says, 'it happens' which amounts to a 
very simple but effective non-agentive way of glossing his illegal activity. I can't help but 
be reminded of the popular American bumper sticker 'shit happens' when I read this. 
Again, this concise phrase encapsulates the whole of his argument ... that sometimes things 
just happen, for no reason, without being anybody's fault. At some level it appeals to a 
common sense notion that some things in life are just not possible to explain or account for. 
He goes on to reinforce his claim by describing a kind of waking from a trance experience 
when he gets up the next morning, and 'realises' what he has done. This pattern is similar 
to the formulation 'at first I thought it was X and then I realised it was T introduced by 
Wooffitt (1991) to describe people's accounts of paranormal events. In this case, the X is a 
normal everyday experience, and the Y is a paranormal explanation. It is that sense of 
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contrast between doing one thing and then 'reafising' something else that seems similar to 
this study. 
In our case, the realisation of the second part of the description retrospectively formulates 
the first part of the activity described, as being done without realising what he was doing. If 
you are actually not aware, or you don't realise that you are doing something, then you 
cannot be held responsible for it. The cognitive theme runs throughout, now contrasting the 
non-intentional, non-cognitively aware state that he was in when he committed the crime, 
with his rational, conscious state the morning after. This is fused with a sense of remorse 
for his previous actions, expressed in his words as, 'oh crap shouldn't have done that' (line 
4, ext. 6). So, not only did he not intend/mean to do it in the first place, but he was also 
filled with regret after discovering that he had. The account that the client provides on this 
occasion is therefore both a claim to lack of intent, and also a claim of a lack of conscious 
control over his actions -a kind of inability account. It is also a display of knowing what is 
right and wrong, which could be important in his argument. 
Transforming Inability Accounts 
Therapeutic intervention is both backward and forward looking; the main reason for 
retrospective discussions is to formulate hypotheses about why certain courses of action 
were engaged in rather than others, and at times to look at what other possible actions could 
have been taken. Where choices taken are deemed to be socially inappropriate, the 
motivations for or causes of those behaviours are sought out in order to begin working 
towards possible solutions which may guard against future recurrence. Pre-equipped with 
ideas about why an individual may be engaging in a particular kind of recurrent behaviour, 
the therapist together with her client(s) can begin to put together a plan for how that 
behaviour can be altered to conform to more acceptable ideals. At this point accountability 
for prior actions becomes directly relevant to the construction and implementation of an 
imminently applicable behaviour modification program, or for treatment or guidance 
depending on what is diagnosed to be appropriate, with a view to future lifestyle changes 
which that intervention may facilitate. 
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With this in mind, let us turn now to look at some more family therapy data. As the 
informing ideas behind this approach being broadly systemic rather than individualistic, the 
therapeutic environment is geared to looking as much at the family system and the inter- 
actions between its members, as it is to looking at the individual member of the family who 
has been identified as having some kind of social or behavioural problem. In theory at least 
then, accountability for one's own actions (in these cases an adolescent family member) is 
not deemed to be exclusively his or her sole, independent responsibility, but at least in part 
resulting from potentially dysfunctional larger social organisation, in the first instance 
represented by the family group. 
In much of the data I have looked at, this theoretical basis is not always apparent, but 
important to bear in mind where issues of causality, personal responsibility and individual 
change are at the forefront of the therapeutic conversation. In effect, in family therapy it is 
the whole family that are being treated, although only one member of that family has been 
identified as the 'referred' patient. At times a therapist will speak to the whole family as a 
group, at times with the individual who has been referred, and at times with just the 
parents. This can occur during the same session, with various parties leaving the room at 
different points in that session, or can vary from session to session depending on the 
therapist's perception of the needs of the family, practical constraints such as difficulties 
encountered with having children present whilst the therapist is talking to adult family 
members, and the therapists' own preferred way of working. 
I have given this section the title 'transforming inability accounts', which is particularly 
pertinent to the following extract. The analytic interest I have in mind in approaching this 
extract is how and why the therapist specifically corrects her client's answer from 'don't' 
to 'can't' (starting in line 4, and concluding with her explanation in fine 15). In effect, she 
transforms what is an inability account into an account which is a matter of personal 
choice. 
Ext 5- G1/1377-1382 
1. Client I always behave in all of them but (03) In=English and Maths 
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2. and Science and French () I can't. 
3. (1.3) 
4. Therapist: Dont 
5. (0.8) 
6. Client Mm. 
7. (0.5) 
8. Therapist Say to yourself (0.8) [it's not that I c-an't, ies that I don't. 
9. Client: [Mm 
10. (0.9) 
11. Client: Mmm 
12. (0.5) 
13. Therapist: 00ka-y,, o 
14. (1.8) 
15. Therapist: If you can't (0.8) you lose control, if you d-on It you're in 
16. control. 
Before we get into any analysis of this particular extract, I'd like to immediately draw a 
parallel with an observation made by Buttny in his 1990 article on blame-account 
sequences in therapy. 
Ext. 6- from Buttny (1990: 232). 
1. Client: I felt that if if things happened to H. he couldn't talk to me 
2. about them if (. hhhh) 
3.1 
Therapist: He didn't talk to you about it? = 
In this extract the therapist transforms the client's description "he couldn't talk to me' into 
"he didn't talk to you". As Buttny points out, 'couldn't' implies ascriptions about the 
client's husband's (H) abilities and competencies, while 'didn't' implies what happened in 
a particular case. Thus, "(t)herapeutically, the focus on actions rather than on capabilities 
allows for more possibility of change" (p233). In this case, 'the possibility of change' 
refers to another party than the one being addressed (the client's husband), whereas for the 
client in our data, a re-description of his behaviour from one of inability (can't) to inaction 
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(don't) is directed at the client himself. For him, a focus on inability in accounting for his 
bad behaviour in certain lessons implies that there is something about those particular 
lessons or teachers that are the external cause of his inability to behave in those lessons (if 
the cause were internal to him, logically he would not be able to behave in other lessons 
either). 
If inability rather than inaction is the cause, then there is nothing that the client can do to 
change his situation. However, if his actions are the result of a personal choice not to 
behave, even though he has the ability to, then he is accountable for making the necessary 
adjustment in his own behaviour. Forsyth & Kelley (1987) looked at the negative effects of 
self-serving bias amongst undergraduates who attributed bad results in exams to external 
factors such as bad luck, poor teachers etc. They showed that by educating the students to 
attribute failure to internal causes such as study techniques (things over which they had 
control) they could change their habits and would have more success. It is this shift in 
thinking that is introduced by the therapist in ext. 5 when she says 'Say to yourself it's not 
that I can't it's that I don't' (line 8). In her next turn, she elaborates by framing her re- 
description in terms of his gaining 'control' of the situation (lines 15-16). Another way of 
framing this might have been to talk in terms of responsibility or accountability, both of 
which, from the therapist's perspective, are more positive outcomes (although perhaps not 
from the client's perspective). 
Another interesting aspect of 'say to yourself is that the therapist is perhaps suggesting to 
her client a need to convince himself rather than her. The idea of talking to yourself is a 
way of empowering the individual to take control of their own life. The effect of this is that 
it is not that she, as the therapist is redirecting him, but that he himself is taking charge of 
that redirection. Also, why 'say' rather than 'think'? 'Think' denotes an internal cognitive 
activity, whereas 'say' represents an external activity. Perhaps 'say' carries more of an 
active, convincing oneself weight to it, rather than what may be a more passive activity to 
'think'. This element of control is reintroduced later in this same extract in lines 15 & 16 
when the therapist asserts "if you can't (0.8) you lose control, if you don't you're in 
control. " I suggest that this final statement on the subject by the therapist confirms my 
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earlier speculation about the use of 'say to yourself as being used as a tool for empowering 
her client to take control of his own life. The issue of self-control is clearly central to the 
transfonnation of the 'can't' to 'don't' in this whole sequence. 
Unable v. Unwilling: Implications for Change 
The question for me now is why therapists might be interested in transforming clients' 
inability accounts into inactivity accounts. The answer I propose fies in the use of inability 
accounts as mitigating devices which circumnavigate accountability for problematic 
behaviour. By using the argument that one is not capable of engaging in alternative 
behaviour for one reason or another, then neither can one can reasonably be held culpable 
or accountable for that action or actions. The elements of choice and ability are central to 
the way that issues of personal accountability are managed. Furthermore, where 
accountability may be conceded by a client going along with the therapists' reformulations 
of choice of action rather than lack of ability, the immediate consequence for the client is 
that behavioural change becomes a matter of willingness rather than constraint, and as such 
is something that the client can do something about. The client is now in a position where 
they are responsible for changing their own behaviour, rather than blaming their behaviour 
on external constraining factors be they other people or situations. 
If we think about how inability accounts have previously been thought of, classically in 
declining invitations, they are used as a way of excusing the speaker from having to give 
reason why they don't want to do a particular thing. By removing the element of choice, 
the moral and accountably relevant issue of willingness is held in tact. Thus, one can 
legitimately be willing but not able. What is much more socially and morally difficult to 
sustain, is to concede to being able to perform a particular action, but don't simply because 
of not being willing. So, inability accounts can also be used to resist the implied change 
that conceding an unwilling account would demand. 
Unable or Unwilling? 
If one is unable to behave differently, then no change can be expected, perhaps even 
sympathy or understanding would be appropriate. However, if an unsociable pattern of 
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behaviour is a matter of choice then there is a massive onus on the offending party to alter 
their behaviour in line with acceptable standards. This counter play of choice and ability 
can be seen in the following examples. Each of the following extracts gives one side of the 
same argument, one from the client and one from the client's father. In the first extract (ext 
7), the father claims that his son has been 'in trouble' because he can't help it - it's 
impossible for him not to, he is unable to do otherwise. In the second extract, the client 
emphatically claims that his behaviour was in fact because he chose to do so. 
Ext. 7 - G3 / 1076-1079 
1. Dad: An n then he says y'know (0.5) if you let me out and do what I 
2. want, I won't get into trouble. 
3. (0.2) 
4. Therapist: Mm. 
5. (0.8) 
6. Dad: Thaf s imp2ssible cos he'll do what anybody asks him to. 
7. (OA) 
8. Dad: -+ He: 's (0.7) he can't (0.3) go out and not get into trouble. 
Dad's argument is that his son is easily led, and can't avoid getting into trouble if he goes 
out with his mates, because he just does whatever they ask him to. I-Es son's counter- 
argument is not that he can't help getting into trouble, but that he chooses to do so, because 
he wants to, as we can see here. The final line of dad's turn in line 8 is also apparently part 
of his own justification for grounding his son. 
Ext 8- G3 / 989-994 
Dad: 
2. 
3. Client: 
4. 
5. Client: 
6. Mum: 
7. Dad: 
They say I've got a tenner an you says ooh (0.2) give n it me 
and I'll get somebody to buy some booze for ya. 
No: (0.3) They said- (. ) (to ask them that). 
(OA) 
>(oh all right then, )< 
But why [couldn't thgy ask them? 
[That's what I just said. 
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8. (0.1) 
9. Client COSID-IWANNIDTO. 
Again, in the following extract related to the same argument, the client reiterates his claim 
that he 'could have said no' he was perfectly able, but that he made his own choice because 
he wanted to. 
Ext. 9- G3 / 995-998 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
Dad: They Asked [you to 
Mum: [. hh HHhhh 
Client AYeh. 
(0.2) 
Client: No. Wha: Wha- wba- 
(1-0) 
Client TYEH they did. So what? Big deal. 
(0.4) 
Client VI COULD HAVE SAID NO, I WANNID, I'DO IT. 
The focus of the argument in these particular extracts is regarding the client buying alcohol 
whilst legally being underage. He has been caught doing this whilst out with a group of 
friends. His father's claim is that his son's friends have asked him to buy the alcohol, and 
he is unable to refuse their request. Whilst buying alcohol is the specific issue here, it is 
also part of a larger generalization claimed by the client's father that he always gets into 
trouble when he is out with this group of friends. In extract 7, the father claims that it is 
'impossible' (line 6) for his son not to get into trouble. Again in line 8, he emphasises his 
son's inability by stating that he 'can't' go out and not get into trouble. 
The direction of the father's argument is towards a conclusion that he should legitimately 
not allow his son to go out with this group of friends. This helps us to contextualise the 
counter-claim made by his son (the client) that his illegal activities are a matter of choice 
rather than compulsion. In extract 9, the client's father reports that 'they asked you to' (line 
1. ) in relation to his son's friends asking him to buy alcohol. Finally, after considerable 
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perturbation and difficulty, first agreeing (line 3), then disagreeing (line 5) and in the end 
agreeing (fine 7), he accounts for his actions as being a matter of choice. By clearly 
demonstrating that he wanted to buy the alcohol, he refutes his father's accusation that he 
was under compulsion from his fiiends. The increased volume in this part of the 
conversation from the client demonstrates his increasing frustration and anger, and his need 
to put across a counter-argument. 
Ros Gill notes a similar relationship between the concepts of choice, on the one hand and 
ability on the other, in her work on Broadcasters' Accounts of Inequality in Radio (1993). 
in her research, the use of ability and choice are used to account for or justify reasons why 
there are not many female DJs on the radio. She writes that there is an implicit suggestion 
in these accounts that women "could become DJs but they have chosen to do other work" 
(p78). In this case, the argument claims that women are not stopped from or discriminated 
against working on radio, they simply choose not to. Within this argument that 'you could 
if you wanted to', is the suggestion that women simply don't apply rather than that they do 
but they are turned down because of discrimination. The problem is then not oppression, 
but a lack of willingness -a choice. As Gill quotes from one radio station, "we get a lot of 
tapes from people who want to be DJs, and they're all from men" (1993: 77). The issue is 
that women just don't want to be DJs. 
if we go back to our own data, and look again at extract 9, the client strongly states in line 
9, "1 COULD HAVE SAID NO, I WANNID T' DO IT. " Here, the client explicitly draws 
on this repertoire of ability v. choice. He overtly stresses that he had a choice about what he 
did - the issue he claims, was very clearly that he chose to do it, not that he couldn't help it. 
As this extract indicates, what 'could' be done is a representation of a range of options or 
alternative possibilities which the speaker was capable of engaging in. the element of 
choice is fmnly located in line 9, '1 WANNID T' DO IT'. This clearly shows how 
responsibility can also be claimed as well as resisted by demonstrating that a particular 
action was deliberately chosen over at least one other possible course of action. 
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Again, the following extract highlights in the client's own words this clear distinction 
between ability and choice. However, in this case, a new category of 'knowing' the 
difference between right and wrong is introduced. 
Ext 10. - G2 / 728-732 
1. Client: I know how- I know what (0.2) de ru- (0.2) the difference between right 
2. and wrong is. 
3. (0.7) 
4. Client An I KNOW to like (0.9) ifi everyone's gonna say ah >come on 
5. smash this< (0.3) winda, I know how to say no I don't wanna 
do it and I know how to say yeh come on lads lets go-. 
Here, the client's argument is that it is his choice to behave the way he does, no-one forces 
him into it. As such he is claiming that he has the ability to do either the right or wrong 
thing, and takes responsibility for his own actions by claiming that his actions are a matter 
of choice not compulsion. In this instance therefore, his capability to make his own 
decisions is used to attract personal responsibility, whereas in the first example deflection 
of personal responsibility was achieved by invoking the reversal of this action, namely by 
claiming inability as a defence for bad behaviour. 
in this example however, the introduction of knowing right from wrong shows that 
rhetorically, mental state description can be deployed as an aid to proving intentionality 
and ability to make personal choices. Remember, the interactional opposite of informed 
choice in these examples is a constriction of options due to inability to do anything other 
than the single course of action that was engaged in - as we saw in the 'it just happened' 
accounts. To prove that an action was engaged in by choice, one way of strengthening that 
argument, as this extract demonstrates, is to introduce a cognitive element into the claim. In 
this case, this is done by declaring "I know .... The 
difference between right and wrong" 
(ext 10, lines I& 2). 
Furthermore, it is not just a matter of knowing the difference but of knowing how to act on 
that knowledge - knowing what to do about it. This is demonstrated by the client when he 
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goes on to say 'I know how to say no ... and 
I know how to say yeh' (lines 5&6, my 
emphasis added). There is a subtle difference. In knowing the difference between right and 
wrong, the client is claiming to have a moral conscience; but by claiming that he knows 
how to make use of that moral conscience in a practical situation he is in effect going one 
step further. In other words, that passive 'knowing' is translated into an active 'doing'. This 
additional claim to active knowing strengthens the claim that all of his actions have been 
the result of personal choice; choice based on realistic and 'doable' alternatives. It is this 
issue of realistic alternative options that substantiates a claim to an activity done by choice, 
rather than simply because of an inability to do anything else. 
To re-cap briefly on what we have learned so far; in extract 5 the therapist attempted to 
transform her client's account from one which claimed that he couldn't do something 
(inability) to one in which he simply 'didn't' do it (choice). The purpose of this 
transformation therapeutically, is that once an account for inappropriate behaviour has 
become a matter of choice, it is possible to change it. In the recent series of extracts, the 
client's father claims that his son can't help getting into trouble (inability), which is 
strongly refuted by his son who claims that he wanted to (choice). The relevance to future 
activity on this occasion is in relation to whether the client is allowed to spend time with 
his fiiends or not. The client's claim that it is his choice to get into trouble undermines his 
father's argument that he can't help getting into trouble when he is with those fiiends. This 
counter-argument on the grounds of personal choice, inoculates the client from the need to 
stop seeing his friends, an unwelcome change in his own behaviour. 
In the first example in this section (ext 5), the client uses an inability account to excuse his 
behaviour at school and therefore any onus on himself to act differently. In the second type 
of examples (ext 8& 9) however, the same client refutes an inability account in an attempt 
to safeguard himself from the particular threat of needing to change his friends. What we 
can see from this is that the repertoire of inability v. choice can be used in two different 
ways. Firstly, an inability account can be claimed, and as such serve to excuse past 
behaviour whilst also inoculating against any future behaviour change that may be 
suggested. Secondly, an inability explanation can be reftited in order to prevent the 
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consequences that may be necessarily implied by it. The important thing is that in this data, 
inability accounts are used in these two instances by the same client in different ways, 
either claimed or refuted, depending on the interactional need of the moment and the 
subsequent potential imphcations. 
ACCOUNTS AS REMEDIAL DEVICES 
This final section of this chapter on the use of accounts in therapy looks at a slightly 
different aspect of their use than in the first part of the chapter. In this instance, occasions 
of accounting are found which do not initially appear to be warranted. However, when one 
looks back at the turns prior to the accounting turn, we find evidences of things that may 
have been treated by the speaker as warranting as account. In particular, the aspect that I 
want to focus on is how therapist's questions appear to be treated by clients as potentially 
accusatory, or morally charged. I have already discussed some of this area already, and is 
something that will be covered more explicitly later in this chapter. It is not always 
apparent as one proceeds inductively and sequentially through a passage of transcribed talk 
that there is an accusatory action being done by the first speaker. What I mean is that at 
times a question appears to be just that, an inquiry for further information. However, 
questions are not always used simply to perform this singular action, they are frequently 
used as carriers for other conversational actions, or at least pre-sequences to further actions 
following. An example of this is the question 'can I tell you a story'; whilst this is 
grammatically a question, in conversation it often acts as a story preface (see Schegloff, 
1980). In a different way they question 'what are you doing tonight? ' is also at face value 
'just' a question. However, this particular question is often used to perform the additional 
action of inviting, or at least operating as a familiar way of preceding an invitation. 
in answering these kinds of questions that at face value at least, are 'just' questions, a 
respondent may explain for example, what their plans are for the evening. However, where 
the respondent is familiar with the use of such a question as a preliminary to an invitation 
(which may or may not follow), the respondent's answer is likely to be addressed to the 
action of inviting and not merely to the superficial, or secondary action of information 
seeking. A good example of this action happening in ordinary conversation is used by 
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Schegloff to explain pre-sequences and the possibility of misunderstanding the intended 
action of a turn. This is an extract from his data. 
Ext 11 (from Schegloff 1992-1323 - Kraus dinner) 
Mother: Do you know who's going to that meeting? 
Russ: Who. 
Mother: I don't kno: w 
Russ: Oh::: Probly Missiz McOwen Cn detsa) en 
Here we can see that Russ initially treats his mother's question as a pre-announcement. 
However he repairs his response after she says 'I don't know', when he realises that it 
wasn't a pre-announcement. I-Es repair subsequently responds to the question instead as an 
information seeking speech act (Schegloff, 1988: 57). We can see in Us example that what 
may appear to be one kind of speech act, as we analyse an extract strictly sequentially just 
as the participants themselves would understand the unfolding series of talk, turns out to 
have the characteristics of another kind of action. The difficulty lies in the fact that indirect 
speech acts frequently appear in the form of questions. A variety of different indirect 
actions however, can be performed through this vehicle of asking questions. This is the 
starting point of the next part of our investigation of situated accounting practices. In this 
section we will be looking at the ways in which responses to questions used in therapeutic 
and counselling sessions reveal how those questions can and are treated by clients as 
morally charged or accusatory. In other words some questions are treated as more than 
'just' questions, as we can see by the client's responses to them. 
Atkinson and Drew in their examination of accounts produced in courtroom cross- 
examination exchanges found that often excuses and justifications, "occur in response to 
questions which do not appear to directly or formally accuse the witness" (Atkinson & 
Drew, 1979: 136). This they claim reflects the witness's recognition that counsel's 
questions are leading to or prefacing blame, and the witness's desire to mitigate such 
blame. Rather than responding to a particular question as a discreet entity, the witnesses 
seem to recognise a 'line of questioning' in a series of questions which appears to be 
building towards an accusation (Drew, 1992). This is observable in the way that witnesses 
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address their answers not so much to the content as to the perceived action of the question, 
by adding rebuttals and accounts to their answers. A similar phenomenon is to be found in 
therapeutic and counseling exchanges. Like courtrooms, therapy is organised by a 
participation framework within which the therapist generally asks the questions, and the 
client gives answers. Additionally, in answering questions, clients tell problems, make 
criticisms, and offer accounts. A feature of these types of interaction is that patients will 
commonly orient to the therapist's questions as therapy-relevant and therefore design their 
answers accordingly. Evidence of clients' orientations to the blame-implicitaveness of 
certain questions can be found in the excuse/rebuttal/justification content of their replies to 
questions which are not overfly accusatory. Furthermore there may also be an orientation in 
here to what Schegloff refers to as a 'conversation-in-a-series' (Schegloff, 1980: 106). A 
particular question in a given context may not be treated in isolation, but as either a 
question within a series of questions, or a question within a series of conversations; both 
alternatives being applicable to therapeutic conversations, either as isolated sessions or as a 
part of a series of sessions. 
Aronsson & Cederborg (1996) in their analysis of family therapy sessions with adolescents, 
also observe evidence of defensiveness and resistance to apparently innocuous questions 
about lifestyle topics such as smoking, sex, choice of friends etc. 
Part of the diagnostic process in the therapeutic encounter is to investigate issues and 
identify problem areas, and therefore it is understandable that a client would feel sensitive 
to issues of blame and accountablity. However in these cases, the interest of the therapist in 
asking questions about lifestyle issues is primarily grounded in a professional interest in 
how the family system works. Resistance from adolescents in these encounters 
demonstrates that such questions, however motivated are 'treated as' accusatory. Buttny 
(1990) suggests that because accounts and rebuttals have identifiable features and are 
usually remedial devices, one can look at what the prior turn consisted of to examine what 
it was that may have been taken as potentially threatening. 
In the current analysis, examples are drawn from a series of family therapy and child- 
mediation sessions. In the first instance, we will look at how questions addressed by the 
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therapist to the client may be taken to be evaluatively implicative, or morally charged. In 
this extract, the therapist is asking her teenage client about whether he smokes. 
Ext. 12 G1/1574-1596 
1. Therapist: 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
ii. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
16. 
17. 
18. 
19. 
20. 
21. 
22. 
23. 
24. 
25. 
Client: 
Therapist 
Client 
Therapist 
Client 
Therapist- 
Client 
Therapist- 
Client 
Therapist- 
And your parents are saying (2) that they don't want you to have 
the opportunity to get in trouble. 
(2) 
I've got plenty of opportunities every single day, but I just pass 
them by. hh 
-Right,, 
Some of them I take up, like skank a lesson or somat like that, 
(1-5) 
Like spending your dinner money on (5) fags. 
Well I don't do that though. 
(1.5) 
Are you a smoker? 
Uh? 
Are you a smoker? 
Yes. 
(1) 
Where do you get the money from? 
(2) 
Client: hhh 
Therapist: - Do your mum or dad smoke? 
Client My dad does. 
Therapist -Mhmm- 
(3) 
Client rve never nicked off my mum and dad, I've never (1) stole off 
them not fags not nothing, 
This is a long extract, but bearing in mind the relevance of what I have just been discussing 
with regard to Drew's notion of a fine of questioning, it is relevant to us to look at this 
whole sequence as a series of questions. The therapist's initial question about smoking both 
in lines 12 and repeated at line 14 could be heard as a 'straightforward' request for 
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information; she asks 'are you a smoker? ' It is not in itself an explicitly critical or 
evaluative, but could be given that firstly, the person asking the question is a health 
professional and smoking is bad for you, and secondly, the person she is asking the 
question of is not legally old enough to smoke. The way that the question is formulated 
uses the term 'smoker' referring to a category of person, rather than the term 'smoking', 
which would be an activity but not necessarily a personality characteristic. By asking her 
client if he is part of the category of people called 'smokers' it is implicit that the category 
bound activities associated with that membership categorisation are also invoked (see 
Sacks 1992; Edwards 1997; Lepper, 2000). There is something about identifying someone 
as 'a smoker' rather than as someone who smokes, or who has smoked, which has an 
enduring quality about it. It suggests an established identity rather than a fleeting activity. 
Thus, as a smoker, one could expect that regular smoking over a consistent period of time 
is a category-bound behaviour. 
As can be seen from the progression of the line of questioning, there is a further 
implication, that in order to sustain a regular smoking habit, one must also have a regular 
source of income to finance that habit. In response to the (repeated) question 'are you a 
smoker? ' (line 14) the client immediately responds 'yes' with no delay or hesitation. His 
answer is in the standard preferred response format, indicating that he has no difficulty in 
answering the question. However, in response to the next question, 'where do you get the 
money from? '(1ine 17) there follows a massive 2 second delay before the client sighs but 
still does not answer the question. To remain silent in the face of accusation can in itself be 
taken as an inference of guilt. Even in law where a person who has been arrested has 'the 
right to remain silent', the strength of conditional relevance for a denial or justification to 
be made after an accusation is such that its absence is accountably noticeable. McBamett 
(1983) points out that where a person is accused of something "it is reasonable to expect 
that he or she will immediately deny it and that the absence of such a denial is some 
evidence of an admission on the part of the person charged and of the truth of the charge" 
(McBamett 1983: 54; from Parkes v. The Queen 1976). 
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The client's non-response implies that he finds the question problematic, possibly because 
he takes it to be evaluative or morally charged. Arguably, for an authority figure such as a 
therapist to ask the question about the source of his finances already exhibits possible 
scepticism about the legitimacy of that source. So, it appears that the client orients to the 
evaluative implication not just of the immediately prior action (the specific question), but 
to the line of action being adopted by the therapist. Potentially this is one which may lead 
to the client incriminating himself by revealing the source of his income. Therefore, whilst 
engaging in making his responses 'therapy relevant', the client also distances himself from 
the evaluatively charged therapeutic upshots that could be inferred as a result. 
The therapist continues by asking a different question after the non-response from her 
client to the question about where he gets the money. This time, she asks 'do your mum or 
dad smokeT (line 20). The client answers that his dad does, to which the therapist quietly 
acknowledges what he has said with a pondering 'mhmm' (line 22). The next turn is 
particularly interesting, as a3 second pause passes with neither party speaking. Finally the 
client self-selects to make his defense 'I've never nicked off my mum and dad... ' (line 24). 
Apparently, this emphatic statement appears to 'come out of the blue'. The therapist has 
not accused him of stealing, so why the need to make a defense like this? The answer is 
that the client treats the therapist's line of questioning as potentially accusatory. Whilst it 
may appear that she is 'just' asking simple questions about whether he smokes, where he 
gets the money from, and whether his parents smoke, the underlying message, at least from 
the client's perspective, seems to be that there is some kind of implicit accusation about the 
legitimacy of how he manages to acquire cigarettes. It seems that the client treats the 
question about whether his parents smoke as particularly loaded, addressing his defense 
specifically to a denial of having stolen cigarettes from them. I suggest that it is not just this 
question about his parents smoking that triggers his response, but rather the culmination of 
3 questions in a series presented by the therapist. It is this cumulative effect of adding 
'smokerT to 'moneyT to 'mum and dadT that when added together seem to imply far 
more as a series of questions than they do as individual questions. It is what the client treats 
as the implicit accusation in this series of questions that he addresses in his defensive 
response. 
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Treating Silences as Accountable 
The following extract is taken from the same series of therapy sessions as the previous 
extract, but on this occasion the topic under discussion is the client's suicidal feelings. 
Ext 13. G1/1759-1774 
1. Therapist -Ok- (2.4) 1 asked you () if you ever felt like killing yourself 
2. and you said every day, (0.8) how would you do it? 
3. Client: How? 
4. Therapist: OMM(O 
5. (1.6) 
6. Client: Hang myself, (0.8) chuck myself in front of a lorry, (1.6) starve 
7. myself, just run away and just go to sleep and never wake up, 
8. (5.1) 
9. Client: Someat like that, 
10. (6) 
11. Client I'm not mental, I don't need a psychiatrist or owt like that, (1.2) 
12. Id never actually chop mys- tLop myself, (1) it's just it makes 
13. everybody- it just () makes (1.8) me feel (0.2) like killing 
14. myself, (1.2) makes me feel I've got nothing to live for, (1.6) 
15. I'm not mental I've got nothing wrong with me, 
16. (7) 
17. Client I'm not thick, I can do all my work, it's just I choose not I to. 
In isolation, the initial question posed by the therapist in lines I&2 "Ok (2.4) 1 asked you 
(. ) if you ever felt like killing yourself and you said every day, (0.8) how would you do it? " 
is likely to be taken to be morally charged. However, if it is taken as part of a sequence of 
diagnostic questions, one may not come to the same conclusion. This particular question is 
the most recent in a series of questions about the client's physical and mental health. The 
therapist begins with questions such as 'how do you feel when you're on your ownT to 
which he responds 'depressed'. She then follows with what is apparently a series of 
questions about eating and sleeping patterns, the answers to which may perhaps provide 
evidence for a diagnosis of clinical depression (see Sacks Vol 1. p57) Within this 
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sequential environment, the question of thinking about killing yourself can be appreciated 
as a logical progression of that line of action. However, as we noted from the research by 
Arronson & Cedorborg (1996), a client may treat such 'diagnostic' questions as morally 
charged or even accusatory. 
In response to this question, the client begins with a series of candidate methods for suicide 
(lines 6-7). After a5 second pause, he adds the tag 'somat like that', (potentially as a topic 
closing formulation). Its status as a 'tag' at the end of what he has said displays that he 
hasn't really thought about it all that much, in a similar way that the device 'I dunno' works 
to deny an over-attentiveness to the detail of descriptions given. At this point, in the 
conversation where an apparently adequate answer to the question has already been given, 
it would be reasonable to assume given the question-answer sequence characteristic of the 
therapy participation framework (which has also been the norm. in this session up to this 
point), that the next turn slot is available and even expected to be taken by the therapist to 
comment on his response or to ask another question. However, the therapist does not take 
up the opportunity of taking her next turn at this point. There is a further pause of 6 
seconds, after which the client finally self-selects to take up the available turn slot. What 
constitutes this subsequent turn however, is a defense and an assertion that he 'isn't 
mental', and that he 'doesn't need a psychiatrist'. 
Such denials might typically be expected to become relevant after an allegation or 
accusation has been made. What is apparent though, is that the denial appears in the 
absence of any such accusation. Given that the turn slot taken up by the client with his 
denial was apparently 'passed over' by the therapist, it seems that the client treats the 
therapist's 'non-uptake' as an attributable silence. His denial indicates that he treats her 
silence as a negatively evaluative non-response to his previous answer about how he would 
kill himself. Given the tendency for clients in therapy to orient to the therapy-relevance of 
their answers to questions, it is entirely reasonable to conclude that the client is orienting to 
the diagnostic relevance of his explication of how he might kill himself. Suicide is 
generally a morally accountable behaviour which, according to everyday folk logic is 
linked with mental instability. The general rule of self-preservation dictates that any person 
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in their right mind would not take their own life. It appears from the sequential organisation. 
of his defense, that he treats the non-response of the therapist to his answer as potentially 
negatively evaluative. As Kitzinger points out, to withhold affiliation is "typically 
understood to signal disagreement" (2000: 130). He orients to this potential 'disagreement' 
with his assertions that he 'isn't mental'(1ines 11&15) and 'isn't thick'(line 17). He later 
goes on to add evidence which supports his claim. 
In the business of fmifly therapy, one thing that can be at stake is who is to blame for the 
problems that the family is experiencing. Although the client is identified as the one who is 
at trouble at school and with the police, it is not assumed that the problem and therefore the 
solution is one which can be located within a particular individual. The ethos of systemic 
therapy is that an individual is part of a larger social organisation and structure, at the first 
level, the family group and at a wider level other aspects of the social and economic 
environment of which that individual is a part. It is not therefore obvious that as the 
'referred' patient he is automatically the one who is to be held accountable for his 
antisocial behaviour. What is at stake then in the conversations that go on within the 
therapy sessions, is how accountability is shared or assigned, and how blame is allocated. 
For the client then, his concern is to ensure that he is not the one who is singled out as the 
person who is the 'problem' and therefore consigned to further treatment to correct that 
deviance. 
Aware of some of the potential evaluative implications of what he has said about killing 
himself, the client is concerned to ensure that those potential assessments and implications 
are not the ones that the therapist chooses. In this case he may be diagnosed as being 
mentally unstable, the therapeutic trajectory of which may be that he is referred to see a 
psychiatrist a trajectory that he also denies is appropriate or necessary (fine 11). The 
interesting thing about this extract is that by looking at the content of each of the client's 
utterances in this sequence, we can see how he treats the therapist's silences as potentially 
negatively evaluative by the way that he works hard to defend himself against those kind of 
implicit implications following the silences. 
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Overall, what we have learnt about from this final section of this chapter is yet another 
environment where accounting practices flourish. As accounts are usually remedial 
devices, we can look at the situation of their occurrence to examine what there was in the 
content of the previous turn that would have precipitated such a response. By doing this we 
can see that questions which at face value seem merely innocuous information-gathering 
tools, may also be treated as performing other actions, such as accusation. We can see by 
the evidence shown in this section that there is certainly something within these kinds of 
questions that clients orient to as potentially accusatory, and which in turn provokes the 
remedial use of accounting practices. 
Summary 
This chapter has been concerned with the production of what I have called 'inability 
accounts' within the therapy situation. One of the first instances of a particular phrase used 
to exemplify this practice was the use of the idiomatic expression 'it just happened'. Such 
expressions, whilst being immensely vague, are yet quite effective in that they appear to 
have a special resistance to being challenged with concrete, empirical facts" thus making 
them an apt discursive resource in resisting accountability. 
Inability accounts can be used in therapeutic situations as anywhere else, to mitigate 
culpability for blameworthy behaviour (or lack of expected action). This chapter has 
highlighted the finding that inability, in contrast to unwillingness, serves to lesson or avoid 
personal responsibility or blame for that action or actions. The inability report in effect 
serves to externalise responsibility for the inappropriate action or inaction. In addition, 
there is a moral aspect to the issue of using inability accounts. For example, to report 
another's activity in the form 'he could, but he doesn't', conveys capability but inaction, 
thus implying moral deficiency. A claim of inability under these circumstances would 
mitigate this claim to moral deficiency. However, the production of such descriptions is 
indefensible unless legitimate incapacity or inability can be successfully brought off as the 
&reason' for inaction. 
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In the first part of this chapter, the analysis focuses on the accounting practices of the 
clients. In the latter part, the analysis of this topic reaches a deeper level, as I have sought 
to explicate the way that the therapist can in effect 'transform' those inability accounts into 
expressions of 'choice' rather than compulsion. Tbus, therapeutically, the focus on actions 
rather than on capabilities allows for more possibility of change. This element of control is 
exemplified in extract 5, lines 15 & 16 when the therapist asserts "if you can't (0.8) you 
lose control, if you don't you're in control. " 
in examining the relationship between the concepts of choice, on the one hand and ability 
on the other, another key area that was investigated was that of inability versus 
unwillingness, and the implications that those categories bring with them for future changes 
in behaviour. What was revealed from this part of the analysis, was that the repertoire of 
inability v. choice can be used in two different ways. Firstly, an inability account can be 
claimed, and as such serve to excuse past behaviour whilst also inoculating against any 
future behaviour change that may be suggested. Secondly, an inability explanation can be 
refuted in order to prevent the consequences that may be necessarily implied by it. 
Finally, I directed the focus of analysis on this topic towards the use of accounts as 
remedial devices. In these instances it was found that there are occasions where accounting 
practices are found which do not initially appear to be warranted. However, when I looked 
back at the turns prior to the accounting turn, I found evidences of some things that may 
have been treated by the speaker as warranting that account. A particular aspect that 
appeared to be most significant was that therapist's questions appeared at times to be 
treated by clients as potentially accusatory, or morally charged. I found that some questions 
were treated as more than 'just' questions, as was revealed by the client's responses to 
them. Similarly, the final section of this chapter investigated the way that silences can also 
be treated as accountable, I found that denials or rebuttals appeared in places where no 
direct allegation had been made by the therapist in any prior turn. What was apparent from 
this observation was that there are occasions when the client 'treats' the therapist's 'non- 
uptake' of a prior turn by the client as an attributable silence, and thus provides an account 
or rebuttal where non was explicitly required. 
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In conclusion, this chapter has shown new areas where inability accounts are used, and has 
shown some of the specific ways that they occur within the enviromnent of the therapeutic 
encounter. 
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CHAPTER 5 
YOU SAID 
This chapter investigates the quote-introductory features of 'you said' as a generic 
conversational resource, with a particular focus on in its application in the context of 
therapeutic interactions. In it I examine the processes by which these Idnds of quotes are 
produced as indexically sensitive, and how the content of the quoted material forms a basis 
for proceeding. The structure of the chapter is based around the four core elements that are 
characteristic of sequences in which 'You said' quote-introducers are found. 
This core sequence is as follows: 
Part One: Quote-introduction (SpeakerA) 
Part Two: Confmmfion (Speaker B) 
Part Three: Pursuit (SpeakerA) 
Part Four: Elaboration (Speaker B) 
Part One is the use of the indexical 'you' plus a quote introductory verb, followed by a 
quote or formulation of something the addressee had previously said. Within this part of the 
sequence, there are two components, firstly the quote-introductory verb (eg 'said', 
&mentioned', 'complained', 'asserted'), and secondly the topic-content of what is quoted. 
The second part of the sequence is agreement or acknowledgement provided by the second 
speaker (the addressee) confirming the content of the quote as more-or-less accurate (by 
explicit agreement or by non-disagreement). The third part of the sequence is what I call 
pursuit. This is where the first speaker takes a second turn in which the content of their 
prior turn is explicated or 'followed up'. The final element of the core sequence is 
elaboration. You-quotation begins the sequence, followed by confkmation and then by a 
follow-up or pursuit question. This question in turn elicits a response which constitutes an 
elaboration of the topic that was introduced via the quotation in the first part of the 
sequence. 
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BACKGROUND 
Quotation 
People use quotations not just to be more accurate in reporting on another person, but also 
to provide an environment for doing other things, such as to express a position or align 
oneself with what the quoted person has said. For example, Sacks (Vol 2, part 5 Winter 
1971: March 4 p309) demonstrates the difference between a report such as 'he had to go' 
and 'he said he had to go', the latter being a form of indirect quotation. In this example, 
simply stating 'he had to go' implies that the reasons were known to be legitimate and 
acceptable, whereas 'he said he had to go' implies an element of doubt or uncertainty as to 
the actual necessity of that person's departure. Using a form of speech which produces 
someone else's words as a quotation, can therefore be a subtle way of expressing one's 
own position in relation to that other person's words, actions or beliefs. In the data corpus 
which forms the basis of this chapter, it is not absent parties who are quoted, but the person 
who is being addressed. I will therefore be exploring how you-quotation can provide an 
opportunity for participants to align themselves with one another's interests, and at the 
same time provide an environment for eliciting further information on the topic-content of 
what is quoted. 
Formulations 
Formulations are a means by which participants summarise or construct the gist of what 
has been said, or make explicit their own sense of what is being discussed. Often 
formulations are prefaced by phrases such as 'you mean' or 'so what you're saying is' or 
&you seem to be suggesting'. The design of formulation prefaces, together with the content 
of formulations themselves, are context-sensitive. In other words, there is a correspondence 
between the 'form' and the 'function' of formulation-construction units (Drew, 2001). One 
of the features of the 'you said' quote introductory sequence that I will be investigating 
here, is the context and content-sensitivity that a particular quote-introductory verb 
combined with the topic content of the quote has as a unit. Another aspect of formulations 
that relates to the project in hand is that of essentialising, particular aspects of prior talk 
(particularly where there has been an extended sequence of talk). In other words, drawing 
attention to particular elements as representative of the whole with a view to 'what happens 
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next'. Just as formulations are used to package prior talk " in a way that prepares for future 
interaction" (Potter, 1996: 48), 1 aim to demonstrate that you-quotation can also operate as a 
device through which prior talk can be re-introduced into current interaction in order to 
provide a basis for its future direction. In other words, past speech is made relevant in the 
current interaction by virtue of its potential relevance to afiture trajectory. 
Reported Speech 
Reporting what someone else has said is a way of 'making relevant' a particular topic, or to 
provide a context for what is happening in a current interaction (Buttny, 1998). It is 
"simultaneously a report of a previous thought or locution and part of a new sequence used 
for a different purpose" (Holt, 2000: 433 emphasis added). Clearly this is not a neutral 
activity, the very fact that particular quotes or formulations are chosen to be reported over 
others is in itself an act of discrimination. As Buttny & Williams claim, reported speech is 
reproduced for "'the reporting speaker's own purposes" (2000: 112). In this chapter, I will be 
looking at how reported speech in the specific form of you-quotation, can be utifised as 
convenient vehicle for the furtherance of the user's current interactional agenda. In therapy 
particularly, I propose that you-quotation performs the function of enabling therapists to 
locate topical issues as originating in clients' own concerns, rather than having been 
imposed by the therapist. 
Footing 
Goffman (1981) first introduced us to the notion of footing by drawing to our attention the 
previously unquestioned categories of 'speaker' and 'hearer'. He dissected the speaker's 
traditionally unitary role into three parts, principal, author and animator. In brief, the 
principal is the originator of the belief or view, the author the person who selected which 
aspects of the principal's view to present and the animator the person who acts as the 
'mouthpiece'. The implications of Goffinan's re-specification of the role of speaker were 
that these now independently distinguishable roles could be attributed to or claimed by 
different people. This was the beginning of what we refer to as 'footing', and has spawned 
numerous empirical studies into the practical uses of footing shifts in various walks of 
everyday life. (Clayman, 1992; Greatbach, 1986). The concept of footing is important 
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because the words that a person uses are treated as reflections or signifiers of what he/she 
believes, and as such persons are held responsible for what they say. Tberefore, footing 
provides a way of saying the words without being held accountable for the beliefs assumed 
to be 'behind' the words. In practice it seems that, especially where difficult or 
controversial topics are being discussed, by quoting the words of another, a speaker can 
distance themselves from being the 'principal' and 'author' of the belief, and position 
him/berself as merely the animator. However, although the speaker who is reporting the 
words of another apparently claims to be 'just animating the words of another', the fact that 
certain words and formulations are chosen to be reported over others makes a claimed 
identity as a merely neutral mouthpiece incredible. Something that I will be investigating 
later, is how a speaker can effect a footing shift by using a you-quotation as a way of 
ascribing the topic (re)introduction to the other party. 
The Validity of Who and What is Quoted 
Where others are quoted in conversation, the inclusion of such quotes, is helpful in serving 
the purposes of the current speaker. In court testimonials 'hearsay' evidence is not 
admissible as evidence. By this I mean that whilst one may be legitimately able to 'quote' 
what one has heard someone else say as part of one's own first-hand evidence as a witness, 
one is not expected to use what someone else said that they had experienced as evidence. 
However, in ordinary conversation, reporting what others have said is common practice, a 
speaker may use the 'evidence' of what another person has said to verify their own version 
or argument. One way of validating one's own knowledge or information, is to situate it as 
based on or supported by someone else's knowledge and authority. However, where others 
are quoted in support of the current speaker's knowledge claim, the degree to which 
referencing that person is beneficial to the current speaker's case is largely dependent on 
how authoritative a source the current hearer deems that person to be. "Whether or not it is 
convincing evidence involves, in part, whom she is seen as citing" (Pomerantz, 1984: 612, 
emphasis added). The importance of this notion to the current study is that, by citing 
something that the person you are speaking to has said, the issue of the validity of who you 
are quoting is largely circumscribed. If I claim that 'you' said it, then the issue of source 
validity becomes far less of a consideration in judging the content of the report. 
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The issue rather, becomes one of whether the person quoted is willing to agree with the 
substance of that quotation as an acceptable rendition of what they said. An absent party is 
not able to refute the content of the quotation that a current speaker may report, but one 
who is present can. There are two main ways that a speaker can deal with this potential 
problem, either they can treat the content as unproblematic, or seek to establish it as such 
in the current interaction. One of the ways that content is treated as unproblematic is to use 
pro-terms such as 'when' and 'as' before 'you said', another is for the speaker to continue 
with his/her turn beyond the you-quotation element, without pausing for the recipient to 
confirm its accuracy. On the other hand, where the speaker orients to a need to establish the 
quote-content as unproblematic, a speaker can offer their hearer the opportunity to agree 
with the content of the quote - or at least the essence of it - before continuing her/his turn. 
In both cases, by either collaboratively establishing, or unilaterally treating the content of 
the quote as unproblematically 'given', the conversation can thus proceed, and 'new' 
information based on or emerging from the now shared knowledge can be incorporated. 
PART ONE: QUOTE-INTRODUCTION 
The particular aspect of the sequence that I am focusing on here is the quote introductory 
uses of 'You said'. Within this part of the sequence, there are two components, firstly the 
quote-introductory verb (eg 'said', 'mentioned', 'complained', 'asserted'), and secondly the 
topic-content of what is quoted. 
Quote Introductory Verbs 
Sacks (Lecture I part 3) suggested that there is a class of verbs which he referred to as 'co- 
participant verbs'. These, he said are selected by a speaker to demonstrate that they had that 
particular hearer in mind, for example 'I just thought I'd better report to you what 
happened today'. In this case Sacks suggests that, "I 'report' to you things about which you 
are concerned, where it's not particularly in my interests that I'm telling this" (p174). This 
recipient-design feature of verb choice in conversational reporting is something that I 
propose is also a feature of what I have referred to as 'quote-introductory' verbs. 
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In spoken rather than written text generally, there tends to be less use of quote-introductory 
verbs such as 'asserted', 'claimed', 'condoned', 'pleaded' and alike. This may be because 
in spoken interaction, prosody and voice quality are commonly used to convey speaker's 
evaluations (Holt, 2000). By using these kinds of paralinguistic resources, speakers can 
convey subtle (or not so subtle! ) evaluations of others' talk at the same time as reporting 
what was said. Making implicit evaluations in this way tends to leave hearers to make their 
own inferences about the reported 'other' rather than being more explicitly guided towards 
how they ought to respond. By not using an essentially evaluative verb, the speaker can to 
some extent, present him/herself as having a 'neutral' position on the topic-content of the 
quote, and thus allow the hearer more room to form their own judgment. With this in mind 
therefore, I would argue that a speaker's choice of quote-introductory verb is not arbitrary, 
but is sensitively designed to be appropriate to both the content and the context (both the 
current context, and the one in which the quoted utterance was originally produced) of the 
quoted utterance. 
Whilst the'focus of this chapter is specifically on the use of 'said' in you-quotation, its 
usefulness can only be fully appreciated by contrasting it with other potential quote- 
introductory verbs. Space constrains me from making a detailed analysis of a variety of 
quote-introductory verb uses, but I will take just one example to illustrate the point. In the 
following extracts, the speakers use the verb 'mention', which I suggest attributes a 'said in 
passing' status to that quote. 
Ext. I- Gl: Sl/473474 
1. Therapist: And what sort of things do you like to do, out of school? You 
mentioned the computer, 
Ext. 2- E5088 /1.11- phone call 
1. Lesley- =TYes it twell it TYes but then last week you mentioned 
the fburtee-nth. = 
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Firstly, where there is potentially delicate or troubling topic-content, the use of 'mention' 
apparently offers the subject matter a status as 'not a big issue'. It presents the topic of the 
formulation or quote as something the addressee hadn't made a big deal about previously, 
but had just 'slipped into' the conversation. Secondly, it does not evoke the same kind of 
con the record' ascription that for example 'stated' or 'asserted' might imply, but has 
instead a rather transient or changeable quality which offers the recipient the opportunity to 
make more or less of as they wish. Quote-introductory verbs tend also to be appropriate to 
the content of what is reported. In theses next extracts, the therapist brings up potentially 
sensitive or difficult topics using 'mentioned' in you-quotation, 
Ext. 3- G151/628 
1. Therapist: You mentioned that you lost a baby before David, 
Ext. 4- G152/1005-1007 
1. Therapist You mentioned once or twice when the rest of them 
2. were here th- thatý you know if things got (. ) too bad that 
3. you would you'd be better -dead- 
It seems that the use of 'mention' is sensitive not just to the evaluative implications of the 
reporting, but also to the subject matter of the report. This content-sensitivity is apparent in 
the examples we have just looked at where in the first, the subject of losing a child is 
topicalised, and in the second the client's suicidal feelings are (re)introduced to the talk. 
Before we go on, it is worth taking a brief look at the use of quote-introductory verbs in 
other environments, where obvious differences in their use can be observed. For example, 
the specificity of using the verb 'testified' in courtroom speech exchange systems is that it 
formulates the quoted utterance as very much 'on the record'. Unlike 'mentioned', what the 
witness says is not treated as just having been said 'in passing' or flippantly, but constitutes 
sworn evidence pertaining to the case in hand. For example; 
Ext. 5 (0J Simpson trial official court transcript - October 23rd1996) 
1. Q: And you previously testified that you began to go into that alley at 
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2.10: 30 to 10: 35? 
A: Yeah, 10: 35. 
In such instances, reminding the witness of what they said is not just a matter of casually 
jogging their memory, or taking a passing interest, but is usually a preparatory move to 
some kind of confrontation. What the witness says in court under oath, actually counts as 
evidence, for which they are personally liable. I have deliberately chosen to illustrate the 
impact of quote-introductory verbs by using 'mentioned' and 'testified' as exemplifiers of 
opposite ends of a hypothetical spectrum, but a more subtle approach would be to look at 
how a more 'neutral' quote-introductory verb is used in different situations or 
environments with different effect; in this instance, we will later be examining the quote 
introductory uses of 'you said'. 
in summary then, what we have been looking at so far in this section, is one aspect of the 
ways that quotations are introduced. The particular emphasis has not been on reporting 
what another person has said, which would typically take the form of 'he said / she said', 
but on a reflective practice of sorts, where the speaker reports something that the person 
addressed has themselves said. There are particular qualities of quoting 'you' that we have 
explored briefly; one being the authority of the reported source. Furthermore, in the case of 
you-quotation, what is reported is not 'news' in the sense that other types of reported 
speech would be, but constitutes more of a check on the facts, or a check that the addressee 
still adheres to or is willing to take ownership of their own prior claim in the context of the 
current interaction. In many respects, this re-presentation and confirmation forms the basis 
and starting point for what comes next. It acts as a check on what both parties agree on to 
be true before moving on to the next thing. In the cases of its use in courtroom interaction, 
that 'next thing' is either the acquisition of new information based on what has been 
agreed, or a contradiction or challenge to what the witness has confirmed as true. 
The first two parts of this series work together to form a basis for proceeding, by 
introducing a particular topic, agreeing its current validity, and moving on to pursue further 
information about the agreed topic. The ultimate direction of the sequence is to obtain 
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fiu-ther information on the topic that has been reintroduced - part 4 in the sequence, 
elaboration. With this in mind, let us now turn our attention to concentrate on the second 
part of this core sequence, confirmation. 
PART TWO: CONFIRMATION 
We saw in the last section that to some extent agreement is projected by the first speaker in 
the first turn of this sequence. Staying with courtroom interactions to start with, in this next 
extract the defense attorney in a rape trial uses a series of 'you said' quote introducers to 
consolidate what facts have so far been established in the case. 
Ext. 6 (Kennedy Smith rape trial - from Matoesian, 2000: 904) 
((RB = Roy Black, Defence attorney; PB = Patricia Bowman, victim)) 
1. RB: -* I think you told us yesterday that (0.6) you said that you:: r (3.8) 
2. left arm was pinned down (1.0) Is that correct. 
3. (1-0) 
4. PB: Yes ((high pitch cry)). 
5. RB: --). You said that your jight arm (0.5) was pinned down. 
6. (1.0) 
7. PB: Pinned between us. 
8. (0.7) 
9. RB: -* You said tha- tuh his chest was on vour chest holding you down 
10. (0.5) correct? 
11. (2.2) 
12. PB: YES ((high piched cry)) 
Tie sffiking organisation of this particular sequence is that it is made up of a series of turns 
which each use the quote-introductory term 'you said'. Its use in this case is to establish the 
witness's testimony clearly and comprehensively 'on the record'. By cementing the facts of 
her testimony in this way, the defense attorney systematically lays down a strong 
foundation on which to build the rest of the case. Similarly, Atkinson and Drew found in 
their research of courtroom interactions, that the early turns of accusations generate the 
descriptions that are going to be contrasted with something that the witness is challenged 
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on later (1979). In essence, this process is designed to scrutinise and expose inconsistencies 
in the witness's testimony, and ultimately to discredit the evidence that she has provided by 
('revealing' it to be unreliable. From our point of view, the primary interest in this extract is 
the turn following each of these quote-introductory turns by the defense attorney. In each 
case the attorney quotes back to the witness something that she had said earlier in the trial, 
and each time, confu-mation is required. This happens in two ways; firstly, and most 
overfly, the attorney appends his quotation with a tag question, "is that correcf' (line 2), 
and "correct? " (line 10). Secondly, and more subtly, the witness self-selects to respond to 
the question implied in the quotation. In fine 7, the witness dually confirms that her right 
arm was "Pinned" (see line 5& line 7), and at the same time repairs the formulation 
"down" made by the attorney to "between us". 
The interesting thing about both of these forms of response, either self-selected 
confirniation or directly requested confirmation, is that the need for confirmation. is clearly 
implicit within the you-quotation turn. If we look back at the two instances where an 
explicit request for confirmation is made, we can see that in both cases the requests are 
made in the form of tag-questions, presented to the witness after a significant pause (line 2, 
1.00 sec; line 10,0.5 sec). Neither turn is completed with fmishing intonation, and it 
appears as though something more is going to be said, However, there is a clear 
anticipation of confirmation before the attorney proceeds. This extract demonstrates to us 
that there is a normative feature of you-quotations that requires confirmation before the 
next turn is taken. The need for this confirmation is especially evident in circumstances 
where what was said may be contested in a subsequent turn, and therefore clearly needs to 
be established 'on the record' by all parties concerned, as we have seen in this courtroom 
exchange. 
The potential danger of being held to account for prior utterances in any conversation is 
apparent. By agreeing with the content of a quoted utterance, a speaker in effect 'binds' 
her/himself to having said it. In the general flow of informal conversation, interactants do 
not usually hold one another to account in this way, unless they are being deliberately 
confrontational. If we take the example of asking people if they mind having their 
96 
conversations recorded, often they will become self-conscious at least, probably more 
cautious and guarded in what they say, and sometimes will refuse to be recorded at all. A 
major reason for this seems to be that once what they have said is on tape, it is in effect 'set 
in stone', and potentially that person could then be held accountable for having said what 
they did. Another participants' concern is that what has been said will be taken out of the 
context of when it was said, and thus be misrepresentative of the speakers true intentions or 
reasons for saying what they did. Similarly, a spoken reported quote used in a current 
conversation, by definition has been taken out of its original context, and is equally open to 
misrepresentation. A you-quote addressed person may therefore quite understandably be 
wary of agreeing to having said something when it is reported back to them in a different 
context from its original setting. 
The flexibility of unrecorded, unofficial talk is that it allows room for interactants to do a 
variety of things which can where necessary help them to distance themselves from things 
they have said, or to account for or justify the reasons for their original utterance. Because 
there is no objective 'record' as such, speakers can reconstruct or reformulate various 
aspects of what and how and why they said what they did, or even dispute that they said it 
at all, or that they didn't quite say it like that, or they didn't mean exactly what is inferred. 
The only 'record' if there is one is a subjective and fallible series of potentially interested 
participants recollections. In the previous extract, the defence attorney repeatedly asks the 
witness to confirm the content of what he reports that she has previously said. As such, the 
agreed content of the prior testimony acts now in the current interaction as a basis for 
proceeding with the cross-examination. 
Projection 
There appears to be a systematically observable relationship between the degree to which 
agreement is projected and the likelihood of the preferred response being forthcoming. Let 
me demonstrate with a couple of examples, 
Ext. 7 (0J Simpson trial, reporter's transcript October 23,1996) 
1. Q: Now, you said that you understood that Mr Goldman walked to and 
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from work, is that right? 
A: NormaHy, yes. 
Ext. 8 (Oj Simpson trial, reporter's transcript October 23,1996) 
1. Q: Now, you said you were on the other side of the alley at 1030,10.35, 
2. right? 
3. A: Yeah. 
In these court extracts, the first speaker finishes his turns with the tag questions 'is that 
rightT and 'rightT Agreement with the quote/formulation in these cases is not just 
projected but overtly requested, and required before the prosecution win move on to the 
next question. This strong emphasis on agreement-prior-to-continuation in court 
proceedings stands in contrast to some subtler forms of projection which tend to occur 
more in informal interactions. The following extract is taken from a mundane family 
telephone conversation. 
Ext. 9 (HS088-1-11: P18 - family telephone conversation) 
1. Mum: Ye 
-I 
thought you'd said the twgntieýeth b[ ut yojukn[ow 
2. Lesley- Uddihhh] [ih= 
3. Lesley: =TYes it Twell it TYes but then last week you mentioned 
the fburtee: nth. 
In this example, not only is acknowledgement not overtly requested, but also the whole 
issue of what Lesley had said is brought up in a very circuitous way. The quote is softened 
to begin with by prefacing it with 'I thought', and afterwards is further hedged with an 
unfinished qualification which begins 'but you know'. Nevertheless, Lesley still orients to 
the shared understanding of a need to confirm or deny what she is claimed to have said on a 
prior occasion, and thus starts her turn with an agreement. However she goes on to add, 
'but... ' which we would typically anticipate as being a preface to an account or 
justification for what she has just agreed that she has said. Rather than finding an account 
though, we find something that looks very similar to the first speaker's turn, she goes on, 
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'but then last week you mentioned', using the swne device of you-quotation symmetrically, 
to deflect accountability for herself back onto the previous speaker. 
By looking at what is going on in this way, we can deduce that the you-quotation turn is 
treated by its recipient as potentially accusatory, or at least something that warrants some 
sort of justification or symmetrically oppositional move. It is precisely this apparently 
accusatory quality of quoting the person addressed that is characterised by its use in 
courtroom cross-examination sequences. The question that remains then, is that if this 
phrase is generically treated as at least potentially accusatory, how can it be that it can also 
be used facifitatively in therapy? We will come back to this question later, but for now let 
us conclude this section with looking at how acknowledgement or agreement is projected in 
therapy. Intonational projection appears to be the most common form of confirmation 
solicitation, although there are occasional instances where additional lexical items are used, 
such as 'rightT (for example, see extract 18). Here are a couple of cases of intonational 
projection to exemplify what I mean, one from a therapeutic setting and one from an 
informal telephone conversation; 
Ext. 10 (Fl: P4) 
1. Therapist. You said you thought other children had more friends 
2. than you did? 
Client Yes. 
Ext. 11 (HI-05: P4 - family telephone conversation) 
1. Nan: You: said, phone on Mondee. hh thats still damp in the 
2. bathroo: m? 
Les: Yes. 
Agreement is clearly projected by the questioning intonation used in each of these 
examples. Grammatically, the recipient is not being asked 'did you say XT but the quote is 
presented as an established fact, said with questioning intonation. The difference is 
significant. The statement nature of the you-quotation positions it as preliminary to 
something relating to it which is anticipated in that speakers next turn (such as a question, 
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or contradiction). Where agreement is not forthcoming after a statement has been presented 
with questioning intonation, that agreement may be pursued with an additional tag-question 
such as we fmd here, 
Ext. 12 - Oakl/S4 Track 25 (Steve=Father) 
1. Therapist (2): Before you said Steve that it was (0.2) Dwain thought it was 
2. very important for him to get his own wa: y? 
3. (1.0) 
4. Therapist (2): --* Didn't you. 
S. (0.3) 
6. Therapist (2): And= 
7. Father: =Yeh. Somettimes when y'say go eyour room, 
This tag-question confirms that agreement after you-quotation is expected. Where that 
doesn't happen, as we see here, the speaker re-asserts, the immediate relevance and even 
requirement for agreement with what was quoted by effectually 'upgrading' an intonational 
agreement projection to a grammatically formed yes/no question. Where something is 
presented as a question there is a strong conditional relevance in operation for its recipient 
to provide an answer to the question, therefore the use of questioning intonation in you-said 
sequences strongly projects the need for agreement onto the hearer. 
In summary, we have seen so far how 'you said' quote introductions are used in both 
institutional and informal contexts. We have also seen how confirmation is very clearly 
projected and at times explicitly requested as an appropriate next turn in the sequence. 
Following on from there, we now look at part three of the core sequence that I originally 
outlined, pursuit. 
PART THREE: PURSUIT 
So far we have looked at the first two parts of the 'you said' quote-introductory sequence. 
Part one was the use of the diexical 'you" plus a quote introductory verb, followed by a 
quote or formulation of something the addressee had previously said. The second part of 
the sequence was agreement or acknowledgement provided by the second speaker (the 
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addressee) confmning the content of the quote as more-or-less accurate (by explicit 
agreement or by non-disagreement). The third part of the sequence is what I call pursuit. 
This is where the first speaker takes a second turn in which the content of their prior turn is 
explicated or 'followed up'. 
Establishing What You Said as a Basis for Proceeding 
With regard to the therapeutic uses of reported speech in particular, Fasulo notes that 
quotation can serve as "a point of departure for fin-ther discussion" (Fasulo, 1997: 220). It is 
essentially this aspect of quotation that I am focusing on here. My argument is that 
speakers often indexically use the quote-introducer 'you said' as a way of agreeing or 
establishing shared knowledge between themselves and their co-participants, and to use 
that shared knowledge as a basis for proceeding. The importance of agreeing to what was 
said as a basis for proceeding, is that it provides legitimate grounds for the subsequent 
request or line of questioning, or in other words, it provides a foundation for an action 
which follows. 
The Indexicality of Talk: Is What You Said Earlier Still Currently Relevant? 
Establishing a basis for proceeding is important because what people say is indexical to the 
situation and company that they are in. Interactants treat what is said not as necessarily 
universally 'true' in some objective way, but occasioned and therefore potentially 
changeable in a new context. In next extract the therapist both reintroduces a topic of 
conversation previously touched on, but also seeks to establish whether what was said then 
is still currently relevant as a basis for proceeding. 
Ext. 13 - Gl: Sl/873-879 
1. Therapist: -> I asked you if you were both in good health and y- you said ye- 
2. tha- I realise it's always difficult to ask that question in front of 
3. --). th- the children. Erm now that they're not here, (12) are you 
4. both again in- (1) excellent health= 
s. Father: =TYeh 
6. Mother: THm 
Father: Yeh. 
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By re-asking the question about their health now that the children are not present, the 
therapist offers the parents the opportunity to give a different answer, one that is designed 
just for the therapist, without having to take into consideration the overhearing children. 
We can see that the participants themselves orient to the indexical nature of talk by the way 
the therapist treats the answer given earlier 'in front of the children' as potentially designed 
just for that company, but that they may give a different answer now that the children are 
not present. Whether or not the parents answer the question in the same way that they did 
initially, the point is that the therapist treats their first answer as provisional in the current 
context because of its recipient design in the original context. In the next extract the same 
therapist is talking with her client alone after having talked to him earlier in the session 
with the rest of his family present. She prompts, 'you said earlier that you weren't happy'. 
Again this re-presentation of something said earlier appears to be a way of asking 'is your 
answer then still relevant now? Would you say the same thing now we are alone as you did 
when the rest of the family were hereT The following extract is in a similar vein, this time 
the conversation is between the therapist and the client himself. 
Ext. 14 - Gl: Sl/1313-1318 
1. Therapist: You said earlier that you weren't happy? 
2. (1) 
3. Client No. 
4. (1) 
5. Therapist: How much of the time were you not happy? 
6. Client: hhh hundred percent. Hhhh 
Although, in this particular extract the word 'no' is used in response to the intonationally 
made request for confimation of a you-quotation, the client is using it in a way that is 
agreeing, or confmning. By "no" he means 'no, I wasn't happy' rather than 'no, I didn't 
say that'. This is clearly the way that the therapist understands his response, as we can see 
by her next turn in line 5 where she treats this response as a confirmation and proceeds 
with what I refer to a 'part 3' of the core sequence, pursuit. By pursuit I mean a request for 
further information on the topic that has been re-introduced via a you-quotation turn, and 
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has been confkmed as correct. This combination of topic re-introduction and confkmation 
forms a basis for proceeding. 
The trajectory of this sequence is that the recipient elaborates on the topic which has been 
re-introduced via the you-quotation. Once confirmation has been established, a pursuit 
question aimed at acquiring that elaboration is forthcoming. In this extract, the kind of 
elaboration requested is a matter of how much 'time' (line 5) the client has felt unhappy. 
We can see that in order for the therapist to ask this follow-up question, it is essential that 
she first establishes the fact that her client feels that he hasn't been happy. You-quotation is 
a useful tool for creating an environment where such a question can both logically and 
legitimately be asked. 
Not only does this extract demonstrate how participants themselves orient to the indexical 
nature of their talk, but it also shows that in order to pick up a topic touched on earlier, with 
a view to exploring it further in the 'now' of the current interaction, that 'starting point' has 
to be re-established as still valid in the current conversational context. Using the quote- 
introducer 'you said' is a way of bringing a past utterance into the present conversation to 
be used as a resource for pursuing a future trajectory. 
Pursuit After Agreement 
In the previous extract, once agreement has been established, the therapist continues with 
her 'pursuit' of more detailed information regarding the content of the quote (line 5). In this 
case the topic-content of the quote is the client's happiness. In Extract 13 the 'content' was 
the good health of the parents, and in Extract 16 the content was the clients' concern about 
being expelled. Once that quoted topic-content is confirmed as a still-currently-relevant 
basis for proceeding, the therapist goes on to pursue that toPic-content in more detail. In the 
extract above, she asks, 'how much of the time were you not happyT (fine 5), and in 
Extract 16 she asks 'why might you get expelled? ' (line 3). More specifically still, she goes 
on to pursue the expulsion topic ffirther still by asking what exact things he is likely to do 
that would warrant such actions, "What would you do to get yourself expelled? " (fines 6- 
7). 
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Pursuit Without Agreement 
In general then, agreement with the first part is prelfininary to, and conditional for the 
delivery of the first speaker's second turn (part three of the sequence). However, there are 
times when the first speaker carries on with their second turn immediately following the 
first leaving no room for the second speaker to affirin the first part. In these cases, I would 
argue, the first speaker treats the content of the reported quote as unproblematic and not 
needing explicit verification. Let's look at some examples to demonstrate, 
Ext. 15 - Gl: Sl/638-629 
1. Therapist: You mentioned that you lost a baby before David, have you lost 
any other children? 
ExL 16 - (Fli-7) 
1. Therapist: So when you said that you think Peter's not very happy, do you 
mean at school? 
Ext. 17 (F2: P40) 
Therapist: You said'Even if you try to fix it', in what way do you think 
they've tried 
in each of these cases, at the transition relevant place after the first part of the turn, (part 
one of the you-quotation sequence) the same speaker continues immediately with the latter 
part of that turn (part three the you-quotation sequence), without giving the second party 
time to affirin the first part. By doing so, the speaker treats the first part as 'given', as 
something which doesn't need to be explicitly affirmed by the second party before slie/he 
can continue. The importance of the acknowledgement marker as an integral part of you 
said quotation sequences then, is that whether it is actually present or not, it is oriented to 
by the speakers as if it is expected, and is therefore a normative feature. 
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Delay After Agreement 
in most of the examples we have looked at so far, pursuit of more detailed information 
about the content of the quote comes directly after agreement. However, in some cases 
there is a delay after agreement, as in the last extract. In this case, the therapist takes the 
initiative to pursue the subject after a one second delay, as her client has not elaborated 
beyond a minimal response. This example gives us an insight into what is normatively 
expected by persons in this kind of situation. By quoting 'you said earlier that you weren't 
happy' the therapist projects that she is not only looking for agreement, but also some 
further elaboration on the subject of happiness. Delaying pursuit gives the client 
opportunity to discuss the topic in any way he likes, rather than in the specific way that a 
pursuit-question would direct. However, where an initial question is vague, or the client 
appears reticent to voluntarily elaborate, it seems necessary for the therapist to formulate a 
more specific question. The same thing happens in this next extract. This time, after a three 
second pause, the therapist poses a more specific 'pursuit' question. 
Ext. 18 - Gl: S2/1006-1011 
1. Therapist: You mentioned once or twice when the rest of them 
2. were here th- that, you know if things got () too bad 
3. that you would be better -dead- or words to that effect. 
4. Ri: ght, 
5. Client: Hmm 
6. (3) 
7. Therapist. How often do you think () about being dead. 
The question, 'how often do you think about being dead', opens the topic for further 
discussion. In this case pursuit is forthcoming, but the delay, and the use of the quote- 
introductory verb mentioned, reveals that the therapist treats the topic as a delicate one. On 
line 3 of this extract, after reporting a gloss of what he had said 'once or twice' (line 1) the 
therapists adds 'or words to that effect'. What this attends to is that what he said may not 
have been exactly those words, but that the underlying meaning was essentially that. The 
importance of this little phrase is that it forestalls repair, it deflects disagreement with 
exactly what was said, and of getting 'hung up' on the details, and thus makes the 
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acquiescence sought more probable. Finally, the use of 'right' (line 4), said with what 
appears to be either questioning or continuing intonation, further signals that agreement is 
required. In other words, agreement with the essence, rather than the literal accuracy of 
what was reported is sought and projected as the preferred response. 
Agreement Without Pursuit 
Just as there are cases where pursuit is delayed, there are also instances where pursuit 
doesn't seem to be necessary. At times, a person will respond to a you-quotation prompt 
with both an agreement and an immediate elaboration. The fact that this happens, again 
demonstrates how people treat you-quotations as topic introducers, and grounds for 
proceeding, and will at times short-circuit the whole sequence by missing out the pursuit 
element, as we will see in Extract 23. 
Ext. 19 - Oakl/Sl 19mins 
1. Therapist: Y- you said that he (OA) Lhought that he saw himself as naughty 
2. when he first come (0.1) but (0.2) hh (0.9) that's l-ess: e: -ned 
3. (0.3) 
4. Mother: Yeh I think so he hasn't s- that's the- (0.9) 11 suppose people 
5. think we're s- (0.9) (be en) (02) y- yknow if wobody'd av 
6. (02) asked im he wouldn't have said oh I'm goin here cos I'm 
nAughty, 
After the therapist's turn (part one of the you-quotation sequence) in lines 1-2, the mother 
agrees (part two), but immediately goes on to elaborate beyond the minimal response, 
missing out part three of the sequence, which would have been a pursuit-question from the 
therapist. This seems to show that she was aware that the you-quotation turn was probably 
a pre-curser to a pursuit-question, or at least that fin-ther elaboration was required beyond a 
minimal acknowledgement. In the previous example, the mother takes a kind of 'short cut', 
by continuing in her turn to give an elaboration as well as an agreement, without waiting 
for the therapist to interject with a pursuit-question. I suggest that this is because the 
projected pursuit after agreement is normatively understood by both parties. 
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Delay After Quote Introduction 
As we have just discussed briefly, the immediacy of the second part agreement turn after 
the 'You said' unit is to some extent influenced by the projection of that agreement in the 
first turn. However, at times there is a delay after the first turn before the second speaker 
responds. If we look at the potential projection in line I of this next extract, we see that the 
'you said' quote is presented as a bald statement, not a question. 
Ex t. 20 - Gl: Sl/1362-1365 
1. Therapist: You said you were worried you might get expe3ed. 
2. (1.5) 
3. Clent: Mm. 
Although the finishing contour at the end of the therapist's turn on line I indicates a 
transition relevant place, this opportunity is not immediately taken up by the second 
speaker. It may be because an additional question or comment from the first speaker is 
anticipated. In effect it sounds like a pre-sequence. This shows us that the client is 
expecting a follow-up question to come after the you-quotation. It also shows that the 
therapist is waiting to receive confirmation before she proceeds with her pursuit question. I 
suggest therefore, that the delay after quote introduction does not signify a disprefered 
response in that the speaker is having difficulty in responding, but rather it demonstrates 
the prefacing quality that you-quotations have, in that they are familiarly used as 
preliminary statements before pursuit questions. It is this normative feature of quote 
introduction that creates a situation where confirmation may treated by one or other party 
as rhetorical, causing either the first speaker to continue with a pursuit question without 
waiting for confirmation, or conversely that the person addressed may not initiate 
confirmation in that 'slot' because at times this confirmation is simply treated as given. 
PART FOUR: ELABORATION 
The final element of the core sequence is elaboration. You-quotation begins the sequence, 
followed by confirmation and then by a follow-up or pursuit question. This question in turn 
elicits a response which constitutes an elaboration of the topic that was introduced via the 
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quotation in the first part of the sequence. Let's look now at an extended version of the 
previous extract to illustrate this. 
Ex t. 21 - Gl: Sl/1363-1368 
1. Therapist: You said you were worried you might get expgUed. Quote Introduction 
2. (1.5) 
3. Client: Mm. Confirmation 
4. Therapist: Why n-tight you get expelled? What would you do 
5. to get yourself expelled? Pursuit 
6. Client: Skank a lesson, swear at a teacher or something, Elaboration 
The topic that is introduced in line I with the quotation is the possibility of being expelled 
from school. The pursuit question is actually two-fold in this example, asking both 'why' 
and 'what would you do' to be expelled in turn. The topic of expulsion is both agreed as a 
basis for proceeding, and as a topic initiated by the client in the first two turns. The 
anticipated pursuit question invites elaboration on the topic of expulsion, which is 
forthcoming in the next turn when the client suggests some things that he might do that 
would warrant expulsion. So, this final element in the core sequence is what the rest of the 
parts have been building towards, a revisiting of a prior topic with the effect of exploring 
that topic in more detail, and for the client to talk more on that subject. As such the whole 
sequence works as an elicitation device, a way of gathering more information on a 
particular topic. 
The sequence relies, as we have seen, on a specific follow-up or pursuit question being 
asked in the third turn. There are however, instances where a follow up question is not 
needed because the recipient predicts that elaboration is expected, as in this next example. 
Ext. 22 (F7: P10 - drawing a pictogram) 
1. Therapist Would you put them all together as one Steve, or separate? 
2. Client Who, on Tabitha? 
3. Therapist You said that she was at the cen before. 
aient Yes. Yes, together reaRy. 
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As we can see, the quote introduction element in the sequence comes in line 3, followed by 
the confirmation by the client in line 4. However, in this example, elaboration comes 
immediately afterwards without the usual pursuit question. One reason for this can be 
found in the earlier part of the sequence, where a specific question has been asked in line 1, 
'Would you put them all together ... or separateT The you-quotation serves to clarify the 
question and to help the client answer the original question, so a pursuit question in this 
instance is not necessary. 
THE EXTENDED SEQUENCE 
Now that we are familiar with what I have been referring to as the 'core-sequence' 
throughout the chapter so far, I would like to go on to explore the characteristics of a 
typical extended sequence, of which the core sequence forms a part. What I have 
discovered is that within a larger environment of talk, often preceding the initial 'you said' 
turn there will be a general or vague question presented by the speaker, which the 
addressee appears to have some difficulty in answering. The 'you said' sequence that we 
are by now familiar with is used to follow up the initial question and to help the respondent 
to answer it. This is how the whole extended sequence looks graphically. 
1) 
2) 
Vague question 
Delay 
(SpeakerA) 
(5peakerB) 
3) Quote introduction (SpeakerA)' 
4) Confimation. (Speaker B) 
5) Pursuit (SpeakerA) 
6) Elaboration (Speaker B) 
Extended Sequence 
Core Sequence 
I will use an example that I have used before to see how this looks in an actual piece of 
data. 
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Ex t. 23 - Gl: Sl/1360-1368 
1. Therapist: What about at school? 
2. (1.5) 
3. Therapist: You said you were worried you might get expglled. 
4. (1.5) 
5. Client: Mm. 
6. Therapist: Why n-dght you get expelled? What would you 
7. do to get yourself expelled? 
8. Client: Skank a lesson, swear at a teacher or something, 
Question 
Delay 
Quote Introduction 
Confirmation 
Pursuit 
Elaboration 
The initial question in line I 'what about school' is a general introduction to the new topic 
in the current conversation - school. However, we see by the lack of immediate response 
that the client appears to find answering the question problematic, perhaps because it is too 
vague. The you-quotation sequence serves a facilitative function by channelling the client's 
response in a particular direction. The therapist picks up on something said earlier so that 
the client has a starting point from which to take his response. 
Within an extended sequence like this one, I have identified what I refer to as a primary 
action and a secondary action. The primary action in the sequence is the main action that is 
being carried out by the first speaker, in this case, the therapist. The secondary action is a 
supporting action carried out by the same speaker which in some way facilitates the main 
action in the sequence to be achieved. I propose that the primary action in this example is 
the question 'what about school (line 1). The secondary action is a sequence (a kind of 
insertion sequence) that enables or helps the client to answer the question which was the 
primary or main action in this sequence. 
Primary and Secondary Actions 
The use of you-quotation within both the core sequence and the extended sequence that I 
have outlined has a role as what I refer to as a 'secondary' action. Let me use an example to 
illustrate what I mean by this; 
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Ext. 24- G161/473-474 
1. Therapist: And what sort of things do you like to do, out of school? You 
mentioned the computer, 
Client Hmmm? 
Therapist: What do you like to do out of school? 
In this example, the therapist's initial question is about what her client likes to do outside 
school (line 1). She eventually returns to the question again in line 4, but what amounts to 
an insertion sequence in between these two questions is a you-quotation. In this instance, 
the you-quotation operates as a secondary action, a reminder of something said earlier, as a 
prompt to enable her client to answer the initial question. The primary action in this case is 
the question/answer pair. At other times, you-quotation can be used as a preface to a 
question which follows, as in this next example. 
Ext. 25 - Gl: S2/1005-1007 
1. Therapist You mentioned once or twice when the rest of them 
2. were here th- that you know if things got (. ) too bad that 
you would you'd be better -dead- 
Here, the primary action is to pursue a line of questioning about whether the client really 
does feel suicidal. The you-quotation serves to introduce the topic and to preface a question 
which seeks to find out more information about that topic. In this case the you-quotation 
serves a secondary role in the overall sequence, although this time as a preface, whereas in 
the previous example it was an insertion. 
Where a you-quotation turn is found in a turn-initial position, and thus acts as a preface, it 
is projected that there will be a follow-up question which is actually the primary action in 
the sequence. The use of you-quotation as a preface is common in confrontational 
interactions such as we saw in the courtroom extracts, and so it is ambiguous as to whether 
the projected follow-up (or pursuit) question will be confrontational or not. However, with 
you-quotation used as an insertion sequence, its role as a secondary action tends to be 
facilitative rather than confrontational. From the examples that we have analysed, this 
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facilitative ftmction is usually found within the context of an extended sequence where a 
respondent has had difficulty in answering an initial question, and the insertion of a you- 
quotation turn or core sequence is used to help the respondent answer the initial question. 
This may take the form of a prompt, or a directive. 
The series of you-quotations and agreements in the extract of rape trial data that we looked 
at (ext. 6) acted as a prelude to the defense attorney's case to discredit the witness's 
evidence by revealing its inconsistencies. It is this role as preliminary or 'secondary' 
actions in talk which you-quotations appear to perform with some regularity. In the 
following exchange, the quote-introductory turn is used to assist (secondary action) the 
hearer in answering a question posed in the speaker's immediately prior turn. It is this 
initial question which I propose is the 'primary' action in the sequence. 
Ext. 26 (UTCL - Have a good trip - A35D21) 
1. Hank: hhhh. hhhh U:: h as far as you know are those people still 
2. wantin to look at d'East Fourth and East Third d'morrow 
3. (1.2) 
4. Lih U:: h hh 
5. Hank: -+ You said somethin mbout earlier [they 
6. LiL. [Yeah I haven't (0.7) 
7. made an appointment with ern though, 
Lil's delay and trouble on lines 34 reflects her initial difficulty in answering the question, 
but Hank's quote-introduction in line 5 assists her by ('reminding' her of something she had 
said earlier. The result is that Lil is now able to answer the initial question (lines 6-7). In this 
instance, the quote-introduction acts as a 'secondary' speech act because of its supportive 
role in facilitating the 'primary' action, which in this example is to produce an answer to the 
question posed in the first turn (fines 1-3). Although Hank does not complete his report of 
what Lil said earlier before she interjects with her answer, in effect the quote-introduction 
still served its purpose of assisting her in some way to answer the original question. The fact 
that Lil answers the original question rather than addressing the immediately prior turn (the 
'you said' turn) demonstrates that in many respects the you-quotation turn acts as a kind of 
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'insertion sequence', in terms of its activity in providing additional information which in turn 
enables its recipient to fulfil the primary action which was to answer the original question. 
Let us look again now at how this works in a therapeutic setting. The following sequence 
begins with a very general question from the therapist, to which the client does not 
immediately respond. Rather than asking another question, or re-wording it, the therapist 
chooses instead to use a you-quotation. The quote acts both as a prompt to answering the 
original question, and as an account for having asked that particular question in the first 
place. As an account, it justifies the kind of question as not just something she has picked 
out of thin air, but which is grounded in the unfolding therapeutic business of the 
interaction, and more specifically in those concerns which the client hersetfhas brought up. 
Ext. 27 - Oakl: Sl- 19mins 
1. Therapist. TIs there any ather changes d'ya think (0.2) that Dwain 
2. might have (1 A) n- identified since he's been here? 
3. (0.2) 
4. Therapist: -), Y- you said that he (OA) Lhought that he saw himself as 
5. naughty when he first come (0.1) but (0.2). hh (0.9) 
6. that's less: e: ned 
7. (0.3) 
8. Mother: Yeh I think so he hasn't s- that's the- (0.9) 11 suppose 
9. people think we're s- (0.9) (be en) (0.2) y- y'know if 
10. mobody'd av (02) asked im he wouldn't have said oh 
I'm goin here cos I'm nAu . gghty, 
The initial turn is a question, 'is there any other changes ... T, and the you-quotation in line 
4 serves to facilitate answering that question. When the mother does not respond 
immediately (line 3), either because the question is too vague, or otherwise problematic, 
the therapist continues with a secondary or supportive action, which again is a 'you said' 
quotation. The generic similarity of you said quote-introducers across a range of settings is 
that they perform a secondary role in that they appear to facilitate and assist the 
effectiveness of either a prior or subsequent primary action turn. Their specificity as a 
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usefid therapeutic tool, is not only to provide a secondary function in a larger sequence, but 
also to locate the source of the topic embedded in the quote as a client's concern. In 
essence, the structure that I am studying here has more than one function. 
Short-Cuts in an Extended Sequence 
In this next example, the therapist takes two 'short-cuts' from the extended sequence, 
effectively cutting out client's turns in the sequence altogether. At the beginning of this 
section I outlined the six stages that characterise this quote introductory sequence; however 
in this instance, the therapist condenses all three of her turns into one, 
Ext. 28 - Oakl: Sl / 375-386 
1. Father: Quite alright Sunday weren't he? = 
2. Therapist: =What dlyou think stopped it goin on, >Cos you said 
3. sometimes it goes on< for three or four days, so what dya think 
4. managed to stop it Othis. timeO? 
5. (M) 
6. Therapist: Dya think (0.3) y2u did anything differfent in it or 
In the therapist's turn on lines 24, the three 'speaker A' elements of a typical quote 
introductory sequence are present in the sarne turn, without the intervening 'speaker B' 
elements or turns; 
PART i- Vague question: What d'fyou think sLopped it goin' on Oine 2) 
PART 3- Quote introduction: >Cos you said sometimes it goes on< Oine 2/3) 
PART 5- Pursuit: so what d'ya think managed to stop it "this timeO? (line 3/4) 
It is as though the therapist anticipates after presenting a vague question initially, that she 
may not have been specific enough for the father to answer, and immediately inserts a you- 
quotation sequence as a secondary action, to help him answer the question. The speeded up 
delivery of this part of her turn indicates not just that she didn't allow room for him to 
answer at the potential transition relevant place after 'goin' on, ' but that she rushes into that 
potential space so as to retain the floor. Again, at the end of 'three or four days, ' she still 
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does not give up the floor, but continues with a pursuit-question designed to elicit a more 
specific answer to the initial question. By condensing her three potential turns into one, the 
therapist short cuts a potentially problematic turn for the father, and a minimal quote 
agreement marker. I suggest that in the first instance she anticipated potential trouble and 
made a precautionary repair by drawing on a you-quotation, and in the second instance 
negated acknowledgement of the quote-content by treating it as unlikely to be contested. 
Delayed Elaboration 
We have seen how various things can happen after agreement with the content of a 
reflected quote, immediate pursuit, delay and pursuit and immediate elaboration. One 
further variation on this part of the sequence is delayed elaboration. Again, pursuit is 
averted, but this time by the self-selection of the quoted person to elaborate without being 
prompted. 
Ext. 29 - Oakl/S2: 29.4 mins. (Steve = Father) 
1. Iberapist: Steve you said you'd rather things jus (0.6) happen. h 
2. (3.1) 
3. Father: Well yeh 
4. (0.7) 
5. Father: As: long as it happens (02) nicely [sorta thing 
6. Mother. [Heh he heh he hm heh. h 
The sequence is standard from lines I to 4, but at this point we would expect the therapist 
to intervene again with a pursuit question, to seek elaboration on the topic embedded in the 
content of the quote in the first turn. However, just at this point the person quoted (in this 
case Steve, the father) self-selects to initiate an unsolicited elaboration. This shows us once 
again, how the pursuit of more detailed information on the topic of the content of the quote, 
is understood by the quoted person to be expected. By not waiting for the therapist to 
produce a pursuit-question relevant to the 'you'd rather things jus (0.6) happen' (line 1) 
topic, the father orients to the normativity of you-quotations being used as 'first moves' in 
sequences designed to elicit more detailed information, and self-selects to elaborate further, 
'as: long as it happens (0.2) nicely sorta thing' (line 5). 
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To summarise, you-quotation turns in the form that we have been exploring, tend to play a 
secondary role in a sequence in support of a primary action - usually a question. They can 
be used either as a preface or an insertion. As an insertion sequence, their role is 
predominantly facilitative. 
TBE USEFULNESS OF QUOTING'YOU' 
Having looked in some detail at the elements of this sequence itself, I want to focus now on 
its practical uses in conversation generally, and in therapy specifically of using you- 
quotation. There are four areas in particular that this device is a useful conversational 
resource, 1) managing topic shifts as reintroductions of your concerns, 2) explaining 'how I 
know this about you', 3) accounting for a current action by reference to something you 
said, and 4) as an indirect elicitation device. 
Managing Topic Shifts as Reintroductions of Your Concerns 
The first thing that 'you said' does is to formulate the topic content of the current talk as 
your agenda (ie any 'you' who is the person that is being addressed with a 'you said' 
formulation). For example 'you said you were worried' (Ext 20). We noted earlier how the 
very act of bringing up a particular extract of talk from a previous conversation serves a 
purpose in the current one. As such, the selection of a particular quote is not random, it 
serves a purpose for the person doing the quoting relevant to the current interaction. A 
particularly useful aspect of re-introducing a topic in the form of a quote, is that it presents 
the interest in the topic as belonging to the person quoted, and not to the person doing the 
quoting. In a client-centred environment, this is therefore a useful tool for the counsellor or 
therapist to use. 'You said' provides a very neat and practical way for the therapist to 
channel the conversation in a particular direction, and yet at the same time ensure that the 
topics discussed remain client-initiated, rather than therapist imposed. 
Extract 30. G151/1047-1053. (Father--Ken) 
1. (2) 
2. Therapist: You said that (. ) always respected your dad and you've never 
3. been in trouble your dad took off (. ) when you were younger 
4. than (. ) u: m (0.5) Ken, and I'm wondering if you were ever in 
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5. trouble at this age, if you had a difficult time at this age 
6. Father: Oh yeh, 
7. Mother: Well you see this is how David justifies it all, 
The 2 second pause on line I and the turn-initial you-quotation in line 2 are pointers which 
indicate that this is a point in the interaction where there has been a topic shift. Rather than 
bringing the subject of Ken (the father) being in trouble with the police when he was 
younger as her concern, the therapist uses the quote introducer 'you said', which implies 
that it was originally his concern. Ken's involvement with the police as a youngster has 
now been made of current therapeutic relevance, and in this way we can see how the use of 
quotation from a previous session, can serve the therapist's current purpose of trying to 
identify the causes of her client's problems. In this way, what may have remained as two 
unrelated pieces of information are now joined together by the therapist as being perhaps 
related in some way. 
So, a piece of a prior conversation is brought in and used by the therapist as a way of 
addressing a current problem that is being discussed. In a way, the therapist skillfully 
weaves together different 'strands' of therapeutic talk, so that prior information can be 
utilized in the current context, and perhaps provide an explanation. 
Another way that prior conversation can be used, is to focus the discussion. In other words, 
where the therapist feels that the current discussion is not heading in a direction that will be 
therapeutically helpful or is confusing, she/he can use the you-quotation device to return to 
a previous point in the conversation. In this way, the therapist almost 're-winds' to a place 
earlier in the session, from where she/he can move forward again. In the next extract, there 
has been a lot of discussion on various topics before the therapist intervenes to bring the 
conversation back to an earlier point, and in doing so, to return to an unanswered question. 
Extract 31 (F3: P4) 
1. Therapist: Can I go back to my question? I've lost track of that bit... 
2. You said you thought other children had more friends than you 
3. did? 
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4. Client: Yes. 
5. Therapist: And what I'm interested in really is whether you think you have 
6. enough friends or whether you feet you'd like to have more 
friends in class? 
The therapist's interjection in the flow of conversation at this point is appears to be an 
attempt to divert the conversation from the current topic, and to return to an earlier issue; a 
"track7' or line of enquiry that he has apparently not satisfactorily completed, and may be a 
therapeutically more useful topic to explore finiher, than the one that they are currently 
engaged in. The interjection is formulated as a question, 'can I go back ... T The addition of 
an explanation makes his request more likely to be granted. Because there is no pause for 
the client to agree, one assumes that the question and explanation are merely rhetorical. In 
clarifying where exactly he wants the client to go back to, the therapist does not simply re- 
ask the question, but picks up on the first part of the client's answer. The specification of 
what the client said that was therapeutically relevant by the therapist, shows the client what 
kind of thing he wants the client to talk more about; in this case, not having as many friends 
as the other children (fine 2). 
In this instance, it is the therapist who 'takes control' so to speak of where the conversation 
is currently heading by requesting that they return to a particular point earlier in the 
conversation (before he 'lost track'). Therefore, it is the therapist who elects what the 
current topic should now be, as a starting point for its future trajectory as one would expect 
for institutional talk of this kind. However, by quoting the client's words, the therapist is 
able to keep the issue as not just his agenda or interest, but also and more importantly one 
which was originally the client's, which they are now returning to. In this respect, the 
therapist maintains control over the direction and content of the conversation, keeping the 
focus of the interaction 'on track' as it were. A client may discuss a wide range of issues 
during the course of a session or a series of sessions, and in this way the therapist can make 
sure that those topics that are potentially therapeutically relevant are kept in focus. 
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Explaining 'How I Know This About You' 
We are generally accountable for the kind of infonnation we know about other people, 
especially if it is particularly personal. 'You said' provides a way for accounting for 'how I 
know that about you'. In this next example the therapist inserts a 'you said account' into 
the middle of his tum. 
Extract 32 (F3: P13) 
1. Therapist: Mmm. Well, I imagine one of the very hard things is that if you 
2. live in a small space - as you said at the beginning - there's very, 
3. very little space for the pair of you to have any discussion, or be 
4. upset or be with each other, or be even cross with each other, 
5. without the boys knowing. 
Here, the therapist provides an account for how he knows that they live in a small space by 
reminding them that they 'said at the beginning' (line2). Where a speaker may wish to raise 
or reintroduce a particular topic into the current interaction, but that topic may be one 
which is rather personal in a way that the speaker may be accountable in some way for 
knowing that kind of information, using you-quotation can provide legitimate grounds for 
the speaker's knowledge. As we also saw in Extract 7, quoting what 'you said' indexes the 
basis of the speaker's knowledge about the subject matter as at least partly derived from the 
person addressed rather than some external source, and that there is or at least has been an 
already established shared knowledge about this particular topic. For example, in the Hank 
and Lil conversation (Ext. 26), this shared knowledge was implicitly represented by reference 
to 'those people'. 
Accounting for a Current Action 
A further activity of you-said quote introducers is that of accounting for a prior action by 
reference to 'you' having initiated it. In this telephone extract the initial action has been that 
of the first speaker telephoning the recipient. The extract is taken from the opening turns of 
the conversation and in this instance you-quotation is used to account for 'why I'm ringing 
you . 
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Extract 33 (Hl-Phone call - 05: Pl- Holt) 
1. Nan: Can p4h hear me:? 
2. Les: Ye: s? 
3. Nan: -* You said phone Mon: dee e: veni: ng? = 
4. Les: =Yes if yau want anyth[ing. 
5. Nan: [Which I'm doýmg? 
6. Les: Ye: s, = 
7. Nan: =No: w I want t'morro: w (0.3) twn scomes 
As the sequence unfolds, we can see that the reason for Nan's call to Lesley is to request 
that she bring her some scones (line 7). However, to make an unsolicited call to someone 
with a request, even if that person is a close relative, may be viewed by some at least as 
being a bit cheeky or presumptive. It appears that it is this kind of concern that Nan orients 
to in her opening turns. She begins with 'you said phone Monday evening' (line 3), as a 
preliminary to her request. I suggest that in this instance, the you-quotation serves to 
account for why she has called. In other words she (Nan) is not initiating the request, but 
merely responding to a prior offer of help. Because the you-said turn also comes as a 
preliminary to a request it fits the general pattern that this kind of 'you said' quote- 
introduction sequence generally operates as a secondary or supportive action to either a prior 
or subsequent primary action. In this case the primary action follows, and the you-quotation 
operates as a pre-curser to that request 'I want t'morrow (03) two scones'. It therefore fulfils 
a dual firriction as both a secondary action, and as an accounting practice for a prior action. 
An Indirect Elicitation Device 
Of all that has been discussed in terms of examining how you-quotation is used in therapy, 
its use as an indirect elicitation device is probably the most important. If we re-cap on the 
core sequence as a whole, the you-quotation part comes first, followed by confirmation, 
pursuit and finally elaboration. The ultimate end of the sequence is for the person quoted to 
elaborate ftirther on the topic of conversation that they are quoted on. For example, when 
the therapist in extract 14 says to the client 'you said earlier you weren't happyT her use of 
this question provides an environment for the client to talk more about not being happy, to 
elaborate on that topic. The confirmation and pursuit elements of the sequence serve as 
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stepping-stones to that end, but are not always necessary. We saw in extract 29 that the 
therapist introduces a topic via you-quotation ('you said you'd rather things jus' happen), 
which is followed by both an agreement and elaboration in the same turn from the 
addressee, without the deployment of a pursuit question. 
When we consider the need for therapists to elicit information from their clients about all 
manner of things, often personal, potentially embarrassing or accountable (maybe illegal), 
then we can appreciate that direct methods of questioning may be inappropriate, and may 
even be perceived as confrontational. Therefore, indirect techniques such as this one have 
an important role to play. The therapist can lead the client into a particular area of 
discussion by using you-quotation, and to a large extent, allow the client to elaborate 
further on that topic without too much direct questioning. So whilst you-quotation may be a 
kind of pre-cursor or introductory turn to a follow-up or pursuit question relevant to that 
topic, it can in its own right at times precipitate elaboration without a follow-up question, 
because the ultimate end of the sequence is projected in the you-quotation turn. As such the 
you-quotation sequence, or any abbreviation of it can serve as a useful indirect elicitation 
device. 
Summary 
The focus of this chapter has been on the quote-introductory uses of 'you said'. Ilie first 
part of the core sequence is constituted by the two elements, 'you' plus a quote 
introductory verb followed by the content of the quotation. I have shown how quote- 
introductory verbs are not used arbitrarily in spoken interaction, but appear to be used in 
some systematically observable ways, dependent in part on the degree to which overtly 
evaluative work is being done by the speaker. 
I have concentrated largely on the form and structure of a recurrent 4-part core sequence in 
which you-quotation is found, demonstrating the robustness of this model across a range of 
formal and informal settings. The four elements that characterise what I refer to as the core 
sequence are 1) you-quotation, 2) confirmation, 3) pursuit, 4) elaboration. I have discussed 
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each of these elements in detail throughout this chapter, showing how they relate to one 
another and are found as a unit of turns in various instances. 
The second stage of this analysis has been to show that this sequence is also sometimes 
found within a larger sequence which I have called the extended sequence. The extended 
sequence retains the same core elements, but in addition is preceded by two additional 
components, firstly a vague question and secondly a delay. These two elements are 
sometimes found to precede the core sequence that the bulk of this chapter has given 
attention to. However, it has been important to included these additional elements, as they 
show a recurrent sequential context for the basic core sequence. Whilst every one of the 
six elements that we have looked at may not always be present, I have argued that where 
one or more are absent, they are normatively oriented to by the participants. 
Another feature of the findings of this analysis is that it appears that a speaker's choice of 
quote-introductory verbs is sensitive and appropriate to the content of the quote reported 
and both the original context of utterance and the current context of its repetition. It was 
also found that participants orient to the indexicality of talk, demonstrating this in the 
current situation by re-establishing the 'still valid' nature of the quote content in its 
reported environment, from its original one. You-quotations provide an environment for 
producing information as 'given' either by collaboratively establishing it as such (quote 
introduction, confirmation, pursuit), or unilaterally treating it as so (quote introduction and 
pursuit). In this way, prior speech is made relevant in the current interaction by virtue of its 
potential relevance to a future trajectory. The particular type of you-quotation which I have 
focused on here, has both a role and a function within larger talk sequences. 
The Role of You-Quotation 
Its role is primarily to operate as a secondary action, supporting or facilitating a prior or 
subsequent primary action. This works in two ways. As a secondary action you-quotations 
can act as pre-sequences which lead up to a subsequent primary action. Their role in this 
environment is to establish a foundation of what is known so far, or in other words to 
establish a basis for proceeding. A typical subsequent primary action, following a you- 
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quotation acting as a pre-sequence would be some form of accusation or confrontation, and 
not surprisingly this is most commonly found in courtroom interactions. Another role for 
you-quotations as secondary actions is to operate as insertion sequences. Typically in these 
instances, a vague question is posed initially by the first speaker, which the second speaker 
demonstrates difficulty in answering iminediately. Where such trouble occurs, the you- 
quotation sequence can act as a prompt to remind the hearer of something which will 
enable them to answer, or as a channel to specify what was meant be the question. Either 
way, the you-quotation as an insertion sequence assists the recipient to better answer the 
original question. 
Ile Function of You-Quotation 
The finction of you-quotations, as a therapeutic tool in particular, lies partly in their ability 
to locate a source of concern or conversational agenda within what the client has said. In 
the examples that we looked at where the therapist takes the first turn in the sequence, 
he/she is able to formulate the current topic as not just manufactured 'here and now' in line 
with the therapists pre-determined agenda, but as a topic that was previously and initially 
raised by the client, which the therapist is 'merely' repeating in the current interaction. This 
animator-only footing shift, made opportune by you-quotation, facilitates the creation of an 
environment in which 'topic' is managed as predominantly 'client-centered'. Furthermore, 
it facilitates the production of the therapist's position as one who has listened attentively to 
the client's own concerns, and has designed her/his therapeutic agenda to match or 
accommodate those concerns rather than to impose his/her 'expert' notions about what the 
clients problems may be. Thus, the specificity of its usefulness as a therapeutic tool, is that 
is provides an explanatory resource for justifying, accounting for, or clarifying an initially 
problematic question, whilst simultaneously locating the source of the question-topic as the 
clients' concern. Apart from its fimction as a footing device, you-quotation can also be 
used to account for knowledge and/or actions, i. e. 'how I know V or 'why I did X'. 
To suminarise then, the role of you-quotation is overwhelmingly a secondary action which 
supports a primary action within its immediate environment. It does so in two ways, as an 
insertion sequence, or as a pre-sequence. The mainfunction of you-quotation is to facilitate 
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footing shifts in making topic (re)introductions, so that the speaker becomes merely an 
'animator' rather than the author or principal of the content of the topic shift. Furthermore, 
you-quotations also operate as devices which formalise prior utterances, as now 'on the 
record'. This function can then be used as a starting point to either undermine an 
addressee's prior testimony or to affiliate oneself with the addressee in the current 
interaction. You-quotations with confrontational trajectories tend to be characterised by 
their appearance as pre-sequences, whilst their facilitative role more commonly occurs 
when they appear as insertion sequences. The therapeutic relevance of the use of you- 
quotation in the main is that they provide an ideal position for the therapist to produce 
fclient centered' topic-transitions. Furthermore, they also assist the therapist by operating 
as an indirect elicitation device, where agreement and elaboration is projected from you- 
quotation. 
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CHAPTER 6 
VERSIONS 
In this chapter I will be looking at how two particular concerns are apparently 'worked up' 
or 'constructed' in the course of therapeutic talk-in-interaction: These are 'truth', and 
'importance'. Although these two are treated as separate sub-sections, they are not 
mutually exclusive. In both cases, what is accepted as so, is the end of a process rather than 
a starting point. Truth, as an everyday currency, is something to be established; it is 
something that can be claimed, refuted, and argued about. It is something that has to be 
agreed to be upon as a basis for proceeding. Where there are conflicting versions, what 
comes to be established as true may be the product of factors such as expert knowledge, 
personal knowledge, corroboration, and objective evidence to name a few. However, there 
are circumstances where what is 'true' is not always necessarily agreed on. There are times 
when it appears that in argumentative envirom-nents it is sufficient to just cast some 
4reasonable doubt' on another person's claim. This is the case in the particular extracts that 
relate to this chapter. More specifically, I have selected those instances where doubt is 
inferred specifically by the use of reporting what a third party has said. In other words a 
eversion' of what has occurred is stated as such via the change of footing that reported 
speechinvokes. 
We will look at the construction of versions of importance in a similar way. The emphasis 
on this part of the analysis however concentrates more on whose versions come to be 
accepted as 'more legitimate' than other's. This topic draws on interactants' own practices 
for establishing dominance pertaining to whose version comes to be accepted by the 
majority, or by those who have the authority to endorse it as so. A unifying principle which 
will act as a framework for the analyses of these processes, is that of contrast structures, 
whether they be overtly claimed or present by implication. 
This chapter focuses analytically particularly on the construction of versions of events 
within the enviromnent of a family therapy clinic. A starting point for all of the analysis 
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that follows is that truth is not a fundamental 'fact', but rather something that becomes 
accepted as such as the result of versions of reality that succeed in their persuasiveness over 
others. I will show that reported speech can be a major way that an element of doubt about 
the accuracy of another person's version can be introduced. This is achieved via subtle 
changes of footing, which demonstrates a dis-alignment on the part of the speaker with the 
reported version. 
Furthermore, the construction of the concepts of 'importance', 'understanding' and 
'remembering' will also be investigated as potentially contestable versions in a similar 
way, not just as a simple mental constructs, but more sophisticatedly, as rhetorical devices 
within their specific contexts of use. The topic of remembering for example, will be 
considered as a participant's concern by looking at how the concept of 'memory', what one 
'knows' of the past can be potentially alterable. In the context of the use of memory in 
conjunction with a piece of reported speech, I will show that this combination has the effect 
of implying that there may be some kind of mismatch between what was said and what 
really happened, without being directly accusatory. 
CONSTRUCTING TRUTH 
There are many ways that this particular topic could be approached, in this instance I am 
led by the data to identify the use of reported speech as a means of casting doubt on what 
another person has claimed or stated as fact. The use of reported speech has traditionally 
been almost synonymous with its use in enhancing the validity of a person's claim to 
facticity in their reporting (see Potter, 1996; Woofitt, R. 1992). The use of specific details 
such as exact times, names, place references are often additionally used in validating a 
claim. Such attention to detail in reporting versions of events has the effect of 'bringing the 
story to fifc', removing it from the plateau of the general and the unsubstantiated, and 
elevating it to a position of the actual, specific, and real. However, I have observed from 
my own analysis that at times reported speech can be used for a quite different purpose 
altogether. Rather than evidencing a claim, it can conversely be used to apparently 
undermine a claim; in other words, to display a degree of scepticism, or to imply doubt. 
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Doing Non-aligmnent With Reported Speech 
In her writings about methods for engendering scepticism, Pomerantz claims that there are 
&at least three stances a speaker may adopt when offering a report: 
1. (s)he may endorse the description as true with an indication of some degree of certainty, 
2. (s)he may display skepticism or doubt regarding the report's truthfulness; or 
3. (s)he may be a "mere reporter", giving the information only as it is known to the speaker. ' 
(Pomerantz 1988/89: 295). 
Here Pomerantz presents a case that a speaker can do one of three things, he/she can either 
endorse a description, or display scepticism or act as a 'mere reporter'. A common way of 
acting as 'mere reporter' is to repeat someone else's assertion, that is to cite a source along 
with the claim. As Pomerantz suggests, 'this reporting practice may be used when a 
speaker has insufficient knowledge to judge the validity of an assertion, does not want to 
go on the record with his/her position, and/or is being careful to get the facts just right' 
(1988/89: 295). In the footnotes to this paragraph, Pomerantz cites a mother telephoning a 
poison control centre, where she reports that 'she's thrown up on her own and she says she 
has burning on her throat', using this as an example of 'merely reporting', a practice she 
claims is used 'when individuals feel the need to be precise' (p31 1). As Pomerantz points 
out, this practice is used where the speaker may be unwilling to validate an assertion by 
claiming personal knowledge, however I question her claim that 'merely reporting' is 
always a means of 'being more precise'. 
I suggest that reporting provides an environment for something else, which I suppose the 
speaker may be happy to allow the hearer to receive as 'more precise'. That something else 
is to introduce an element of doubt about the validity of the assertion, and in doing so 
separating the speaker from ownership of, or responsibility for the report's accuracy, in 
effect displaying non-alignment. Therefore, I suggest that the three divisions that 
Pomerantz claims are not sufficient, as they do not always or necessarily appear in talk as 
discrete categories. In fact, a speaker can display scepticism by presenting their description 
as a 'mere report'. What I mean by this is that when a speaker chooses to use reported 
speech in what appears to be just reporting they change their footing from author to 'mere 
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. ator'. As a conversational move, the effect of this footing change is to introduce an 
element of doubt as to the absolute facticity of the claim, thus the speaker dis-aligns 
him/herself with the report. 
A simple example of the use of reported speech to demonstrate a non-alignment with a 
reported version is given by Sacks (Vol 2, part 5 Winter 1971: March 4 p309). He 
demonstrates the difference between reporting 'he had to go' and 'he said he had to go'. By 
baldly stating 'he had to go' an implication has already been introduced that 'he' really did 
have to go. This type of unmodified assertion has the appearance to a hearer of being 
uncontaminated by the speaker's own position. Whereas 'he said he had to go' changes the 
focus for the hearer from the action of going that is being reported, to the action of 'telling' 
about going. Thus, a question may be raised about why 'he said' is there. It is 
grammatically unnecessary, and as far as reporting the facts, also apparently unnecessary. 
So immediately we can hear the 'he said' as not just a pronominal introduction to the 
reported speech, but also as subtly evaluative. 
In the utterance 'he had to go', the animator and the author are the same person - the 
speaker. However in the utterance 'he said he had to go' a division between the author and 
the animator has been introduced. The 'he' of the story has now been allocated the role of 
author, whilst the speaker remains the animator. It is this separation of the roles of author 
and animator which puts the second utterance on a completely different footing than the 
first. As Goffinan states, this change of footing, 'implies a change in the alignment we take 
up to ourselves and the others present as expressed in the way we manage the production or 
reception of an utterance' (1981: 128). 
In the course of a stretch of talk, there may not be an observable change in footing, but the 
basis of the talk will necessarily be on some footing. However, it is by looking at what 
changes of footing accomplish, and at how alternative scenarios could have been played 
out, that we can then look with greater understanding at what is happening when there are 
no changes as such. This next extract is an exwnple of the use of 'he said' is a footing 
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stance which makes explicit that the speaker, whilst being the animator, is not also the 
author of what is being reported. 
Ext 1. Gl/S2. L1098-99 
1. Father: this bike that he pinched, when the kid got it back he said that (5) they'd 
ripped his seat so we've got to buy him a new seat now, 
In this extract, that the bike was pinched is presented straightforwardly as established fact. 
The indexical use of 'this' enhances the status of the stolen bike as an already established 
fact. Thus 'this bike that he pinched' is a statement which is uncontested and simply 
asserted, and clearly identifies the bike in question. In contrast, we find that as the speaker 
goes on to discuss responsibility for the ripped seat, he reports that the child who owned the 
bike 'said that they'd ripped his seat'. As the speaker continues with his narrative about the 
ripped seat incident, the consequences are clearly to do with whose responsibility it was to 
replace the seat. What he doesn't say is that when his son and his friends had stolen the 
bike, they had also ripped the seat. Instead he refers to what the owner of the bike said had 
happened. So, there is a contrast between 'this bike that he pinched', which is presented as 
fact, and 'he said that they'd ripped his seat', which is presented as a version. 
Ile introduction of reported speech at this point in the narrative alters the footing, and thus 
changes the speaker's alignment, from 'author' to gmere animator' by reporting another 
person's claim rather than stating his own knowledge. In other words by inserting a clear 
footing-shift marker in the forrn of 'he said', the speaker highlights a move away from 
alignment with the contents of the report, to a deliberate and hearable dis-alignment. An 
element of doubt about the actual facticity is consequently introduced without such 
scepticism being overtly claimed. In effect, he reports having accepted responsibility for 
replacing the seat, whilst at the same time indicating an element of doubt as to whether his 
son really was responsible for the damage. 
The use of reported speech in this extract displays, and claims the ripped seat episode as a 
version. Instead of the reported speech being used to evidence a claim as Pomerantz 
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suggests in the example of the little girl whose mother reports that she 'says she has a 
burning in her throat', the use of reported speech in this case is used to imply that what the 
third party has claimed is only a version which may or may not be accurate. In effect, the 
speaker is not endorsing the report, but simply relaying it. The Merence between these 
two examples lies partly in the function of the claims being made via reported speech. In 
the case of the mother speaking to the poison control centre, her concern is to explain as 
fully as possible what the symptoms are so that she can be given the appropriate help and 
advice. In contrast, in the situation with the damaged bike, the focus of the discussion is on 
blame and responsibility; there are interested parties involved, who have a stake in who is 
allocated blame for the damage because they will also have to bear the responsibility and 
cost of paying to repair the damage. In this scenario, accountability is may be contested. 
Therefore, when reported speech is used in this setting, it is not a matter of the client's 
father supporting the victim's father's claim by reporting what he said. On the contrary, as 
an opposing contestant in the argument, the client's father is highlighting the fact that what 
the victim's father said may well biased by what is at stake. In other words by reporting 
that the victim's father 'said' the client had ripped the seat, he is implying at the same time 
that there may be other competing versions of the same scenario, such as what the client 
himself said about who ripped the seat, or what a witness may have said about who did it. 
The message is clear - reported speech can be used and is used in certain situations to 
present a report as a version, a potentially contestable version of a particular event. In doing 
so, the reported speech also implies a degree of doubt as to the validity of what is reported, 
after all, it is one person's representation of a situation, but may not be the definitive 
version. 
This brief encounter therefore shows us that people themselves orient to other people's talk 
as action-oriented. By that I mean that the participants themselves appear to recognize and 
treat one another's talk not just as a straightforward and honest reflection of what they 
treally' think, but as context sensitive, designed for the particular content and possible 
trajectory of the current interaction. The fact that the victim's father in our example blames 
the chent for the ripped bike seat is not just a simple 'reporting of fact' but an action of 
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blaming, pertinent to the larger context of an argument about responsibility for repairing 
the damage. 
In the previous example, 'he said' was used to separate out what the speaker aligned with 
as fact, and what the speaker merely reported as a version of events. The next extract is 
similar, with the client again using reported speech to dis-align himself his report of what 
his father said. The focal turns are towards the end of the extract. 
Ext 2. G1/S3. L243-249 
1. Therapist: It wouldn't have made much sense if your mum and dad if one of 
2. them had gone to pick you up and had a car crash'cos they'd too 
3. much wine? 
4. (2) 
5. Client: Well I asked I asked them (1) 1 said are you drunk he said no, 
6. Father: Well I wasn't [drunk 
Mother: [You don't have to be drunk [to be over the limit 
What I want to show in this example is that the skepticism introduced by using reported 
speech in this way is not just my analysts interpretation, but is clearly oriented to by the 
participants themselves. The client is reporting a telephone conversation with his father 
during which he asked his father if he was drunk. His rendition of what happened which 
includes 'he said no' (line 5), stimulates an immediate response from his father to defend 
himself by stating 'well I wasn't drunk'. It is this response which is of particular interest to 
us. Firstly, the client's father does not dispute that he said 'no'. In fact by adding to the 
claim by giving a justification for having said it, he simultaneously validates the claim that 
he had said it in the first place. So, the fact that he said 'no' is not being questioned. What 
is in question however, is whether he really was drunk or not. 
What is implicitly conveyed in what the client reports is that there was a possible 
discrepancy between what his father said, and what was actually the case. It is exactly this 
implication of discrepancy that is picked up by the father, and provokes his response to 
justify himself in the current interaction by emphasising that he really wasn't drunk. His 
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need to make that clear, illustrates how the use of reported speech in the prior turn was 
treated as contrasting what he had said from what was really the case. The reply 'well I 
wasn't drunk' is clearly both an emphatic re-emphasis of the original claim, but also a 
defence. However, it is not obvious in the first turn that any accusation was being made, 
that might occasion that defence. 
To gloss briefly on what has happened up to this point, the client's argument with his 
parents at this point is that it wasn't his fault that he didn't come home until I o'clock in 
the morning, but that it was his dad's fault for not picking him up (it later transpires that he 
was late because he had to walk home). The therapist appears to 'take sides' with the 
client's parents in fines 1-3 when she defends their reasons for not picking him up because 
they might have 'had a car crash 'cos they'd too much wine'. It is in response to this 
suggestion that the client explains that he had telephoned and asked his dad if he was drunk 
and his dad had 'said no' (line 5). The basis of the argument is that on one side the therapist 
and the client's parents are saying that they had had a glass of wine and so couldn't drive. 
The client on the other hand, is saying that at the time he had asked if they were drunk and 
his dad said no. There seems to be a discrepancy created by the way that the client portrays 
what his dad said at the time, and what appears to be the basis of the argument for not 
picking him up now, ie. They couldn't drink and drive. As it turns out, the apparent 
discrepancy is cleared up by the intervention of the client's mother in line 7, who explains 
that 'you don't have to be drunk to be over the limit'. In doing so, she clarifies the 
difference between being drunk and having had too much alcohol to be safe to drive. This 
dissipates the argument, by showing how what the father said on the night of the incident 
about not being drunk is not contrary to the reasons given for not driving that are being 
discussed in the current conversation. So, let's look back now at the target lines. 
Ext 2(b) GI/SI: L 247-248 
5. Client Well I asked I asked them (1) 1 said are you drunk he said no, 
6. Father Well I wasn't [drunk 
Firstly, as I have already discussed, the turn by the client in line 5 is in response to a 
question from the therapist (lines 1-3). So, the turn that follows from the father is the result 
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of overhearing the client's turn which was directed at the therapist. His assertion is made as 
a response to what was said by his son, although he was not actually the one who was 
directly addressed. The turn 'I said are you drunk and he said no' (line 5) is both a 
justification in response to what the therapist has just said, and simultaneously an 
accusation against his father. 'Me accusation in effect shifts the blame from himself to his 
father. So, what may appear superficially as just a statement of fact about what two people 
said to one another on a prior occasion, a 'mere reporting', turns out to be not so 
straightforward. However, it is the father's response to this statement which shows that he 
at least treated what his son said as casting doubt on how genuine what he is quoted to 
have said was. 
As analysts we cannot assume that the client's intention was to be accusatory or to imply 
doubt, because it is impossible to know. The only evidence we have that we can use to 
discover what it might have been, is what was said, and how what was said was treated by 
the co-participants in the interaction. The claims I am making about the use of reported 
speech as a way of casting doubt on the validity of another person's claim are based on 
how reported speech is treated by the co-participants. This means that I am not 
superimposing my interpretation, but explicating the interactants' interpretations of the 
conversational actions that are happening between them. 
I suggest that unless the father heard what his son had said to the therapist in the 
immediately prior turn as an act of displaying incongruity with reality, he would not have 
self-selected to make his defence in the way that he did. What happened by the client using 
reported speech in this way was that a contrast was introduced between what was said and 
what was true. It is precisely this implication that the client's father was seeking to rebut by 
re-stating that he wasn't drunk. Let us look now at a couple more examples of how this 
contrast between what a person is reported to have said and what may actually be the case 
is constructed. In the cases we will now look at the issue is one of constructing relevance. 
In the following extract, the client begins by describing a trope, or metaphor - something 
that apparently is said often, that he is now relaying in the context and for the purposes of 
133 
the current interaction. The metaphor he uses is of an issue being repeatedly 'pulled back 
up', like a plant that is frequently disturbed and pulled back out of the ground. 
Ext 3. G1/S1. L1716-1727 
1. Client They keep pulling that back up, oh when he was little he couldn't 
2. of loved you more. Y- w- (0.2) He couldn't have loved anybody 
3. more than he loved you. ffeigned deep voice)) 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
ii. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
(0.6) 
Client: (Well) it's a shame that I can't remember none of that all I can 
remember is him p1inching me, an- (0.4) shoUtin' at me and 
swEaring at me an- 
(4.2) 
Client: .1h.. -knob head-. 
(1.2) 
Therapist: Maybe it's easier to remember those bits. 
Client: Mm? 
Therapist: Maybe it's easier to remember those bits. 
Client: Oh and they said th- th-... hh that () he was good with me when I 
was liatle. 
In this extract the client reports something that his parents had said earlier in the same 
session (lines 14-15 'they said th-th- that (. ) he was good with me when I was little'). The 
use of indirect reported speech, together with the fact that the reported speech is a 
combination of what two people have said (the 'they' being the clients parents) inevitably 
means that what is reported is very much a gloss or formulation of what had been said. The 
client's turn is apparently complete after 'little' in that it has finishing intonation and is 
grammatically complete as a sentence, however there is more to it than this. The turn-inifial 
introduction to the reported speech in fine I of this extract is not in the canonical 'they said' 
format, but the phrase that the client uses, "keep pulling that back up" implies both that 
something has been said ('pulling that back up'), and that it has been said repeatedly 
('keep'). Furthermore, the use of this phrase implies that the topic that has repeatedly been 
brought up by the boy's parents is one which is old, possibly even buried. The term 
4pulling' suggests an effort to retrieve the information, coupled with 'back up' suggesting 
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that the information was once current but has been let go of or dropped, so that to bring up 
the subject is both a process of resurrection to some extent and one of effort. 
Following this introduction comes the change of state marker 'oh' (Heritage, 1984) which 
marks a transition from a description of the general behaviour of his parents to a segment 
of active voicing. Whilst, 'oh' as a conversational particle has most commonly been 
interpreted as a change-of-state marker; this 'change of state' may not necessarily be 
interpreted as a cognitive one. According to Schegloff, "oh can claim a change in the 
speaker's state, but its utterance enacts an interactional stance and does not necessarily 
reflect a cognitive event. " (1991: 157). Taking this position in relation to the piece of data 
that we are investigating, the particle 'oh' represents an indicator of a change in 
interactional state; in this case the introduction of reported speech using active voicing. 
"when he was little he couldn't of loved you more. Y- w- (0.2) He couldn't have loved 
anybody more than he loved you. " (lines 1-3). The active voicing is most clearly 
identifiable from the feigned imitation in the tone of the speaker's voice, an alteration of 
voice quality that continues throughout this part of the client's turn. Although it is not clear 
who he is imitating we can assume that it is the voice of his mother as the person reference 
is masculine in both cases ie. 'he (father) couldn't have love anybody more than he loved 
you (client)'. After a short pause, the client continues with 'well', used in this instance as a 
pre-curser to what turns out to be a contrastive statement that acts to undermine the validity 
of the claims that he has just reported moments earlier. 
The format he chooses does not deny that the claims are true, but has a sarcastic edge as he 
continues that "it's a shame that I can't remember none of that, all I can remember is him 
plInching me, an- (0.4) shoutin' at me and swearing at me an-w" (lines 5-7). The use of 
rcan't remember' leaves the possibility open that his parents were telling the truth, but that 
simultaneously displays a discrepancy between the two versions. The client 'remembers' 
being punched, shouted at and sworn at. His parents on the other hand, reported that they 
couldn't have loved anyone more than their son. The extract that we have been examining 
comes towards the end of a larger sequence in which the client talks at greater length about 
the apparent dichotomy of how his parents love him, and yet treat him badly. What appears 
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at first contradictory becomes clearer on closer inspection. To appreciate this we need to 
look briefly at the extended sequence preceding the extract that we have already looked at. 
Ext 4. G1/S1. L. 1660-1717. 
Client: They don't do nothing for me s2p they can sod em ... hh 1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
ii. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
16. 
17. 
18. 
19. 
20. 
21. 
22. 
23. 
24. 
25. 
26. 
27. 
28. 
29. 
30. 
(12) 
Client I aint goin to do [nothing for them. 
Therapist [Th- ] The problem is (0.4) that it's 
not just sodding them it's sodding y2u. 
Client: No not really. 
Therapist: But you're the one that's in trouble with the police, (1.2) and 
you're the one that's >wrecking your lungs-< wre- wrecking your 
lungs with the fags 
(3.2) 
Client: Yeh but it's only myself but because they (0.2) love me (1.6) and 
I'm wrecking my Lungs they get upset. 
(0.8) 
Client: And because tha- they love me and I'm getting in trouble with the 
police, and I could get banged up and all this they're getting upset. 
(0.6) 
Client So (0.6) it gets them one way or another. 
(2) 
Therapist: Do they reaUy deserve to be got 
(1.8) 
Client: TYeh. 
(1.8) 
Client You don't see how they treat me. 
(2) 
Client: Js- nasty really nasty. 
(1.2) 
Client How they can just (1.6) s- swear at me and, (1) threaten to kick my 
head in an-, (M) and [then just be as nice as- nice as I pie, 
Therapist: [(I've not seen that today) 
Client: to my sisters. 
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31. (5.4) 
32. Client Never shut up, David dont do this, David don't do that (1.2) 
33. Carina you can do this, Leanne you can do that, David you CA-n'L 
34. (3.8) 
35. Client Like last Wednesday, (1.8) 
((17 lines omitted)) 
36. Client so I just slammed the door, (1) told him to F off and walked away. 
37. (2.6) 
38. Therapist: Very civilised exchange. 
39. (2A) 
40. Client: -He's (a knob)- 
41. (4.2) 
42. Client They keep pulling that back up, oh when he was little he couldn't 
43. of loved you more. Y- w- (0.2) He couldn't have loved anybody 
44. more than he loved you. ((feigned deep voice)) 
45. (0.6) 
46. Client: (Well) it's a shame that I can't remember none of that an I can 
47. remember is him p1inching me, an- (0.4) shoUtin'at me and 
48. swearing at me an- 
49. (4.2) 
50. Client .. h h.. -knob head-. 
Note first of all, that in lines II and 14, the client clearly repeats the statement 'they love 
me' when referring to his parents. However, the occasion of him saying this occurs amidst 
a bitter argument regarding how he is glad that his behaviour upsets his parents (see lines 
12 & 15). In other words, he is trying to 'get' them (lines 17 & 19). When questioned by the 
therapist in line 19 about whether his parents deserve to be 'got, he maintains that they do 
Oine 21) and goes on to justify his position by explaining how badly they treat him (line 
23-33). The logic of the client's argument is quite sophisticated; to start with, he knows that 
his parents love him, and yet they treat him badly. They don't act towards him in a way that 
he expects them to if they were demonstrating that love. 
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Another aspect of this section of talk is that the parents express that they love him, and that 
they feel hurt and upset when he does things that are hurtful to himself such as smoking 
and getting into trouble with the police The client is obviously upset by the way his parents 
treat him, and explains that in order to retaliate, he acts in ways that upset them - namely by 
causing harm to himself. A bizarre 'catch 22' situation has thus been created, with the 
client causing himself harm in order to 'get back' at his parents and upset them. They react 
by punishing him for his bad behaviour and becoming cross with him, which in turn 
stimulates his response of self-inflicted harm. The difficulty for the therapist is how to 
break this destructive cycle of attack and counter-attack, so that the family system can 
begin to fimction normally again. 
The client's explanation of what the problems in the family are about, to start with consists 
of a general gloss on the kinds of things that his parents do that constitute bad treatment. 
After presenting this characterization of their behaviour there is a lengthy 3.8 second pause 
(line 34) during which time the therapist makes no response to the allegafions by way of 
assessment as would usually be expected. At this point the client continues to defend his 
position by being more specific about his claims, this time giving a concrete example of a 
recent event which typifies the general behaviour of his parents that he has just 
characterized. I have omitted the detail of this story for the sake of keeping the extract as 
short as possible. The point I wish to make however, is that firstly the client makes general 
claims about the way his parents treat him, for example in line 25 he claims that they are 
6nasty really nasty'. He then goes on to elaborate a little by explaining that they swear at 
him and threaten him (line 27). However, when the 'non-response' of the therapist occurs 
in line 34, a place where we would expect her to make some comment or 
acknowledgement, he chooses to instantiate his claim with a specific example. 
Pomerantz showed in her analysis of small claims courts that whilst generalizations are at 
times useful because they are more difficult to refute than specific examples, the use of 
exact detail at times can make facticity more tangible (1987). The client's rendition of an 
argument is reported as an instantiation of the 'nasty' treatment that he receives from his 
parents. The report concludes with a description of how he had sworn at his father, and 
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receives from the therapist the anticipated story assessment, albeit a sarcastic one, "very 
civilized exchange" in line 38. The client responds by producing a description of his father 
that characterizes him in such a way as to imply that his manner of speaking to his father 
was justified, "he's a knob" (line 40). 
My point in showing this extract is to demonstrate that the client is able to hold two 
apparently contradictory ideas in tension. On the one hand, he clearly states that his parents 
love him (lines II& 14), and on the other hand he goes into considerable detail about how 
badly they treat him. When we hear the report of how much his parents had loved him 
when he was little, we can now understand a little better why the speaker may have chosen 
to say "I can't remember none of thaf' (line 50). The crux of the argument is consistent 
with what has just been said in the preceding few minutes. In the preceding fines, the client 
himself talks about the fact that they love him. The issue of whether they love him or not, 
does not therefore seem to be the issue in question. What is in question however, is the way 
that they treat him now. Although his parents say they love him, the way that they act 
towards him is not consistent with that claim. So, when the client says that he can't 
remember how close he and his parents were when he was younger, he is not denying that 
they were, but rather making a point that that was a long time ago, and therefore not 
necessarily relevant to the current situation. In essence, the issue in this argument is one of 
comparing what someone says with what they do, and either validating what is said or 
undermining it by referring to contradictory actions. 
CONSTRUCTING INTORTANCE 
A pervasive theme for family members generally, and one which invariably comes out in 
the therapeutic environment also, is the extent to which parents allow their children degrees 
of freedom to have or do what they want. This involves the production, by various family 
members, of descriptions and narratives that define, legitimate or undermine those various 
wants or sanctions. The notion of 'importance' is invoked by children and adults alike 
when making conflicting demands of one another, or when producing conflicting versions 
of events. According to the dictionary definition, something is important if it is 'of great 
consequence'. So, importance is linked to consequence. Consequence is 'that which 
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follows from any cause'. The emphasis of the meaning of the word 'importance' 
semantically, is on what happens next the consequence of the thing, action, thought, issue 
or whatever, is what makes it more or less important. In other words, the 'thing' that is 
current topic in a given conversation can be measured abstractly as more or less important 
depending on the degree of severity of what follows on from it - the consequence. 
Consequences can be measured in crude terms as either good or bad, desirable or 
undesirable, and in degrees of these extremes. Therefore, the whole issue of importance 
and consequence is necessarily only appreciable within the context of a system of meaning 
and values. What is important is by nature a relative term and as such, it has to be relative 
to, or contrastive with something else. Things are thus more or less important than other 
things. Just to say that something is important is by default also to imply that there is some 
kind of contrastive category of other things that are less important. So, 'importance' is 
relative to something else which may be more or less important. Importance as a concept 
needs therefore to be appreciated as a product of an occasioned and situated piece of 
discourse, in which the thing of import is produced as such by either an overt or implied 
contrast to something else of lesser import. 
What About What I Want? 
Once again, we continue with the general theme of this chapter, which is about how 
versions are constructed. In the first part we looked at the construction of versions of the 
truth, and in particular at how reported speech can be used to signal that a report is one of a 
number of possible explanations -a version. In this second half we will be turning our 
attention towards the construction of what is or isn't important. The key issue here is to 
determine whose voice becomes the prevailing authority on whether one thing is deemed to 
be more important than another, who gets to say what is true or right, whose values are 
accepted as dominant, and how are other voices marginalized or silenced in that process of 
constructing a dominant version of what really is important. I begin with a family therapy 
session where the mother, father, client (15 yr old lad) and his two younger sisters are all 
present. It is the first session in the series. 
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Ext. 5 G1/S1. L690-704 
1. Client: 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. ? 
7. Client 
8. 
9. Therapist 
10. Client 
11. Therapist 
12. 
13. 
14. Client: 
So you expect me to do everything they want ... hhh when they want 
how they want if they want, I've got to Ive got to do everything, but I 
want something and (. ) they just woril let me do it or Thave it. There 
there's only 2ne thing that I really want and that' s to get my eyebrow 
pierced. 
[((possible general laughter from others in the family)) 
[Cos loads of people have got it done at school, and I reckon it looks 
reaRy good, everyone's telling me itd suit me, 
Yeh [hang on 
[and [Q) they won't let me 
[Hang on hang on. We're talking about how 
unhappy this family is and it- Leanne's cry crying, and yotur 
talking about having your eyebrows pierced 
No I'm just ... hhh Oh forget it then. 
What I am aiming to do by introducing this extract is to show how relationship between 
parents and children in particular may influence the outcomes of arguments, and may in 
fact be inseparable from the trajectory of those arguments in terms of who 'gets what they 
want' and how relatively important those conflicting desires are deemed to be by the 
opposing parties. The issue of importance is something that is constructed through their 
talk, so that the person(s) who deserve the right to have their wishes take precedence over 
the wishes of others are those who can argue that their own concerns are more 'important'. 
In the extract above the key issue of importance to the client is that of having his eyebrow 
pierced. He claims that this is what he really wants (line 4) but that his parents won't let 
him (line 10). The issue however is not an isolated desire that happens to be expressed right 
here and now in the interaction. The question of whether having your eyebrow pierced is 
important or not on a scale of I to 10, is not the right question in this context. Nor is it a 
question of determining or quantifying in some kind of vacuum how much the client really 
wants this thing. What matters in this particular scenario is how important discussing issue 
of being allowed to have your eyebrow pierced is in relation to discussing for example why 
the client's sister is crying, or why the client is here in therapy, or why he is in trouble with 
141 
the police. The issue of which things are more or less important is not relevant as an 
abstracted concept outside time and context but is only meaningful as an issue that is 
constructed in the current interaction, with the co-present others for the particular purpose 
that is serves in that particular interaction. To ask an apparently simple question such as 'is 
having your eyebrow pierced important? ' one has to simultaneously ask 'in comparison to 
whaff or 'by whose standardsT Perhaps for the client it is vitally important for him to be 
accepted as part of his group of friends (see line 7 'loads of people have got it done at school). 
Being accepted by his friends may well be far more important to him than being accepted 
by his family, or anyone else in society such as teachers, future employers etc. In this 
example, the importance of the eyebrow piercing issue is constructed by the therapist as in 
contrast to the obvious current distress of other family members, and is thus played down 
as being relatively unimportant. Therefore, the category 'important' needs to be understood 
relationally, as a contrast to some other issue or phenomenon. 
Let's go back now to extract 5 to see how this notion of relativism is deployed as a 
discursive resource in this instance. The crucial turns in this respect or from lines 7 to 13 
where the therapist cuts across what the client is saying. 
Ext. 5 (b) G1/S1: L697 -704 
7. Client Cos loads of people have got it done at school, and I reckon it looks 
8. 
9. 
10. 
ii. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
really good, everyoneýs telling me it'd suit me, 
Therapist: Yeh [hang on 
Client: [and [Q) they won't let me 
Therapist: UHang on hang on. We're talking about how 
unhappy this family is and it- Leanne's cry crying, and yoTur 
talking about having your eyebrows pierced 
Client: No I'm just ... hhh Oh forget it then. 
To begin with the client uses a powerfid rhetorical structure in his turn in lines 7 and 8, by 
listing the reasons why he should be allowed to have the piercing - 1) 'loads of people have 
got it done at school' 2) '1 reckon it looks really good' 3) 'everyone's telling me itd suit 
me' (see Jefferson, 1990) The therapist actively tries to stop her client in his tracks in line 
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9 when she says 'hang on'. Although this is not done in overlap, the end of the client's 
prior turn is said with continuing intonation, so he had obviously not finished what he was 
saying. As he disregards her interjection, and continues with 'and' in line 10, the therapist 
once more interrupts him and repeats her assertion to 'hang on' another two times. Once he 
has finished speaking, she continues by contrasting what 'we're' talking about, and what 
'you're' talking about (lines 11 & 12). The 'we' that is constructed in this assertion is 
obviously exclusive of the client. The therapist overtly and strongly draws a distinction 
between what she and the rest of the family are concerned with talking about, and what he, 
as the client is talking about. In effect, she makes that the case by defining it in that way. 
She alienates her client by claiming that he is not part of the same conversation as the rest 
of them. 
Furthermore she makes another distinction between 'this family' and 'you' (line 12). She 
claims that the point of the discussion is about how unhappy the family is (evidenced by 
reference to the fact that Leanne, the client's sister is crying), not about what he wants. 
However, it seems to cut across the fact that the client is himself part of that same family, 
and his happiness is just as much at issue as everyone else's. The point I am making is that 
at this crucial juncture in the conversation, when the client is in 'mid flow' about 
something that he claims is really important to him, "there's only pne thing that I really want" 
(line 4 ext 5), the therapist strongly intervenes, stops him from what he is saying, and 
enforces a claim about what to her is more important. Clearly, the therapist makes relevant 
her position in this interaction as 'therapist' at this moment, and uses this to assert a 
direction on the conversation. The context of therapy is not always apparent in looking at 
the data, but it is at crucial junctures such as this one that we become more inclined to 
interpret the current interaction as 'therapy relevant'. 
Again, we have to think about the issue of what is or isn't important as something that is a 
flexible resource that can be drawn upon or oriented to at any time. At this point, the 
therapist is making a claim, not abstractly about whether the piercing issue is important, but 
something more subtle and specific to the 'here and now' of the interaction. What she is 
saying is that 'right now', 'at this point, 'in this conversation' 'with these people' and 
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'these other concerns at stake', what is more important than discussing eyebrow piercing, is 
to discuss other more fundamental issues to do with why this family is so unhappy. In his 
article on accounting practices, Buttny (1990) explains that often people will cite the 
impossibility of taking an action with the proviso 'if circumstances would have allowed'. 
Such constraints are formulated to appear as strong and uncontrollable as possible. Other 
actions that the person were engaged in are often cited, so that the account for not doing X 
is that doing Y was of greater importance or priority. In our example, the reason for not 
discussing the piercing issue is not that it isn't of any importance, but rather there is another 
issue right now that has to take priority. Even later in the same session, when she is alone 
with her client and the rest of the family have left the room for a short while, she remains 
strong on her line of not giving time to her client to discuss what he has overfly claimed to 
be so important to him: 
Ext 6 G1/S1: L1271-1283 
1. Client if I if my mum and dad want me to behave and do whatever I whatever 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
ii. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
they want me to do (. ) er I don't mind as long as they let me do some of 
the things IT want to do. (0-5) 1 mean there's nothing more that I there's 
nothing that I want more than to get my eyebrow pierced. I I'll pay out 
of my own money and go in on on busfare and everything [like that 
Therapist: [So- sorry, 
there's nothing you want more than to get? 
Client: My eyebrow pierced. 
(2) 
Therapist: So we're back to that? 
Chent: *YeV 
(5) 
Therapist Do you think you're good (1) at switching (. ) worry off? 
Client: Worry? 
Note in this extract, that as the client once again brings up the piercing issue in line 4, 
referring to it as so important to him that there is "nothing that I want more" her response is 
bluntly "so we're back to that? " (line 10). When the client affims his reintroduction of this 
topic, the therapist's response is once again very curt. She completely ignores the 
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possibility of continuing this topic of conversation, leaving a massive 5 second silence, 
before she initiates as new topic, 'worry' in line 13. The introduction of this new topic is 
obviously a surprise to the client, as he responds by repeating 'worryT with questioning 
intonation, as if he just hadn't quite heard her right. Again we can see evidence that in 
terms of whose topic gets the floor, there is a considerable disjuncture between what the 
therapist thinks is important to discuss and what the client wants to discuss. The therapist 
wins. 
This next extract sheds a little more light on the issue of how what is and isn't important is 
constructed and 'explained'. Here, the therapist is speaking with her client alone, and 
addressing a concern of his that his does not receive equal treatment with his two younger 
sisters. He claims that his parents treat him more harshly than the girls: 
Ext. 7 G1/S1: L 1816-1821 
1. Therapist: I'm sure (0.6) that the girls do get lighter punishments than you do 
2. because you're the oldest and that always happens in families the 
3. oldest one Always gets (2) more control (1.8) by the time the 
4. younger ones come along (1.2) parents have sussed out (2.8) 
5. what's more important and what's less important (1.8) and they're 
6. usually easier on younger ones. 
An interesting point that the therapist makes during this exchange is to transform what 
could have been a contrast between boys and girls, or even between him as an individual 
and the others, into a contrast between an eldest child and subsequent siblings. The claims 
that the client have been making are that in some way he is singled out for rough treatment 
which is 'unfair'. The therapist's attempt to reformulate the problem in terms of something 
that is common in families, is a way of 'normalising' what the client is seeking to claim as 
abnormal. If the therapist succeeds in normaaing his experience as something that is 
common in all families, then his argument about being singled out for punishment does not 
carry as much weight. In the first fine the characteristics of the family are described as 
contrasting 'the girls and 'you'. This categorisation is subsequently transformed by the 
therapist within the continuing same tam, into 'the oldest' (lines 2& 3) and 'the younger 
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ones' (line 4). Similarly 'punishment' in line I is transformed into 'control' in line 4, 
minimizing and normalizing the severity of the discipline. 
Finally, the therapist directly addresses the issue of what's important. She describes the 
process that parents go through as they have more children as having 'sussed out' the 
things that are more or less important. This characterization of discovering or 'sussing' 
what is important displays the concept of importance as somehow external, in someway 
&out there' waiting to be discovered by a process of trial and error, rather than something 
that is actively constructed in the moment-to-moment interaction of everyday fife. The 
implication of what she is saying about this process is to concede in a way that parents 
generally tend to be overly harsh in their discipline of firstborn children, justifying that 
position by explaining that they just haven't worked it out yet. She does not deny that the 
client's parents are harsher with him than with the girls, but defines a way of understanding 
some reasons why, in an attempt to help her client accept that fact as normal. Thus, in 
normalizing their behaviour, it is by implication, his behaviour that now appears to be 
abnormal in comparison, and therefore his behaviour that needs to change. 
This section has focused in general on the construction of importance in the therapeutic 
environment. One of the fimctions of the indexical use of importance as a discursive 
resource is that it emphasises the way that 'important', like other such terms and (member's 
measurement systems' is only logically understood indexically - and in particular 
relationally and rhetorically. Importance by its nature has to be constructed as relative to 
something either more or less important rather than as a kind of 'free standing' entity in 
itself. Two other facets of this discussion about how contrasts are used in the construction 
of relative ideal are the use of the concepts 'understanding' and 'remembering'. I will 
briefly look at both of these in relation to the current discussion. 
Understanding 
The following extract, at face value, is all about what the therapist can and can't understand 
with regard to the family situation and some of the issues that have been discussed during 
the course of the session. However, her use of this mental concept is not simply a matter of 
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her inability to grasp the matter, nor that she reaUy just can't understand the issues, but it is 
a question of the use of the concept 'understanding' being deployed in a given situation for 
the sake of its rhetorical effect. 
Ext 8. Gl/Sl: L1799-1811 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
ii. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
Therapist I can't understand why anybody would want to have their eyebrow 
pierced ok? 
(0.6) 
Therapist but than I belong to the days of the dinosaurs 
Client mm 
Therapist Ok? Right, so I'm not going to fight your battle on the er the eyebrow, 
y- your eyebrows are wonderful the way they are. Right? 
(4) 
Therapist I can understand that you want them to trust you, but I can also 
understand (2.2) their worry that there are times when you make daft 
decisions 
Client: mm 
Therapist Ve daft decisions (1A) and get yourself in big trouble, and they want f -rV 
to protect you from it (0.5) and I can understand that. 
The issue that the therapist raises is not that she doesn't understand why her client wants 
his eyebrow pierced, but why 'anybody' would (line I). It doesn't come across as an 
admittance of lack of understanding which is open to having the issue explained, but rather 
an expression of how ridiculous she thinks the idea is. Thus, it has more status as a kind of 
criticism or negative evaluation, than a confession of ignorance. When she goes on to say 
what she 'can' understand, again, it's not a verbalisation of the adequacy of her intellectual 
ability, it's not that she is reporting on the efficiency of her cognitive processing. Rather, 
she is expressing what she perceives as reasonable. She is saying that it is reasonable for 
children to want their parents to trust them (line 9), and for parents to worry about their 
children (fine 10) and to want to protect them (line 14). So, her tAffig about what she does 
and doesn't understand is not really so much to do with expressing her personal ability to 
comprehend a range of issues, but is more to do with presenting her opinion on what she 
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discerns to be matters which are either sensible and important rather than peripheral or 
unreasonable. 
The use of the concept 'understanding' in this environment has more to do with alignment 
and legitimization than it does about cognition. In line 1, the therapist begins 'I can't 
understand', not, 'I don't'. Using the repertoire of inability is something which she on 
another occasion explicitly tells her client to avoid, telling him to say 'don't' rather than 
rcan't' (see chapter 4 ext. 5). In this case, her use of 'can't' has the same effect that her 
client's use of it did. In his case, he was expressing an inability to do otherwise, and 
therefore without responsibility to change. In this case, the therapist is similarly claiming 
an inability to understand, rather than a choice not to; in other words, it would be 
unreasonable for anyone to expect her to do something which is not possible. To claim to 
&understand' a position or a line of argument is to align oneself with it; to validate that 
position. By claiming not to understand why he (or anyone else) would want their eyebrow 
pierced, she is stating that she does not align with that position. So she is not prepared to 
take 'his side' against his parents "to fight your battle" (fine 6) with this issue. Clearly, by 
portraying the argument as a battle, the metaphor also invokes the idea of two opposing 
sides, fighting against one another. By defining the battle as 'yours', she is clearly 
indicating that she is not willing to align with him and argue for his side. 
After identifying what she 'can't understand' the therapist goes on to explain what factors 
in the dispute she can understand; these being his desire for his parents to trust him (line 9), 
his parents' worries about him (line 10), and his parents' concern to protect him (line 14). 
These are the issues that she selects as 'more important', issues with which she can align 
herself The dichotomy of the eyebrow piercing situation as a matter of greater or lesser 
importance is interesting in that it is both very important to the client, and not at all 
important to the therapist and to the client's parents. In fact, it seems that the eyebrow, is 
rather an instance of something he is not allowed to do: the prohibition of certain activities 
being the bigger issue, as is illustrated in this final example: 
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Ext. 9. Gl/Sl: L1296-1298 
1. Therapist Are you teHing me (. ) that aU that matters to you in life is whether or 
2. not you get your eyebrow pierced? 
Client No. No that that's what 1 (1.5) like to have done. They won't let me. 
Here, using the extreme case formulation 'all that matters to you in life' (line 1), the 
therapist scorns the reintroduction of the subject of piercing that the client has raised. His 
response belies the real issue - 'they won't let me' (line 3). This is notjust about eyebrow 
piercing, but about control, about who gets to decide what he is or isn't 'allowed' to do. 
What really matters to him, is to be able to have the degree of independence from his 
parents to do what he wants, rather than what they want. The issue is the battle, the 
eyebrow is the topic. 
The interesting concern that is relevant to who gets to say what is or isn't important in the 
context of a family group, especially where there are adolescent members, is the issue of 
maturity. We saw in an earlier extract that the therapist used a similar repertoire to explain 
how parents learn with successive children to 'suss out' which things are really important. 
It is this same repertoire of experience and maturity, of growing and learning, that is used 
with this issue of determining how much freedom an adolescent is given in determining 
their own fife choices. As a participant's repertoire, the idea that experience and maturity 
are critical indicators of an individual's ability to accurately determine what is important, 
this is a particularly fimdamentalist mode of discourse which appears to be based on an 
underlying presumption that certain issues really are more or less important than others. 
For example the therapist discusses in extract 7 how parents learn which things are really 
important in raising children. Similarly, in episodes where the client's maturity is brought 
into question by the therapist such as in the previous extract where she claims 'you make 
daft decisions' (ext. 8. line 11), the concept of maturity is implicit. 
The Piagetarian developmental view of maturity is a view that conceptualizes children as 
primarily egocentric beings who see themselves and their own needs, concerns and wants 
as of primary importance. This view appears to be the basis from which this therapist's 
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contributions are made, as she questions the validity of her client's knowledge and 
understanding of which things are really important, rather than perhaps the immature, 
egocentric perception of importance that he seems to be displaying. This notion of the 
ability to accept and embrace other people's points of view is central to systemic family 
therapy. So, there is a parallel with so-called physical maturity in a developmental sense, 
and a social maturity in a systenfic sense. One of the primary objectives for a therapist 
working with a family group like this, and ultimately a measure of his/her success, is 
evidence of those individuals having heard and accepted other people's viewpoints, and to 
be able to vcrbalise them as part of a range of perspectives alongside their own. This seems 
to be more relevant in counseling adolescents, who have more of a tendency towards 
egocentrism than adults (see Geldard & Geldard, 1999 ppl74-175). Therefore, we can see 
that to move away from what may alternatively be called 'egocentric' or 'selfish' ways of 
viewing situations is ultimately a therapeutic goal. The need to embrace the ideas of what is 
important to another family member even if it doesn't seem important to you, is a way of 
reaching this position of embracing more than one perspective. So, importance per se is not 
a discrete entity, which can be identified and ranked, but something which is a category 
which is also a personal, flexible conversational resource. We will now briefly look at the 
use of the term 'remembering' in a similar way to the analysis of the concept of 
'understanding' that we have just examined. 
Remembering 
Using a mental state term such as 'remember' in this situation is especially useful in that it 
presents his side of the argument, whilst still suggesting that the two apparently 
incompatible versions may be resolvable. In other words they are different aspects of 
perspective rather than of reality. The term itself carries with it the possibility of fallibility, 
and the possibility of suddenly finding things coming back to remembrance that were not 
previously accessible. What one 'knows' of the past is thus potentially alterable. 
The client's account of what he can and can't remember in the following extract, however, 
should not be interpreted simplistically as his actual reflections on his inner cognitive state. 
This extract comes as part of a sequence of turns in which the therapist is reminding him of 
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times that his father had talked about when he was much younger; of how close they were, 
and the mount of time that they had spent together: 
Ext 10. G1/S1. L1726-1735 
1. Client: Oh and they said th-th-... hhthat (. )he was good with me when Iwas 
2. httle. (1) But I can't remember fl-iPpin' fourtee- er eleven years ago can I? 
3. (3) 
4. Client Can't even remember last T week. 
S. (4) 
6. Client Only specific bits, only important bits. (0.8) Can't remember all- (1.2) 
7. what lessons I had or owt like that. I can remember that I got suspende: d, an-, 
To claim to 'not remember' in this environment is also an interactional action. By saying 
that he can't remember 'fourteen or eleven years ago', the client is not just drawing 
attention to a deficit in his ability to recall events of the past; rather, he is complaining 
firstly that it is unreasonable to expect him to be able to, and secondly that what is actually 
more important to him is what is happening in his life right now (see also Lynch & Bogen, 
1996 and Bogen & Lynch, 1989). The client does not deny that he and his father were close 
in the past, but by saying that he doesn't remember, he is in effect saying that those times 
gone by aren't relevant any more. What is more important to the client is that if his dad is 
beating him up now, it doesn't really matter how great things were all those years ago. 
What he wants is not rosy reminiscing about the good old days, but some concrete help 
with his current relationship problem with his dad. This is further evidenced when he goes 
on to talk about more recent events that he can or can't remember. 
The client claims that he can't remember what lessons he had last week, let alone eleven or 
more years ago. What he can remember though are 'important, things like the fact that he 
got suspended. What he is saying is not meant to be taken literally as just an interesting 
piece of information about how human memory processing works, but as a description that 
accomplishes some interactional business. In this case, that business is to express what is 
and isn't important to him. It doesn't matter if he can't remember what lessons he had last 
week because that isn't the important thing about last week. What is important about last 
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week is that he got suspended. When this additional support for his argument about what is 
reasonable and unreasonable to be expected to be remembered is added to his initial claims 
about remembering how he and his dad were years ago, we can see that what be is saying 
all the way along throughout this extract is not just about how good his memory is, but 
about what things are important to him. What is important to him is to deal with and sort 
out how his dad treats him now, and not to talk about how he was treated eleven years ago. 
I would like to return now to part of extract 3, which we previously examined from the 
point of view of how reported speech is used as a way of exhibiting non-alignment or 
skepticism. This time, I would like to look at the same segment, but with the emphasis on 
the current discussion of how 'remembering' is constructed as an activity in conversation, 
and the work that this accomplishes. Towards the end of the extract, the client uses the 
transition marker 'oh' to introduce an aspect of reported speech (line 10). 
Ext. 11. G1/S1: L 1725-1727 
1. Therapist Maybe it's easier to remember those bits. 
2. Client Oh and they said th- th-... hh that () he was good with me when 1 
3. was little. 
The turn-initial particle 'oh' has the effect of displaying a 'just now' realization or 
rememberance of an additional piece of information, a display of current cognitive activity 
(see Heritage, 1984). It is here, in precisely this environment and sequential location that 
the client speaks the words that we began Us investigation with, "they said th- th- Ah 
that (. ) he was good with me when I was little. " (lineslO-I 1). The point that I began with at 
the beginning of this discussion is that this turn seems intonationallY and grammatically 
complete as a sentence at the end of 'little'. However, given its place in the overall 
sequence, and the nature of the prior talk, it sounds as though the turn is incomplete, as 
though the speaker has more to add. The whole of the previous stretch of talk by the client 
was given over to setting up a contrast between what his parents said and the way that they 
behave towards him. This contrast is also strongly echoed in the apparently unfair 
distinction between the way that his parents treat him compared to how they treat his sisters 
(see lines 27-53). So when we hear 'they said X' in line 10, we are anticipating something 
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contrastive to follow. Surely enough, after aI second pause the expected contrast is 
delivered. 
Ext. 12. G1/S1: L1726-1728 
1. Client Oh and they said th- th-... hh that (. ) he was good with me when I 
was little. 
3. (1) 
4. Client But I can't remember flippin' fourtee- or eleven years ago can I? 
Not only does the contrast come where we expected it, but it is also in the form that we 
could have anticipated, 'yes, but Once again the client uses the phrase 'I can't 
remember' that he had used in the previous contrast earlier in this segment. A very similar 
contrast happens in the following extract. Again, the first turn appears complete were it not 
for the strong implication evoked by the active voicing that what is reported is clearly 
meant to be heard as a version, and therefore implicitly something that the speaker is 
clearly not aligning himself with. It is this use of reported speech (in this case by active 
voicing) that we have already seen, to present a version of something as a version, which 
sets up a contrast with an unstated 'other' version. The alternate version may or may not be 
produced, but is already 'heard'. In this case however, a in the previous extract, that other 
version is actuaRy verbalized in the next turn. 
Ext. 13. G1/S1: L1717-1719 
1. Client He couldn't have loved anybody more than he loved you. 
2. ((feigned deep voice)) 
3. (0.6) 
4. Client (Well) it's a shame that I can't remember none of that, 
In this extract 'he couldn't have loved anybody more than he loved you', is contrasted with, 
'I can't remember none of that'. Similarly, in extract 12 'they said th- th- Ah that () he 
was good with me when I was little' (linesl-2) is contrasted with, 'But I can't remember 
flippin' fourtee- or eleven years ago can IT(line 4). In each case the first part is a snippet of 
reported speech, and the second part is an assertion of 'not remembering'. 
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As I noted above, the use of reported speech presents the third party's claim as just a 
version. In both of these examples the speaker is referred to by the third party who is 
quoted, and is therefore part of that 'history'. This means that in terms of rights to 
knowledge claims, the current speaker, the client, has just as much right to claim to 'know' 
about the issues reported on as his father. In other words, the person whose speech is 
reported does not have more right for their version to be accepted than the current speaker. 
So, when the client reports that he can't remember his dad being 'good' with him or 
, loving' him when he was little is not a flat denial, or claim that this is not true, but rather 
that it may not be an entirely accurate version. Alternatively, the client may be suggesting 
that his father's version is accurate, but not relevant. If something was true many years ago, 
it is not necessarily relevant in the current argument. It is not unreasonable that the client 
can't actually remember his early childhood, and so claims made by his father about how 
good their relationship was then, have no real bearing on their relationship now. Again, in 
extract 4 the contrast is made more of by the addition of information about what the client 
can remember (being punched and sworn at), a description which appears to be made as 
polarized as possible to add to the effect. 
Ext 4(b) G1/S1. L 1713-1715 
46. Client (Well) it's a shame that I can't remember none of thatý all I can 
47. remember is him p1inching me, an- (0.4) shoutin' at me and 
48, swearing at me an- 
In extracts 10 & 12 the contrast is also embellished, this time by the addition of more 
specific information, in numerical terms indicating more-or-less exactly how long ago the 
he can't remember, "fourtee- or eleven years ago". This numerical detail contrasts with the 
"when I was little" (ext 12 line 2) that he reports that his parents have referred to. 
The contrast becomes not just what his parents say about how much they love him and how 
they treat him, but between how they say they loved him then and how they treat him now. 
In other words the client's argument hinges on the problem that 'they keep bringing that 
back up' (ext. 3, line 1). His parents are using an argument from 11-14 years ago about 
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how they loved him, which he complains is too long ago to remember. The use of the 
phrase 'I can't remember' does not negate this claim as being true, but merely points to its 
current ineffectiveness on the basis of being outside his personal recollection and therefore 
serviceable experience. It implies that there may still be some kind of mismatch between 
what was said and what really happened, but is not directly accusatory. He doesn't directly 
claim that his dad wasn't 'good' with him when he was younger, and thus make an explicit 
assertion that his father hadn't been telling the truth. This would be a very confrontational 
and dangerous move to make, immediately creating a situation where it was his word 
against his parent. The subtler approach that the speaker takes, is to introduce an element of 
doubt into the mind of the hearer about the testimony of the previous speakers. 
To say 'I can't remember' allows that the speaker may just be fallible and unable to recall. 
It allows room for both parties in a contest of versions to possibly be right. It allows for the 
possibility that the other person's version is correct, and that the speaker is just unable to 
recall the incident, whilst also introducing the possibility that the other person's version 
may actually be incorrect. Thus an element of doubt is introduced. At least where there is 
doubt about a particular version, then both parties still have opportunity to continue the 
discussion. By adding the tag 'can IT (ext. 12 line 4) the client furthermore indicates that it 
would be unreasonable for anyone, the therapist included, to expect him to remember that 
far back. As the client is 15 at the time of the interview, he would only have been between 
1 and 4 years old. 
As with all of the examples I have been using in this chapter, the use of reported speech in 
the course of the narrative is not included to endorse the content of what is reported (eg 
whether his parents love hfin or not) as is usually accepted to be the case with reported 
speech, but conversely, it is used to set up some form of contrast which is used to cast 
doubt on the validity of what has been reported to have been said. In this next extract, the 
speaker pits two contesting versions of an event next to one another. 
Ext. 14. G1/S3. L282-285. 
1. Mother: On Monday we got a phone-call from the local shop, saying 
2. David's outside and he'd given them ten pounds and asked her to 
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3. buy him some alcohoL weR he said he wasn't there, I don't know- 
4. where the money came from, y'see he won't discuss it with us, 
The first version of events is reported via the person at the shop who had called the current 
speaker (the client's mother). The caller's version is that David had given him ten pounds 
to buy alcohol for him (David is under age). David's version as reported by his mother is 
that he wasn't there. The use of 'well' at the pivotal point between one version and the 
other suggests immediately that a contrast is being set up. At the end of the two versions, 
just after 'well he said he wasn't there', we are presented with two opposing versions of the 
same story; 1) David was buying alcohol at the local store, 2) He wasn't even there. 
However, immediately following the presentation of these two versions, his mother goes on 
to offer what amounts to her own personal assessment of the incident. 
She continues 'I don't know where the money came from' (line 5). This comment supports 
the version that there really was a ten pounds involved, and that there is some reason to 
presume that she may have some knowledge about where the money had come from. If this 
were not the case she would have no reason to comment on not knowing, as people 
generally only comment on things that are unusual, or contrary to normal expectations. In 
doing so she indicates support for the version of events presented by the caller from the 
shop. Finally she makes the link between the money and her son by saying 'y'see he won't 
discuss it with us' (line 6). The positioning of the comment about not knowing where die 
money came from, immediately next to the comment about her son not telling her, links the 
two concepts together. This strength of linkage between two otherwise unconnected 
statements by consecutive positioning, means that the sum of the two statements is greater 
than their meaning separately. This was demonstrated most clearly by Sacks when he 
juxtaposed the two statements 'the baby cried' with 'the mommy picked it up'. Returning 
to our current example, the juxtaposition of 'I don't know where the money came from' 
with 'y'see he won't discuss it with us' line 4), links the two sentiments as being in some 
way causally related. The result is to infer that David knows where the money came from, 
but he won't tell his parents. 
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The combination of support for the initial version in this story that the reference to the 
source of money suggests, with the use of reported speech in the form of 'well he said' act 
together to throw doubt on the son's version of events as reported by his mother in this 
interaction. We can see how the use of reported speech can be used in certain situations to 
engender skepticism about the validity of reported person's account. This scepticism is 
achieved by the implicit suggestion that there is a discrepancy between what the reported 
person said and what in fact was the truth. Let us look at one more example of how this 
discrepancy is achieved in a reported version of events. 
Ext15 Gl/S3. L638-639 
1. Client Y- YOU SAW it's not a p1inishment BUT Ya grounded ya not goin'out. 
In this extract the client is confronting his parents about what he perceives as a clear 
discrepancy between something that was said, and the actions that supported it. Again we 
can see the by now familiar accusatory 'you said X, but you did Y' format. This is a simple 
example of how the notion that there is the possibility of discrepancy between what one 
says and what one does can be constructed through and by talk. It may seem an obvious 
point to make that people don't always say what they really think, or act in line with what 
they say, but it takes on a particular significance when you begin to think about how 
traditionally in psychological testing, what people say is taken to be a direct reflection of 
what they really think. This concept that there is a mapping of mind onto words which has 
been used in a largely unproblematised way, is potentially a serious problem for 
psychological research which relies on verbal or written reports of mental processes. 
Summary 
This chapter has primarily been concerned with the construction of versions of events 
within the environment of a family therapy clinic. An important issue to cover as a basis for 
this analysis was the concept of truth as a construction. In this section I outlined how the 
use of reported speech has traditionally been almost synonymous with its use in enhancing 
the validity of a person's claim to facticity in their reporting. However, through the analysis 
of the data that I have been working with I have been able to show that the use of reported 
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speech can also be a way of 'dis-aligning' oneself with what one is reporting. This is done 
by subtle changes of footing, and has the effect of introducing an element of doubt about 
the validity of the assertion. 
By changing footing, the speaker in effect separates him/herself from ownership of, or 
responsibility for the report's accuracy, in effect, displaying non-alignment. In fact, I have 
shown that a speaker can display scepticism by presenting their description as a 'mere 
report'. What I mean by this is that when a speaker chooses to use reported speech in what 
appears to be just reporting they change their footing from author to 'mere animator'. As a 
conversational move, the effect of this footing change is to introduce an element of doubt 
as to the absolute facticity of the claim. For example, the report that the child who owned 
the bike 'said that they'd ripped his seat' suggests more than a straightforward repetition of 
what someone else has said for the sake of accuracy; it concurrently implies that there may 
be other competing versions of the same scenario, such as what the client himself said 
about who ripped the seat, or what a witness may have said about who did it. 
The construction of the concepts of 'importance', 'understanding' and 'remembering' have 
also been investigated as potentially contestable versions in a similar way. Firstly, 
importance was linked to consequence in that any 'thing' that is current topic in a given 
conversation can be measured abstractly as more or less important depending on the degree 
of severity of what follows on from it - the consequence. The issue of which things are 
more or less important have been shown to only be meaningful as issues that are 
constructed in the current interaction, and the notion of 'importance' itself was 
demonstrated to be understandable only as a flexible resource that can be drawn upon or 
oriented to at any time. Of particular interest in regard to who gets to say what is or isn't 
important in the context of a family group, especially where there are adolescent members, 
one issue that was identified was that of maturity. As a participant's repertoire, a 
particularly fundamentalist mode of discourse was revealed in the presentation of the 
notion that experience and maturity are critical indicators of an individual's ability to 
accurately determine what is important. 
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Secondly, the notion of 'understanding' was examined not just as a simple mental concept, 
but more sophisticatedly, as a concept that is deployed in a given situation for the sake of 
its rhetorical effect. The use of the term 'understanding' in the extracts that I presented 
were shown to have more to do with alignment and legitimization than with cognition. In 
one case in particular, the therapist claimed an inability to understand, where to 
'understand' a position or a line of argument would be to align oneself with it; and thus to 
validate that position. By claiming not to understand the therapist in this analysis 
demonstrated that she was not aligning herself with a particular position. 
Thirdly, the topic of remembering was considered as a participanes concern. I 
demonstrated in this section, that by using the concept of 'memory', what one 'knows, of 
the past becomes potentially alterable. In an exemplifying extract, the client claimed that lie 
couldn't remember what lessons he had last week. What he could remember though, were 
'important' things such as the fact that he had got suspended. His memory claims in this 
instance demonstrate a broader principle that, at time talk of 'memory' ought not to be 
taken literally as a piece of cognitive information, but as a description that accomplishes 
some interactional business. In this case, that business was to express what was important 
to him. In the context of the use of memory in conjunction with a piece of reported speech, 
I have shown that such combinations have the effect of implying that there may still be 
some kind of mismatch between what was said and what really happened, without being 
directly accusatory. 
It has been shown in this chapter that reported speech can be, and is used in certain 
situations to present a report as a version of a particular. In conclusion, this analysis 
demonstrates that participants themselves appear to recognize and treat one another's talk 
not just as a straightforward and honest reflection of what they 'really' think, but as context 
sensitive, designed for the particular content and possible trajectory of the current 
interaction. 
This chapter shows the significance of being able to demonstrate empirically that people 
operate in everyday talk with a set of principles that allow for the Possibility of saying 
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other than what they really know to be true. Furthermore, it demonstrates that people have 
a way of creating in their talk a world where there can be a differentiation between thought, 
language and action. Thus, the construction of truth and importance need to be seen as is 
discourses which can and are used in conversation as flexible resources which cannot be 
taken out of context in which they occur and isolated as static or consistent realities; they 
are rather issues which are intrinsically indexical. 
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CHAPTER 7 
KNOWING YOUR MIND 
The 'Inner' and the 'Outer' Self 
Representations of other people's internal states occur frequently in everyday conversation, 
and no less in therapy talk. During therapy, clients often make claims about the motives, 
attitudes, thoughts and feelings of other family members or friends. Here are a few 
examples; 
Mother: 
Father: 
Therapist: 
Mother: 
Mother: 
He thinks he's very. hh (1) picked on. (Gl/L903) 
an' Dave thinks it's briffian4 (G2/Ll361) 
Because lwfeels obliged (5) to defend his friends. (G3/Lll45) 
Hewants them to be like that so that he's not the only one in trouble. (G3/Llo92) 
Now, he absolutely hates it (G2/Ll644) 
The form of these claims varies, sometimes assertive or declarative, at other times offered 
tentatively or reluctantly. In terms of their sequential placement, although I have not shown 
it in the brief extracts above, at times they appear to be spontaneously volunteered, at other 
times they are clearly solicited. Their coherence as a set of observable actions lies in their 
status as personal ascriptions of others. They also share a uniformity in being ascriptions of 
what we might refer to as 'inner' processes, those things that are not outwardly observable,, 
but which can only be deduced, inferred or assumed from outward actions such as what a 
person says or does. 
Psychology itself is a profession given to the academic pursuit of knowledge with regard to 
how these inner processes can be reliably identified and predicted, although there are many 
within the profession who would claim that this is an impossible and ultimately futile 
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enterprise. For example, Garfinkel (a sociologist, but a great influence within social 
psychology, particularly that strand of social psychology done in North American 
sociology departments) declared that "there is no reason to look under the skull since 
nothing of interest is to be found there but brains" (Garfinkel in Coulter, 1990: 6). 
There is a common-sense notion that we think first and then act and/or speak as a 
consequence of that thought. The conversation analyst, Robert Hopper, illustrates this point 
very eloquently with a simple story from his own childhood, 
"My dad was a careftil man, an engineer. After some occasions in which 
I ran my youthful mouth and got into trouble Dad could emit a silence to 
help me reflect on my actions. He showed in his own infrequent but 
literary speech, in his stories for instance, evidence that each word had 
been carefidly edited. On one painful occasion he shared me this 
engineer-speak maxim: 'Engage brain before putting mouth into gear. "' 
(Te Molder & Potter, in press). 
As Hopper goes on to explain, this old cognitivist maxim prescribes thought before speech 
as a preferable and attainable order of things. It also suggests that purposeful thinking is the 
source of talk, and talk proceeds from purpose to effect. Thus, a differentiation between 
what is internal and private, and what is external and public is created, although the two are 
inevitably linked. In many psychological studies, especially those within social psychology 
that relate to the measurement of attitudes, the assumption is made that these psychological, 
mental states can be represented in the form of answers to questionnaires and interview 
schedules. However, we need first to question this assumption that there is indeed such a 
separation between the inner and the outer world of the individual, that there is a pre- 
existent 'mind' and 'heart' that can be reached. The constructivist approach to this issue is 
to look at how these mental predicates are actually the result of, rather than the pre- 
requisite for social interaction. 
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With modem technology we can measure many physical changes in the body that are 
believed to be associated with particular states of emotion for example, such as increases in 
perspiration, pulse rate and body temperature. These physical measurements can then be 
mapped onto self-reports from the experimental subject about how they were 'feeling' at 
the time of the tests. In this way correlations can be made between the physical 
measurements and the subject's self-reports, to make quantifiable claims about the nature 
and constitution of varying emotional states. However, in our everyday lives, we do not 
carry around with us such sophisticated machinery, and yet people incessantly continue to 
offer their knowledge claims about how other people think and feel. As people are so ready 
to make such claims, even after even the briefest of encounters, the question that clamors 
for attention is just how do they do that? On what basis do people make such claims, and 
when challenged how do they justify their assertions? These are a few of the issues that we 
will be probing in this next chapter. 
As we do not have the same kind of privileged access to other people's thoughts as we do 
to our own, we can say that we cannot actually 'know' for definite what anyone else thinks 
or feels. In this respect we have 'Ifinited access' (Pomerantz, 1980) to what other people 
are thinking. What we tend to do, is to infer things about other people's 'inner' world from 
external evidences such as that person's expression, their words or actions. As Pomerantz 
illustrates, we can infer that someone is home if we see their car parked in the driveway, 
but we do not know for sure in the same way that we would know whether we ourselves 
are at home. So, although we do not have direct access to other people's thoughts we use 
the evidence that we do have to make inferences about what they may be. In therapy and 
counseling, a person's everyday actions are not open to the scrutiny of the therapist in the 
same way that they are to their family members, and consequently the therapist must rely 
on other people's descriptions of a client's actions as a kind of second-hand form of 
inferential evidence. Where there may be competing claims about an individual's state of 
mind, it is largely these descriptive evidential reports that the therapist uses to inform. her 
diagnosis. 
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A classic example of this reliance on secondary sources in describing a person's behaviour 
as an indicator of their state of mind is the case study of 'K' by Dorothy Smith in 1990. In 
this instance, K's 'fiiend' Angela reports a series of instances of unusual or odd behaviour 
that she has observed in K, which cumulatively seem to point to the fact that she is 
mentally ill. Ile focus of this particular paper is to examine how apparently factual 
descriptive discourses can be used to create a picture of an individual's mental state. The 
emphasis is on how descriptive practices cannot be simply a neutral activity, but will 
always contain some bias or interest on the part of the speaker. With this caution in mind, 
we will return to the project of examining how mental states are attributed to others in 
therapeutic situations by corroborating those claim with 'evidence' in the form of 
descriptions of behaviour and/or by reported speech. 
In seeking to give reasons for - making claims about someone else's state of mind, two 
forms of evidencing appear to be recurrent; one is the use of reports about what that person 
has said, and the second is to report on what that person has done. A particular technique 
used by some therapists to elicit information from their clients is that of 'circular 
questioning'. In this approach the therapist asks her client what he thinks that his 
mother/brother/partner/fiiend thinks or feels about a particular topic. There are various 
therapeutic reasons for using this approach, which I will discuss in some detail later, but 
my primary interest is in its role as a method of eliciting mental-state ascriptions. To begin 
with though, I would like to take a brief look at the notion of causality and how it surfaces 
in the context of the therapeutic interaction. 
PURSUING CAUSALITY 
part of the process of the therapeutic encounter is to investigate possible internal causal 
explanations for outward behaviour. A measurement of success is the evidencing of some 
extent to which clients have made positive change in how they think or feel during their 
course of treatment. However, without direct access to see inside a person, therapists, like 
everyone else, must rely on external evidences, such as what a person says or how they act 
as indices wbich represent inner activity. A person's speech and actions are thus treated as 
reflections of the inner world of thoughts, feelings, desires, motivations and attitudes. 
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Whilst claims and ascriptions of this nature need not be just ied or supported by a spe er, if A 
it is common that some form of evidencing will either precede or follow a claim. This is 
particularly true in contentious environments, where competing versions are rife. The 
therapeutic environment whilst perhaps not quite as contentious as a courtroom for 
example, is still a fertile location for justified ascription claims. 
In making claims about someone else's inner processes or 'psyche', an appeal to evidence 
that claim is often seen in the form of reported speech and descriptions of instances of 
behaviour that apparently epitomise the claimed characteristic thoughts or attitude. 
Conversely, just as external behavioural 'evidences' can be used to substantiate claims 
another person's inner state, observable behaviour and speech are also treated as having 
been 'caused by' some internal factor or factors. It is this relationship between the 'inner' 
and 'outer' selves as it were, the relationship of cause and effect between these two selves, 
and how these concepts are talked about in therapy that this chapter is primarily concerned 
with. 
So far then, we have established that people make assertions about other people's inner 
states. They do so either by volunteering an unsolicited comment, or in response to a 
question. In the case of the therapeutic setting, it is normally the therapist who can be heard 
asking a range of different 'wh' questions that elicit information about the clients' views on 
many things, including their perceptions of what other members of their family may be 
thinking or feeling. Also, we have considered the need for claims about someone else to be 
substantiated in some way. This is often done via a report of something that person said, or 
something they did. Finally, we have also thought about how not only are words and 
actions taken to represent 'inner' processes, but also that inner processes are expectably 
expressed in these same ways. 
This last point forms the basis of our next line of enquiry. In the assumption that everyone 
has desires, aspirations, feelings, thoughts, attitudes and beliefs that can be expressed 
verbally, the therapist sets about asking a range of questions aimed at uncovering what that 
inner world may consist of. Therefore, a key location for observing these assumptions at 
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work is in the arena of the kinds of questions that therapists routinely ask. To begin with, I 
would like to continue the current theme of investigating cause and effect in the 
relationship between the 'inner' and 'outer' self A good place to begin this enquiry is to 
look at one of the simplest question structures that demonstrates this activity, the 'why, 
question. 
Why Questions 
The most unambiguous way to ask for an account or explanation is to simply ask 'why? " 
However, often eliciting information from a client is not always a straightforward task for 
the therapist, especially if the client perceives that some accountability for their actions is at 
stake. Many times therapists will draw on more subtle approaches to the problem of 
information elicitation than to use a direct questioning technique such as a 'why' question, 
but the principle is basically the same. Somewhere along the way, a client will begin to 
provide the therapist with their story, a story which relates to what has brought them to 
look for a therapeutic solution to their problems, and one which is laden with descriptions 
of their own or other people's actions. It is here that the process of jointly establishing the 
possible causes of these 'facts' begins. 
At this Point I must just say that I am not going to address the issue of fact construction as 
an interactional process per se, nor the way that descriptions are formulated towards that 
end. We will consider our current analysis from a point which occurs at a stage in therapy 
which follows on from, and builds on prior elements of the conversation where particular 
things have already been accepted as real, or at least treated as a basis for proceeding. That 
is to say that certain descriptions of events or actions are treated by the participants in the 
current moment of interaction as true, and on the basis of that 'treated as' facticity provide 
a basis for exploring what the motivations or causes of their occurrence might have been. 
The following extracts demonstrate how this is so in the therapist's use of some 
straightforward 'why' questions. 
1) Therapist: Why are you suspended David? Gl/S2. L29 
2) Therapist: Why n-dght you get expeRed? Gl/Sl. Ll367 
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3) Therapist: Why dyou feel guilty? G1/S1. L1144 
In each of these cases the 'thing', suspension, possible expulsion, or the client's feelings, is 
treated as already established, as 'given'. By talking in this way the therapist demonstrates 
that what she is now looldng for is not ftirther evidence to validate what has been claimed, 
but an account for why it happened. In the third extract for example, the therapist does not 
question whether the client really does feel guilty, but by seeking information about why 
she feels guilty, the guilt is treated as given. 
in the first two extracts the therapist asks her teenage client to provide information about 
his own situation, his suspension from school (1), and his possible expulsion (2). Generally 
speaking, an individual is expected to be the primary authority on information or 
knowledge pertaining to themselves, or about things that they have first hand experience of 
(Pomerantz, 1984). The questions themselves in both extracts (1) and (2) display a pre- 
supposition on the part of the therapist that an account or explanation is required or 
expected, and ftirthermore that the person in question is expected to be able to provide such 
an account. As a member of the same culture, the therapist understands that being expelled 
from school is not the normal experience of the majority of pupils. Where an expulsion is 
likely, therefore, an account can reasonably be required, exactly because of its 
exceptionality. Also, as the matter relates directly to the client, it is also reasonable to 
expect that he would know why he had been suspended, and why he might be likely to be 
expelled. If he did not, an account for not knowing would also become relevant. 
The third extract is slightly different from the first two in that it is a question about how the 
client feels. In a similar way to the way that an expectation of knowledge about the client's 
own circumstances is displayed in the first two extracts, this question displays that the 
therapist assumes the addressee has insight into the causes or reasons for her own feelings. 
So, the therapist treats the client's feelings as being actual, identifiable, and reportable, and 
as having been caused by something or things which are also identifiable and reportable. 
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In each of these examples we can see that without actually using the words themselves, the 
notion of cause and effect is a repertoire that is being drawn on by the therapist to engage 
her client fin-ther. This brings us back to the central theme of this chapter, which is to 
examine how people in therapy talk about the relationship between external observable 
actions and possible inner causal factors, and how that may be therapeutically relevant. An 
issue that is important to discuss briefly with this overall objective in mind, is that of a 
person's rights to knowledge. Where there are potentially competing claims regarding the 
facticity of evidence, or the validity of propositions about causal factors particularly where 
it relates to a client's behaviour, the issues of access to knowledge, and the comparable 
reliability of those knowledge claims are brought to the forefront. 
The 'discovery' of causality is a focal topic in medical and legal settings alike, as the 
implications for treatment or punishment of the individual concerned rests heavily on its 
outcome. With the high stakes involved any talk about causality especially where it relates 
to personal responsibility and accountability is a rich forum for investigating how claims 
are delivered and evidenced. The issue of what is known, or legitimately knowable by an 
individual is central to the task of establishing and appropriately dealing with causal 
factors. With this in mind, let us look briefly at the subject of access to knowledge and 
rights to knowledge claims. 
KNOWLEDGE CLAIMS AND THE CASE OF THE'EXPERT OTHER' 
Normally, an individual is expected to have privileged access to his own thoughts, what 
Pomerantz refers to as 'type I knowables' (1980: 187). Sacks also mentions a distinction 
between what one knows first hand, and what one knows by virtue of having been told. In 
his words, "one is responsible for knowing some things on one's own behalf in contrast to 
the situation in which one is treated as likely to be repeating what another has told him 
about himself' (Sacks, 1975: 772). However, there may be a difference between how Us 
premise works with regard to two friends or colleagues talking together informally, 
compared with an individual talking to a therapistý because of its institutional situatedness. 
168 
For most, seeking professional help firorn a therapist is the result of unsuccessful attempts at 
dealing with their problems themselves. The therapist as a professional, trained and 
appropriately qualifited person, is regarded even before the first encounter, as having a 
potentially greater ability to diagnose and prescribe treatinent for the problem than the 
clients themselves. Harvey Sacks made the point in one of his lectures that Freud had a 
mission in his lifetime to develop psychology "so that laymen would know that they don't 
know anything about it" (Sacks, 1995 Vol 2. p217). To some extent this appears to be true. 
The therapist, by virtue of her incumbency within the category 'expert' has certain category 
bound expectations attached to this role which may entitle her to a greater claim to 
knowledge about the psychological causes of her client's behaviour than the client himself. 
In this particular context then, there is a slight difference in what might normally be 
expected in terms of who has privileged access to knowledge. The categories 'self' and 
'other' are no longer adequate. Rather, an additional institutional category of 'expert other' 
becomes relevant. 
The concept of 'expert other' is important when considering issues of evaluation which 
routinely attach themselves to any situation in which persons are asked to discuss matters 
about which someone else who is present (actually or virtually) may be more 
knowledgeable about than themselves. One way that clients manage this problem is to 
make subjective rather than objective claims. For example; 
Subjective: I think it's uncotnfortable for the girls, Gi/S112152 
Objective: It sort of () recovered an'now it's hurting again G1/S1. Lq 
In the first example, a subjective comment is made, one that expresses an opinion, the 
thought of the speaker. It is not stated as an objective fact in the same way that the second 
example is. At times, even within the same turn, a speaker will assert that they don't 
'know' what a particular answer or state of affairs is, but are willing instead to offer an 
alternative, lesser, subjective appraisal. Often this is presented as something that they 
, think' or 'feel'. We can think of these subjective modifiers as a way of making an 
Gcpistemic downgrade'. They do this by moderating an outright knowledge claim down to 
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the level of a subjective opinion. These next two examples demonstrate how this works in 
practice. 
1) 1 don't know I think it was the fact of (OA) comin' here Oakl/Sl. L962 
2) 1 fdon't know, I think he can ngw identify (0.7) that he has done, 
in certain areas he has done things wrong Oakl/Sl. 1501-502 
In each of these turns, which are both second parts of a question/answer pair, the speaker 
begins by deliberately outlining the terms of the following answer. In particular the 
speakers fi-ame the subsequent utterance in each case by specifying it as not 'known', but 
'thought'. In other words, the knowledge claim is downgraded from one of objective fact to 
subjective opinion. The vehicle for making this distinction clear in each case is by use of 
the phrase 'I don't know'. Pragmatically it would appear that this framing statement is 
surplus to requirements, as we can see from the extended extracts that follow, the first part 
of each pair was a question which sought only opinion anyway. 
Extract 1. Oakl/Sl. L959-962 
Therapist: Wh-at d'ya think helped Steve (OA) get involved again? 
(0.5) 
I Client: I don't know I think it was the fact of (OA) comin'here 
Extract 2. Oakl IS1. LA99-502 
Therapist: Dyou think he still sees himself as naughty? 
(3.0) 
Client: I Tdon't know, I think he can now identify (0.7) that he has done, 
in certain areas he has done things wrong 
in both cases the question is posed in a way that solicits an opinion, 'what d'ya think' (1), 
'D'ya think' (2), in the first with an open, and in the second with a closed question 
structure. If it were 'facts' that were being requested, the therapist may have asked 'what 
was it that helped Steve' or "does he still see himself as naughty'; both entirely plausible 
alternatives. Although these examples are only hypothetical, I want to demonstrate that 
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such questions, by virtue of their grammatical structure have inbuilt into them something 
which displays a presupposition that there is already an actual agreed 'right' answer to the 
questions. In contrast, if we look back again at the data, we can now contemplate what it is 
about asking what someone thinks that makes the difference. To start with, the change of 
footing transforms the question from a 'right answer' question to a question which has a 
range of legitimately alternative answers. The crucial difference between these two ways of 
asking is that for the 'right answer' scenario, if a client doesn't know what that right answer 
is, then the subject may effectively be closed down. However in the 'what do you think' 
scenario, whatever answer the client gives will in effect be "right'. 
So, in essence, a subjectively framed question is easier to answer than an objectively 
framed question. This allows for the conversation to continue and for alternative opinions 
and ideas to be aired without the immediate polarisation that a question that presupposes a 
, right or wrong' answer would create. Also, by asking a subjectively framed question, the 
questioner displays that a range of possible alternative answers are relevant, and legitimate. 
The subjectively framed question therefore pre-configures the nature of the relevant second 
part of that question/answer pair as one for which a range of possible 'right' answers are 
available, any of which would be equally acceptable. 
Even though the questions in each case ask specifically for what the client thinks, the initial 
response in both cases is to make explicit that the answer is to be heard as a subjective 
rather than objective account. In the first example, Steve, the person being talked about, is 
also in the room. As we have already established, an individual is usually expected to be 
the most reliable source of knowledge about him/herself. Therefore, we can with some 
confidence conclude that Steve should in theory have a more accurate insight into his 
rnotives for 'getting involved again' (in the therapy sessions). However, A this being said, 
it still does not invafidate whatever his wife proposes as her own opinion, because after all 
it was only ever proposed as just her opinion. Let us look now at an extended version of the 
same extract to see what happens next. 
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Extract 3. OaklSl/L959-985 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
ii. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
16. 
17. 
18. 
19. 
20. 
21. 
22. 
23. 
24. 
25. 
Therapist: Wh-at d'ya think helped Steve (0.4) get involved again? 
(0.5) 
Sandra: I don't know I think it was the fact of (OA) comin' here it [was sortof 
Therapist: [Right 
(0.6) 
Sandra: ýWell. A- whether the reality or seriousness or (0.6) e help Dwain he 
would have to come 
(02) 
Therapist. IMM 
Sandra: [whatever. 
Steve: When I started goin () again before we came back here when we seen Dr 
Larson it's (0.4) somebody else who- II don't know how we seen Dr 
Larson for [but 
Sandra: think 
(0.2) 
Sandra: He said ye- Lve haad 
Therapist: [MM 
(0.3) 
Sandra: Like >it were sortof< y' had to come if you wanted(O. 4) t' come here. 
(0.7) 
Sandra: It come from both parents so it was a sortof 
Therapist Right, so it was ul- urn ultimatum? 
Sandra: Ye: [h 
Steve: [But yeh but the worst thing was when we met hi- well when I met 
him, I don't know if Sandra had seen him a few times before [that 
From line 3 through to line 10, Sandra attempts to answer the question that the therapist 
asks in lines I and 2. She starts with 'I don't know I think' in line 3, which we have already 
estabhshed, frames her answer as subjective opinion. It appears that she is having some 
difficulty in providing her answer, as we can see at the end of line 3 where she begins 'it 
was sort of and then abandons what she had started to say, only to begin again with a 
different way of answering in line 6 where she starts with 'well'. Finally her answer comes 
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in the form of a hypothesis that has two alternative possibilities, 'the reality or seriousness' 
(line 6) 'or t'help Dwain he would have to come' (line 7). 
Steve eventually self-selects in line II to offer his version, although he has not actually 
been asked outright by the therapist to do so. His tam is more like a narrative introduction 
to a relevant answer rather than an answer in itself, and Sandra steps in again to expand on 
option two of her hypothesis. Finally, despite considerable perturbation throughout her turn 
from lines 14-21 she concludes 'it come from both parents'. 
Picking up on this conclusion, the therapist offers her formulation of the reason for Steve's 
return to therapy from the responses given so far, as being the result of an 'ultimatum'. 
Sandra's immediate response in the next turn is to agree with the therapist's formulation, 
'yeh' Oine 23). Steve responds very quickly as well in partial overlap with his wife with 
'but'. To say 'but' in itself only makes sense if it is an abbreviated way of saying 'yes but'. 
The necessary agreement for the 'but' to be relevant in this instance is not initially 
verbalised, but is 'heard' none-the-less. However, Steve immediately emphasises his 
agreement with a self-correction which takes the form of 'yeh but' (fine 24), thus inserting 
the agreement marker that had been missed out in his first response. So, first by die 
grammatical necessity of 'yes' preceding 'but', and then by actually stating his agreement, 
Steve also concurs with the therapist's formulation of what his motives were for coming 
back to therapy, that being that he had been offered an ultimatum. 
What we have been looking at here is an example of a clearly marked, subjective account 
of someone else's possible motives, in the presence of that person. The account here was 
provided in response to a question that asked for a subjective opinion about die 'inner' self 
of another person. If we go back now to the second example that we looked at initially, the 
person in question (the client's son) is not present. 
Extract 4. Oakl/Sl. L499-502 
1. Therapist: Dyou think he still sees himself as naughty? 
2. (3.0) 
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3. Client I Tdon't know, I think he can now identify (0.7) that he has done, 
in certain areas he has done things wrong 
In this situation, the person who is being discussed is not able to give a second assessment 
in response to the claim his mother makes about whether he sees himself as naughty or not. 
The question 'what do you think' is not only contrastive with 'what do you know' but also 
with 'what does anyone else think'. So there are at least two ways of hearing this question, 
what do you think, or what do you think. The first part of the answer deals both with its 
epistemic base as a subjective response, 'I don't know, I think' and with the implied 
contrastive person reference, 'I don't know, I think'. 
What I am proposing is that where there is an explicit unsolicited underlining of the 
difference between knowing and thinking as there is in these two extracts, one of the things 
that it does is to inoculate the speaker against a possible counter-claim by another party. It 
allows room for the subsequent presentation of alternative perspectives or evidence which 
might contradict that claim had it been presented as fact rather than opinion. 
Using Epistemic Downgrading Positively in Therapy 
The presumed level of 'category-incumbent' knowledge that an addressee may have access 
to can be displayed in the way that a question is phrased. For example the question 'Why 
d'you feel guilty? (Gl/Sl. L1144) displays a presumption that the addressee has direct access 
to definite reportable knowledge, whereas 'what did you think was in it for you? 
(G1/S1. L1442) is a form of epistemic downgrading, and implies that the addressee has 
possibly fallible or limited access to knowledge about the matter. In the second instance, 
the addressee is not being asked for the reason, but for a possible reason: their opinion, 
which is a far lesser request. In some situations this kind of downgrading would be heard as 
a 'put down', for example 'what do you think you're trying to do? ' However in therapeutic 
situations, the use of episternic downgrading can have a positive role to play in facilitating 
the opportunity for potentially unsubstantiated propositions to be ventured. Where 'non- 
factual' comments are invited by therapists by using 'what do you think' question prefaces, 
an environment conducive with a freedom of expression is fostered. This freedom is 
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created on the premise that anyone is allowed to have their own opinions and thoughts 
about a range of matters. The foHowing extract is an example of such a case. 
Extract 5. Gl/S111553 
Therapist: What do you diink it's going to take (0.5) for () life to kind of turn around? 
In this extract, the question is not posed as 'what will it take for life to turn around, but 
'-what do you think it's going to take '. The former question presumes an authoritative 
knowledge on the part of the answerer. Presumably if he knew the answer, his reason for 
being in therapy would already be greatly reduced. The design of the whole question both 
addresses the reason for being in therapy, 'the 'problem', and at the same time allows the 
client maximum room to give his own viewpoint. By glossing the problems that her client 
is experiencing as 'life', the therapist demonstrates an orientation to the delicacy of the 
situation, and the potentially inference-charged nature of using more specific descriptive 
terms. The displayed neutrality of 'for life to turn around' is a non blame-specific phrase 
which ftirther assists her client by giving him room to answer the question without having 
to draw on a more defensive repertoire. 
Within this overall context of the therapist's turn, the phrase 'what do you think' is found. 
As I have already discussed, to report on what one thinks about a situation is cpistemically 
far more answerable than to give a definitive answer about a situation. In the case of 
disclosing what you think about something there are no wrong answers, what one person 
thinks may well be different from what another person thinks regardless of any so-called 
external reality. Thus, an acceptance of a multiplicity of perspectives on any given matter 
can be fostered in this environment by using this simple technique. 
There are two important points from this discussion that I wish to draw out. Firstly, that 
requesting a person's opinion, whether it be in the form of asking 'what do you think' or 
'what is your opinion' or 'what do you see' makes the question far more easily answerable 
than to ask for some definite answer to a problem. In theory at least, everyone is entitled to 
their own beliefs and opinions about a range of issues, whether they are 'right' to think as 
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they do or not. The question, put in this form, therefore allows the respondent the space to 
talk freely about the topic proffered without concern for the 'correctness' of their 
comments in any absolute sense. It is apparent that this is a useful approach to take in a 
therapeutic setting, where a large part of the therapist's activity is addressed at getting the 
client to talk openly and without fear of reproach or accusation. 
Secondly, although everyone is entitled to say what they think, what some people think 
may be treated as more influential than what others think. Whilst both the therapist and 
client are in theory equally at liberty to volunteer what they think about any given situation, 
what one person thinks is not necessarily equally comparable with what another person 
thinks, dei)endinz on their status. exDertise, situation etc. There are deQTees of entitlement 
to knowledge and rights to make knowledge-claims depending on a variety of these 
category incumbencies. Whilst it may often be the case that none of the parties involved in 
a therapy session claim to 'know' what a problem, its cause or solution is, what the 
therapist thinks is likely to be ascribed with greater weight than what the clients themselves 
think. 
KNOWING YOUR OWN MIND V. KNOWING OTHER PEOPLE'S MINDS 
I want to turn now to the subject of knowing what other people are thinking, or at least at 
how this issue is talked about in the context of therapy. To start with let us consider how 
therapists talk to clients when they are asking what the client him/berself thinks about 
something. We wiH then go on to compare these question types with questions about what 
someone else is thinking. The following extracts are illustrative of therapist's questions 
about what the client his/herself thinks. In the way that the questions are formatted, they 
display something of the therapist's perspective regarding what access to knowledge about 
their own thoughts the client may have. 
1) Therapist: What do you think () they should have done to Carina? GI/S1- L1335 
2) Therapist: But at the time (. ) what did you think was in it for you? G1/S1. L1442 
3) Therapist: What do you think ies going to take (0.5) for () life to kind of turn around? 
G15111553 
4) Therapist: How often do you think (. ) about being dead. Gl/S2. L1011 
176 
I have chosen these particular examples because they illustrate various things, not simply 
the assumption of a given speaker that her addressee has access to what he thinks right 
now, but that he can also report on, 
1) what he thinks now about a past event 
2) what he thought about a past event then 
3) what he thinks now about afuture event, and 
4) thefrequency of discrete identifiable thoughts about a particular topic 
There may be many other permutations that I have not identified, but the point I want to 
make fundamentally is that an individual is normally expected to have access to, or 
knowledge of their own thoughts about a range of topics, persons, events etc., and that they 
can report on those thoughts. This socially shared assumption is evidenced by the fact that 
such a question as 'what do you think about X? ' can be asked. What I want to look at now 
is the slightly more complex situation of asking one person what another person thinks. In 
therapy this process is known as 'circular questioning', although the practice of asking 
someone what someone else thinks is obviously not confitned to this context. 
Circular Questioning 
Circular questioning is a technique in Family Systems Theory that has its origins in the 
Nfilan model of family therapy (Selvini et al, 1978; Palazzoli et al, 1980), and is defined as 
a question asked by an interviewer of a patient about a person or persons in a relationship 
with the patient, such as family members, peers, or members of the fan-dly of origin. The 
focus of the question is the patient's perception of the experience or the belief of the third 
person whom the patient is discussing" (Maukshe & Roesler, 1990: 6). The therapist will 
typically ask the client what they think someone else in their family or friendship circle 
thinks or feels. Here are a few examples from the data set that I have been working from: 
Therapist: What do you think they think? G1/S2. L680 
Therapist: What d'you think he thinks he's got out of being at Acorn House? Oakl/S111491 
Therapist: How dyou think he's (1.5) u: m (0.7) thinking about his discharge. Oakl/Sl. L447 
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Where the subject-actor is also present the therapist may then prompt a response from him, 
or the subject-actor may himself initiate a response (Perakyla, 1995). Where the subject- 
actor is not present the client may continue (either with prompting from the therapist or by 
their own initiation) to talk about their own feelings or thoughts, and to make clear whether 
they agree or disagree with the person reported (Geldard & Geldard, 2000). This style of 
questioning is considered to be a particularly helpful approach when dealing with 
adolescents, as it can be used as an indirect way of finding out what the client's own 
thoughts or feelings are. From a systemic therapeutic point of view its primary usefulness 
lies in its fimction of assisting clients to build a framework of alternative perspectives, by 
utilising the notion of "relational language" (McNamee, 1992, p195). 
Using relational language, responses to circular questions shift one's attention away from 
what is 'factual' and "focus on the possible distinctions in interpretation that can be 
constructed within the same interactive context" (McNamee, 1992, p195). In this respect it 
is a tool for helping the client to realise the 'systemic' nature of their own problems: that a 
problem is not solely that of the individual concerned, but that it is embedded in their social 
relations. However, as Perakyla has pointed out in his excellent study of AIDS patient 
counselling, circular questions also provide a more fundamental purpose related to die 
moment-to-moment management of the unfolding interaction. In his study of circular 
questions presented by therapists to clients whose partners were also present, lie found that 
a primary function of this device was to eliciting talk on a delicate topic from the 
'overhearing' partner (Perakyla, 1995 p142). With partners present, a typical sequence 
would be something like this: 
1) CounseRor asks client 1 to describe somediing related to client 2's experience 
2) Client 1 responds 
3) Counsellor asks client 2 to respond to the description provided by client 1 
4) Client 2 responds 
The difference with the data that I have been working with is that typically, although not 
always, the subject-actor is not present. This distinction presents a functional difference in 
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the way that therapists use circular questions, and an evidential difference in the way that 
clients respond to them. Claims made by clients in the former situation can be immediately 
verified or countered by the subject-actor themselves, but not in the latter. It seems likely 
therefore that this may be a reason for the propensity for evidencing ascription claims made 
by clients about absent subject-actors. 
During the course of any therapy session, one is likely to find all manner of self-initiated 
claims and ascriptions about other people's states of mind. However, at present I will focus 
specifically on ascriptions elicited on those occasions where an explicit invitation is made 
by the therapist of the client by way of what is known as a 'circular question'. I have 
symbolically characterised these kinds of questions with the formulation 'what do you 
think A thinks about X', where A is the subject-actor, and X is a specified topic. So how is 
it done? How can anyone even begin to answer a question such as 'what does A think'? 
The only way that we can determine what makes this possible is to examine closely what 
people actually do say when asked such a question. But first let us take a look at the 
question itself. 
In many cases, such as the examples just given, the question is formulated not as 4what 
does X think', but 'what do you think that X thinks'. If we compare this question structure 
with a typical question about what you yourself think, there are obvious similarities. With a 
question about what you think, the format is canonically, 'What do you think about V. 
With a question about what someone else thinks the pattern is commonly 'What do you 
think that A thinks about V If we take the second example in two parts, we can see that it 
starts in the same way as the first example, 'what do you think The directness of Ole 
question presumes that the addressee has definite knowledge about what they think, Ole 
difference with the circular question however is that it is designed to explicate not what you 
t1link about X, nor what A thinks about X, but what you think that A th inks about X 
The point I'm making is that the question 'What does A think' is not the one that is asked 
This question posed in this direct form, would assume that the addressee knows for sure 
what the other person thinks, in the same way that they may be expected to 'know' their 
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own thoughts. It assumes a kind of privileged knowledge about something that on the 
whole is treated as beyond absolute knowing. I am not suggesting that this question is un- 
askable, or that it doesn't get asked, but simply that there is a big difference between asking 
what someone else thinks and asking what you think that someone else thinks. 
In essence, what I am saying is that just by the way that the question is formed, the asker 
demonstrates a pre-supposition about the anticipated knowledge entitlement of the person 
addressed. In effect, a display of what is expected to be knowable by the addressee is huilt 
into the question. This has strong implications in terms of the assumptions made about 
mutual rights to and expectations of knowledge about persons in close relationships. As 
Sacks points out, knowledge about someone close to you, such as a member of your family 
or close fiiend can be thought of as a kind of category bound activity (Sacks 1972, in 
Perakyla p138; also Potter, 1996). Part of being close to someone, is to know what they 
may think or feel about various things. So much so that the closeness of a relationship that 
two people share can be demonstrated in the way that they talk about one another's 
experience. For example: 
Extract 6. Gl/S2. L157-158 
Client you think you're a bad girl and you think you can speak up an all but 
you don't know nothing. 
Here, the client addresses his sister directly, making a bold assertion about what she thinks 
about herself and her inaccuracy in making claims to knowledge about him. Similarly 
claims about a third party can be made in their absence, displaying the same intimate 
knowledge of that person. For example: 
Extract 7. G1/S1. L903 
Mother He thinks he's very. hh (1) picked on. 
In this last example, two things are relevant to draw out; firstly the claim about someone 
else's thinking is made definitely, rather than offered as a subjective opinion as we saw 
earlier in the chapter. The mother in this extract is talking about her son (the client). Again 
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a display of close relationship is achieved by a demonstration of knowing what someone 
else is thiriking. In the same way, a claim like this may be heard to have greater veracity 
because it is made by a mother, than if it had been asserted by a more distant acquaintance. 
Secondly, it is another example of an epistemic downgrade being used negatively. By this I 
mean that the use of 'he thinks' in this extract is used as a way of undermining or 
demonstrating scepticism about the facticity of what she subsequently reports. The 
insertion of 'he thinks' effectively reduces the impact of what she says from what could 
have been the straightforward 'factual' statement 'he's very picked on', to the more 
skeptical 'he thinks he's very picked on. ' Furthermore, we can see that the way that die turn 
is produced, implies that it is contrastive with something else that has not been said. There 
is a silent 'but' at the end of the statement. One is left with the clear impression that 'lie 
thinks X, but Y is really the case' although that 'but Y' is not verbalized. However, we can 
still see that there is an embedded contrast in what is said, and both the hearer and the 
analyst are left with the impression that whatever Dwain thinks is incorrect. Here, 'thinks' 
is obviously contrastive with what is 'really' the case. So, it very neatly performs the dual 
function of demonstrating intimate knowledge of another person by being able to report on 
their thoughts, whilst at the same time displaying the attitude of the speaker as one who 
treats those thoughts as 'merely subjective' (and by implication, incorrect) rather than 
factual. 
Having spent some time looking at the presupposition embedded in questions about other 
people's minds, I want to turn now to look at some of the kinds of responses to circular 
questions posed by therapists when the subject-actor is not present. 
Some Responses to Circular Questions 
Going back to some of the examples that I started this chapter with, what the therapist 
projects with the 'what do you think A thinks' question-type is that what is required is not a 
definitive answer about what the other person's actual state of mind is, but what the 
addressed person 'thinks' might be their state of mind. It may not be immediately obvious 
why this subtle difference may be important, but if we look now at the kinds of responses 
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that questions formulated in this way produce, I hope that the significance will become 
apparent. The following extract is an example of a typical circular question-response 
sequence from the data that I have been working with: 
Extract 8. Oakl IS1 T-A91-503 
1. Therapist: What d'you think he thinks he's got out of being at Acorn House? 
2. (3.6) 
3. Mother: I d- I don't know really cos he h- he doesn't (02) s2y (0.4) he 
4. doesn't say a lot about here 
In this particular example, after a very long pause (line 2-3.6 seconds), the client's mother 
makes a faltering start as she begins her attempt to answer the question posed by the 
therapist in the prior turn (line 1). Her turn has the recognisable characteristics of a 
'dispreferred' response in conversation analytic terms. Typically, the first part of an 
adjacency pair such as a question and answer sequence projects something of the kind of 
response that is expected. The expected or 'preferred' answer can be identified by its 
structural features, such as being produced quickly after the first part of the pair, and not 
being prefaced by markers such as 'well' or 'urn' (Hutchby & Woofitt, 1988). Delay, 'um' 
prefacing and discontinuity or fragmentation in the response, are all displays of 
'disprefeffence', not in the psychological sense of the word, but in the interactional sense. 
The important issue is that the first part - in this case the question - is built in such a way 
as to project what the preferred response should be (Schegloff 1888). Let me illustrate this 
with a couple of simple examples: 
Extract 9. Christmas Dinner '98. L63 
Father: are you happy with what you've got? 
Daughter: Yes. 
In this extract, the projected preferred response to the question is agreement, it is 'yes' she 
is happy with what she's got, which is exactly how the daughter responds. In this next 
extract however, the response takes a 'dispreferred' forin. 
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Extract 10. Christmas Dinner'98. L84 
Daughter: Mummy were you the one who put the sausage on the plate? 
Mother: Err () don't know 
The notion of preference is a complex one; the kind of answer that any question 'prefcrs' is 
not just a matter of grammatical determinism, but is also constituted by situational 
variables such as the context (ie an institutional one such as therapy, or an informal one 
such as over a meal) and the wider sequence of talk that the turns appear in. A simple 
example of an exception to the basic preference rules is that of complements, where 
grammatically, the question may appear to project or prefer a particular kind of response, 
because of socio-cultural factors to do with politeness and modesty, the pattern for 
preference is reversed. So, without consideration of the wider environment of any question, 
the expected or preferred response is indeterminable. 
If we return now to the question posed by the therapist in extract 8, the preference that Ole 
question design appears to anticipate is not a simple yes or no answer, but it does project 
that there is a 'what' that can be expressed by the addressee. It presupposes if you like that 
the addressee is competent to answer the question. To be able to answer also assumes 
knowledge about the object in question. In this case, it displays a presumption that the 
addressee already has thoughts about what her son thinks about the proffered topic, 
thoughts which she is able to report on. As we established earlier, there is plentiful 
evidence to show that people are ordinarily expected to have direct access to their own 
thoughts. In this instance, the required thoughts-to-be-accessed are those thoughts which 
are relevant to the proposed topic of what her son thinks about Acorn House (Ole 
pseudonym of the residential mental health unit where he has been staying). 
The dispreferred structure of the addressee's response displays that there is a problem witli 
immediate production of the expected response. In other words, she does not immediately 
produce an answer to the question that describes what her thoughts are. Another feature of 
disprefeffed responses is that they are typically qualified and accounted for. When we look 
at what she does actually say, we can see that the initial 'I don't know' response is 
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inunediately followed by such an account. Therefore, we can deduce that in this case 'not 
knowing' is treated by the participant as accountable. 
So, the question 'what do you think that A thinks about X' displays a presupposition that 
someone else's thoughts are in some way knowable or at least discemable. The accounting 
and dispreferrence noted in the example given, demonstrates that some work has to be done 
in answering such a question if compliance with this presupposition is not attainable by the 
answerer. To be specific, if the mother in this extract is not able to verbalize her thoughts 
about what her son thinks about Acorn House, she is apparently accountable for not being 
able to do so. There may be context specific reasons for this accountability, which go 
beyond the general category-bound activities which predict that a mother may be expected 
to know what her child thinks about various things. As this particular therapy session is 
largely concerned with her son's discharge from the residential unit where lie has been 
staying, there is an immediate relevance for all concerned regarding this particular issue. 
Therefore, whilst it may be more understandable that the client's mother doesn't know 
what her son thinks about global warming or the big bang theory, the local relevance of his 
discharge is more immediate. Her accountability for not knowing what he thinks about this 
particular subject is therefore perhaps more acute. 
In both the question and the response, we can see that there is an orientation to the 
discernability of someone else's thoughts. Other people's thoughts are not treated as 
completely unknowable, mysterious or out of bounds. They are treated as in some way 
accessible. For this to be so, there has to be some socially shared understanding of some 
kind of mechanism of how this might be possible. One way of finding out what this might 
be is to analyse the kinds of accounts given in 'not knowing' answers to circular questions. 
ACCOUNTING FOR NOTKNOWING WHAT SOMEONE ELSE IS THINKING 
I would like to look again at extract 8 from the point of view of accounting for not knowing 
what someone else is thinking. In this extract, I am treating the response 'I don't know' as 
an actual reporting of not knowing the answer to the question rather than what could be 
referred to as a 'hedge', or technique for displaying disattentiveness to particular details. 
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This extract is just one example of a 'not knowing + account' response to a circular 
question, but it provides an excellent starting point for this investigation. In her account for 
not knowing, the mother in this extract reports, 
Ext 8(b). Oakl/Sl L501-503 
3. Mother: I d- I don't know reaUy cos he h- he d-oesn't (02) s, ýy (0.4) he 
doesn't say a lot about here 
In any report, we can presume that what is stated not to have happened is only sensibly 
reportable by its unstated contrast to what would normally happen. By and large things that 
are expected, normal and everyday, by being just that, are not treated as newsworthy, or 
reportable. It is only those things that are out of the ordinary, unexpected or different, 
which are sensibly things that are worth telling. A story preface such as 'a funny thing 
happened to me on the way to work today' for example, is a 'tellable' thing not by virtue of 
its description of a typical journey to work, but by virtue of the 'thing that happened' on die 
way which was Wferent from what normally happens. 
So, going back to our example; to report that someone 'doesn't say much about X' is a 
'tellable' thing because it reports something other than what is expected. Therefore we can 
say that for 'he doesn't say much about X' to be a possible, intelligible thing to say by way 
of account, it demonstrates that 'saying' rather than 'not saying' is the normal and expected 
alternative. Taking the whole extract once again as a unit, we can conclude that the account 
that the client's mother gives to explain her 'not knowing' reveals something of the way 
that she would normally know what he is thinking. The account she gives for not knowing 
is that 'he doesn't say ... a lot about here' (line 4). So, if this is an account for not knowing 
what her son is thinking, we can legitimately deduce that her normal way of knowing what 
he is thinking is by what he says to her. 
This is the point at which we come full circle from where we started at the beginning of 
this chapter when we discussed the 'inner' and the 'outer' self, and how these two are 
produced as causally linked in conversational interaction. Here we can see a very clear 
example of how an inference about what another person is thinking (their inner selo can be 
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drawn from what that person says (outer self). It is this 'outer' demonstrative act of speech 
that interactants treat as a resource which they can use to interpret what is going on inside 
that other person. Furthermore, even from this single example we can see that this is a 
normative expectation. The link between what another person thinks and what they say 
comes in the environment of an account. The account as it is produced implies by the way 
that it is expressed, that the fault, if there is one, is with her son for not talking about what 
he thinks rather than with her for not knowing. 
Both in making claims about what someone else thinks, and in accounting for not knowing 
what someone else's thoughts are, the use of reports about what that person has or hasn't 
said is a common way of evidencing those claims. This is a sub ect that we will now look at 
in more detail. 
EVIDENCING CLAIMS ABOUT OTHER MINDS WITH REPORTED SPEECH 
Let us begin by returning to the first two extracts that I began this chapter with, and look at 
the responses that those questions elicited. It appears that there are various ways that a 
client can answer, or attempt to answer circular questions. Broadly speaking, an answer 
may take some form which indicates that the client doesn't know what the other person 
may be diftildng or feeling, as the last extract illustrates. At other times, the client may 
attempt to make some assertion about the person in question anyway, for example: 
Ext 12. Oakl/Sl L447451 
1. Father: Well he- he hasn't said much about ýit I think he's (OA) probably 
2. looking (ojward to it 
Here, we see that whilst the father is unable to say what his son thinks, he is still willing to 
make an attempt at guessing what that might be - "he's probably looking forward to if". One 
of the significant things which this extract and extract 8 have in common is that in each case 
some reference to what that person hasn't said is made relevant as an important factor in 
seeking to validate the answer given. 
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What I would like to focus on now is the difference in the way that questions about cognitive 
activity tend to be asked of someone in contrast to about someone. In other words there is a 
noticeable difference in the way that therapists ask about the thoughts and feelings of Ole 
person they are addressing, and the thoughts and feelings of a third party. Let us begin by 
looking at an example of the former: 
Extract 13. Gl/Sl 1483-1493 
1. Therapist When there aren't people around, how do you feel? 
((7 lines of insertion sequence omitted)) 
2. Client: Depressed. I hate being by myselL (0.5) That's the one 
3. thing I hate most. 
4. Therapist M hmm. Because? 
Here, the therapist asks her client directly "how do you feel? " (fine 1), not 'how do you 
think you feelT. The point I am trying to make is that in this example, as in many others, 
the therapist treats her client as proficient in being able to answer her apparently 
straightforward question. By asking the question directly, she treats her client as both 
competent and in a good position to be able to answer the question. In other words, the 
direct form of the question displays a presupposition that he has both direct access to 
knowledge about his own feelings, and will be able to articulate that inner state in response 
to her question. Following a brief insertion sequence initiated by the client to clarify what 
she meant by 'people' (omitted) the client proceeds to answer the question, apparently 
unproblematically. In doing so he also demonstrates that he does not treat her request for 
information as unreasonable nor the displayed presumption that he should be able to 
provide an adequate answer as problematic. Therefore both the form of the question and the 
response to that question show that there is an orientation by both parties to the normative 
nature of one person asking another person to tell them how they feel. 
Taking this example just one step ftirther, after the client's response in lines 2 and 3, flie 
therapist goes on to ask, "Because? " She demonstrates in this minimal request that not only 
is it perfectly reasonable to ask someone else to report on their own emotional or cognitivc 
state, but also to be able to provide an explanation for why that might be the case. She 
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treats her client's emotional state as not just something randomly generated and 
unpredictable or mysterious, but as something which is influenced by identifiable causal 
factors, causal factors which fin-thermore are also reportable. 
We are now in a position to identify some important contrasts between how people relate in 
terms of their ability to report their own or other people's internal states. Let us hold in 
mind for a moment the difference between the direct form of questioning used when asking 
someone to report on their own thoughts or emotions, and the circuitous form of 
questioning used when asking someone to report on someone else's thoughts or feelings as 
we look again at an extended version of an extract we have already briefly looked at. 
Extract 14. Oak 11S1 L447451 
1. Therapist: How d'you think he's (1.5) u: m (0.7) thinking about his discharge. 
2. (1.7) 
3. Father: Well he- he hasn't s-aid much about ýit I think he's (OA) probably 
4. looking forward to it 
As we established in the previous section, there is a great deal of difference between asking 
'how do you think he's thinking about his dischargeT and 'how is he thinking about his 
dischargeT Here, the therapist's mid-turn perturbations in line I indicate a possible word- 
search on her part. The word that appears after the trouble is "thinking" aldiough it is 
conceivable that given the environment it could have been that the therapist may have said 
'feeling' at this point. Although this is largely conjecture, it is none-the-less conjecture 
built out of the evidence that the therapist did not produce "thinking" immediately, and yet 
in all other respects her turn passes smoothly and is grammatically coherent. Ilie delay of 
1.7 seconds before the father begins to answer is very long considering that an answer from 
him is immediately relevant. He begins with 'well', a typical dispreference marker, 
suggesting perhaps that the answer he is about to give is not the one that was expected. He 
then goes on to say, "he hasn't said much about if' (line 3) which serves as an advancc 
qualification of what he is about to say. This qualification ftirthermore implies that what his 
son has said would normally be the point of reference for making a judgement about what 
he thinks. 
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The father does go on to produce an opinion about what he thinks his son thinks, but the 
nature of the subsequent qualifier shows very clearly that although he does make an 
attempt to give an answer to the question, it suggests that he does not have the kind of 
evidence to support that claim that he would normally have provided. The delay before 
"probably" (Ext 14. line 3), and that word in itself both indicate a degree of avoidance of 
making a strong claim. We can assume that this caution of making the claim definitively or 
even strongly is due to the lack of evidence for that claim. The use of the word 'probably' 
also implies that he is making more of a guess about what his son might be thinking, than 
he is claiming to actually know. Such guesswork may be based on a collection of observed 
behaviours, or he may be guessing based on what he thinks anyone may think if they were 
in that situation. Either way, his claim is neither substantiated by a report of what his son 
has said, nor by any anecdotal evidence about what he has done. 
However the fact that he draws attention specifically to the lack of evidence in the form of 
what his son has said, demonstrates that had he access to such information, that is what he 
would base his claim on for current reporting purposes. So, highlighting what evidence lie 
does not have to support his claim, indicates precisely what kind of evidence lie would have 
used if he had it. In this instance the father indicates that in order to substantiate a claim 
about what his son is thinking he would have to use some evidence about what his son had 
said. We find an almost identical pattern in response to a similar question in the next 
extract. This time the mother of the same boy referred to in the previous extract is die 
object of the therapist's questions. 
Extract 15. Oak 11S1 IA91-503 
1. Therapist What d'you. think he thinks he's got out of being at Acorn House? 
2. (3.6) 
3. Mother: I d- I don't know really cos he h- he d_oesn't (02) s2y (0.4) he doesn't say 
4. a lot about here or what (0.6) cos when he first came he used to say I've 
5. come because I'm n- Nobody had ever said that but that's in his mind 
6. what he had thoUght. 
7. (0.3) 
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8. But he's never said like what he has to do or what he thinks about 
9. anything. 
10. Therapist D'you think he still sees himself as naughty? 
11. (3.0) 
12. Mother: I tdorýt know, I think he can now identify (0.7) that he has done, 
13. in certain areas he has done things wrong and what (0.5) he could 
14. sorta change or he could do (with). 
Again the therapist asks what the mother thinks her son is thinking about a particular issue. 
The massive delay after this direct question is the first indicator that she is having difficulty 
in answering the question. In the last extract, the father qualified his response before he gave 
it, In this instance the mother gives her response first and then qualifies it afterwards. 
Throughout her response there is continuous perturbation, as she appears to stumble over her 
words, again indicating her difficulty in answering. 
As with the last extract, there is an emphasis on the word 'say', which I suggest is 
contrastive with what he either thinks or does. Again, the response to the question seems to 
be one which brings up the relevance of what the boy has said about the topic raised by the 
therapist as evidence for what he might be thinking. The use of the word 'really' early in her 
response (line 3) signifies that when she says she doesn't know, what she means is she may 
have some thoughts about it, but nothing that could be substantiated as 'real', as entirely 
factual or definite. Together with her re-emphasis of "I don't know" (line 3 and again in line 
12), she not only provides the epistemic basis of her subsequent report, but also, by using 
"reall "'in addition, she underlines her basis for making her claim even more clearly. 
In line 3 the client's mother apparently begins to start to try to fmd a way of responding to 
the therapist's question, even if her response isn't exactly the answer to the question she was 
asked. She starts, "when he first came he used to say I've come because I'm n-o" (line 5). 'Ille 
cut-off on n-, I suggest, is just at the point that she would have said 'naughty'. Being unable 
to answer the question about what she thinks her son thinks now, she instead gives some 
evidence, in the form of reporting what he used to say when he first started coming for 
therapy, about what he was thinking then. Perhaps not feeling qualified to claim knowledge 
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about his current thoughts she presents instead some knowledge about his earlier thoughts 
evidenced by what he had said then. Interestingly, she doesn't attempt to provide the 
therapist with an answer to the actual question based on some other information or 
conjecture, as her husband had earlier, but instead abandons any attempt to claim such 
knowledge on the basis of not having heard her son say anything about the subject recently. 
The direct link between what he said and what he thought is conclusively made in this one 
utterance: "I d- I don't know really cos he h- he doesn't (0.2) sAY (0.4) he doesn't say a lot 
about here" (lines 3& 4). Furthermore, she goes on to make an even clear link when she 
quotes her son as saying, "I've come because I'm n-" (possibly 'naughty) and going on to 
add, "that's what's in his mind" (line 5). 
Further evidence which suggests that the therapist also treated the cut-off word beginning 
with n- as probably intended to be 'naughty', can be seen in her response in line 10. She asks 
"d'you think he still sees himself as naughty". The therapist in this turn demonstrates that 
what she has understood from what the client's mother had just said was that her son used to 
see himself as naughty. What she actually said was "That's what's in his mind what fie had 
thought" (lines 5& 6). Subtly she makes an almost imperceptible self-correction in the 
course of producing her utterance regarding the tense that she is using. She begins, 'that's 
what's in his mind' present tense, and ends, 'what he had thought'. Perhaps as a result of this 
self-correction, or perhaps simply to clarify what her son's current state of mind might be, 
the therapist asks whether she thinks 'he still sees himself as 'naughty' (line 10, emphasis 
added). In order to ask this question the therapist has already accepted the mother's claim 
that indeed he really did used to think of himself as naughty, even though she doesn't 
actually produce the word 'naughty' (line 5). 
This question is presented after the mother has for the second time, explicitly reported that 
her son has "never" said "what he thinks about anything" (line 8). Her assertion is 
formulated in the extreme by using the adjectives "never" and "anything", giving die 
therapist very little room to continue this line of questioning. The fact that the therapist in 
her next tum does continue suggests that she still thinks that Sandra can answer questions 
about her son's state of mind despite her report that he has not actually said anyfliing to her 
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about it. The massive 3 second pause after her question reveals once again that Sandra has 
great difficulty in answering. When she finally does, her answer is "I don't know" (line 12). 
Although she does elaborate somewhat, what she says is very vague and trails off at the end 
inconclusively. So, on the one hand, the client's mother presents an argument that she does 
not know what her son is thinking based on the lack of information provided by him in die 
form of what he has actually said about what he thinks, and on the other hand, the therapist 
in the face of this strong claim to lack of knowledge still pursues the issue. 
As we saw in the first extract, the client's initial response was that he didn't know what his 
son thought because he hadn't said much about it. In this case, as with the previous example, 
a report of not knowing about the thinkiiig of another person is substantiated by refcrring to 
the fact that that person hasn't said very much about the current topic. So, knowledge claims 
about another person's thoughts on a given matter seem to be closely linked to whether the 
person making that claim can provide some supporting evidence in the form of reporting 
what that person has said, which is then treated as a reflection of what that person is or was 
diffiking. 
By and large people tend to ask other people questions that they anticipate are within that 
person's ability to answer. So to ask the question in the first-place is to presuppose that the 
person addressed is capable, that they have the resources or necessary knowledge to 
adequately answer, and to provide where necessary a basis for that claim. It appears 
therefore that claims about other people's psyche, are largely grounded in reports of what 
they have said. 
Volunteered Talk About Other Minds 
So far we have looked at talk about what another person is thinking which has been elicited 
by direct questioning on the part of the therapist. I would like to move on now to look at 
some other instances in therapy talk where clients talk about what someone else is thinking, 
but do it without being directly asked by the therapist. This next extract is an example of a 
client volunteering to talk about what he thinks her son might have been thinking on the 
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occasion that they are discussing. The father initiates and follows up his claim subsequently 
with report of what the boy said as evidence for the validity of that claim. 
Extract 16. Oakl IS1 L. 472-476 
1. Father U s'pose that's a- another thing he thought y'know at least H be 
2. goin Tesco. 
3. (0.3) 
4. Mother: Yeh= 
Father: =Cos he actuafly ac[tually said (0.2) can we stiH go Tesco? 
The evidencing begins in line 5 with 'cos', which is further supported by the use and 
repetition of the word 'actually' which emphasises the facticity of the report. In this extract, 
the father initiates quite a strong claim about what his son was thinking on a particular 
occasion by asserting 'he thought ... ' (line 
1). In an increment to this original turn, he adds 
that his son had actually said, "Can we still go Tesco? " (line 5). The active voicing in the 
father's second turn increment adds validity to his assertion about what his son thinks. This 
example demonstrates that not only can what someone hasn't said be used to account for not 
knowing what someone thinks, but also conversely, by reporting what someone has said a 
speaker can verify a claim about what another person does think. 
Summary 
In conclusion, what I have examined in this chapter, broadly speaking, is the way that pcople 
talk about what other people ay be thinking or' feeling. I began this chapter with an 
observation that in day-to-day life people commonly make representations of other people's 
internal states, their motives, attitudes, thoughts and feelings. Although we can say that we 
cannot actually 'know' for definite what anyone else thinks or feels, what we tend to do, is to 
infer things about other people's 'inner' world from external evidences such as that person's 
expression, their words or actions. 
The first major section in this chapter was to examine the topic of 'pursuing causality. This 
was an investigation of the kind of internal causal explanations that are made for outward 
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behaviour. In seeking to evidence claims about someone else's inner processes or 'psyche', I 
have shown that one of the main ways in the data that I have been studying, is to use 
reported speech and/or descriptions of behaviour that epitomise the claimed characteristic 
thoughts or attitude. Secondly, I explored how knowledge claims are requested, produced 
and substantiated or, where the requested information was lacking, accounted for. Although 
generally speaking, an individual is expected to be the primary authority on information or 
knowledge pertaining to themselves, in the case of the 'expert other', such as a professional 
therapist a client's confidence in that authority of the self appears diminished. I have 
demonstrated one way that clients manage this problem is to make subjective rather than 
objective claims. I refer to these subjective modifiers as a way of making an 'epistemic 
downgrade'. In other words, the knowledge claim is downgraded from one of objective fact 
to subjective opinion. 
I have shown also that facets of that 'inner realm' such as feelings are treated as reportable, 
and as having been caused by something or things which are also identifiable and reportable. 
In these cases cause and effect is a repertoire which is unproblamatically oriented to by all 
participants. However a difference between present and non-present other has emerged in 
terms of how participants verbalise their own representation of what that third party may 
think or feel. The key issue in this regard is the ability of that 'other' person to have 
opportunity or not to offer a second assessment in response to the claim that is made about 
them. 
A significant analytical discovery is that of the use of epistemic downgrading being used in a 
positive way in therapy. For example, the question 'Why dyou feel guilty? displays a 
presumption that the addressee has direct access to definite reportable knowledge, whereas 
'what did you think was in it for you? is a form of epistemic downgrading, which implies 
that the addressee has possibly fallible or limited access to knowledge about the matter. 111C 
usefulness of this kind of epistemic downgrading is that it makes the question more 
answerable for the client, especially in view of our earlier discussion of the intimidating I 
factor of the 'expert other'. 
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In the section entitled 'Accounting for not knowing what someone else is thinking', I 
demonstrated how explanations made about 'not knowing' reveal something of the way that 
speakers would normally know what someone else is thinking. Accounts produced in these 
environments belie the fact that there is something to account for, in other words that the fact 
of 'not knowing' is in itself accountable in certain close relationships. The use of reported 
speech was shown to be heavily used as a normal way of evidencing one's own claims about 
what someone else is thinking. I have shown that there is a noticeable difference in the way 
that a therapist asks about the thoughts and feelings of the person they are addressing, and 
the thoughts and feelings of a third party. For example, directly 'how do you feel? ' displays 
a presupposition that he has both direct, reportable access to knowledge about his own 
feelings. 
I have also examined the practice of circular questioning within the context that my data 
allows. This technique is designed to probe one client about what they think another 
person my think/feel. There are various therapeutic reasons for using this approach, but my 
interest has primarily been in the presumption that other people's 'inner' states are both 
knowable and reportable. I showed that in my data, where the subject-actor is typically not 
presentý claims made by clients cannot be immediately verified or countered by the subject- 
actor themselves. In this instance there is a propensity for evidencing those ascription 
claims with reported speech and anecdotal descriptions of actions made by the absent 
subject-actor which fiulher support the client's claims. 
In this chapter I have focused predominantly on the way that claims to such knowledge arc 
evidenced by reports of what those people have said. Conversely, where accounts are made 
for not knowing what another person thinks, the same resource of what that person has not 
said is used. By this we can see that inferences about another person's thoughts, attitudes, 
feelings, beliefs, motivations, concerns etc. are constructed in interaction as available via 
the medium of what that person has said. Thus speech is treated in a common sense way, as 
a mode of accessing the 'psyche' of another person. The data shows therefore that in 
ordinary sense-making practices, people use the words of others as symbols of their inner 
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%%otkL be that tkir thw; hts or fcclings, This is so cndcn-ýc as to be the case that it is 
Pcffcctly acccpubL- to ask, the question *%%hat do 3 ou think X thinks? ' 
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Cl IAPTER 8 
REV IEW & CONCLUSION 
TIIESISO%TRVIEW 
"ýIy 8PPrO3ch to an4l)sis in this thesis his been d, -ducti%, c rather than inducfi%, e. In this vein, 
throu; h a proms orcarcu *kvking' at the data, certain themes began to immerge, that I 
C%vntuaUY made the cemrPicce of the anaýsis. T'he TlxMcs and Issues chapter rcflects 
some" hat how I b. 2% C mmialiscd these particular themes %%iNn the context of a series of 
rCLUCd 100CS. Mulst the amal)tic charqm dx-mcl%vs to not map exactly onto these 
di-ICYCCt arcas. Mh dram hca%iý- on a small set of pertinent issues as its underpinning. I 
"'al t2kc Och theme in turn and show how I havc approached it, and %%here the essential 
cl=Xnu from each of the com chapters tic in to that therne. 
ClClutnKfion of Reality/ Versions 
in rauch or the DP rescarch to date. there has been a central concern with the way that 
peopic fcgTnutne descriptions or thernsci%es, or others and of events to achieve what is 
Wcued to as 'intcractioi businm-. one or the essentiai aspects of DP is that it treats 
PsychOlOU as something inhefcntb- sociA It is the study of how . vnions arc assembled 
and stablused as ractuA and irkkpcndcnt or their producer. In chapter 6.1 took the 
Construction or %cniotu as a u-p=tc topic, and in%vgigated how different concerns were 
aPP"rendy 61AOCLed up* cc 'constructcd' in the course of therapeutic convcrsation. The two 
co`ccPU that I examined in particulz %%ct-c "truth'. and 'importance'. In both cases, what 
bccles accepted. is the cnd of a ivocess rather than a starting point. I showed that what 
is 3CCCPlcd as trw. his to be csublishcd. and %%hilst it can be clairned, it can also be 
"r1l". and alSucd. In CtLlp(cr S. I sho%cd tha4, %%hcn someone reports what )-ou said, the 
adjrc"" h-U 10 APCC and confirm that as true bcrore it can act as a basis for proceeding. 
'A'hcfc thc1c arc conflicting %cf*. ions, such as in the argumentative sequences of Chapter 6, 
the use or rcpnd j,, h %, a, u,, j .. %ay or casting doubt upon, and undermining the 
%-Al"ly or ahc=, One %3y that a %crsion %%as sho%%m as that by a speaker was 
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in the change of footing that using a piece of reported speech invokes. In other words a 
'version' of what has occurred can be stated as such via that change of footing. Iliese 
subtle changes of footing were shown to demonstrate a &-alignment on the part of the 
speaker with the reported version. 
Furthermore, in this chapter, the construction of the concepts of 'importance', 
'understanding' and 'remembering' were also investigated as contestable issues and 
rhetorical devices rather than as simple mental constructs. 17he concept of 'remembering', 
for example, was considered as a participant's concern, whereby rhetorically speaking, 
what the speakers claimed to 'know' of the past was something clearly worked up for the 
sake of the immediate interaction. In the context of demonstrating remembering what 
someone else said in a particular scenario, and re-presenting it via reported speech in tile 
current conversation, I demonstrated that this action implies a discrepancy between what 
was said and what really happened, and yet without being directly accusatory. 11is is 
achieved through the creation of a contrast structures, whether it be overtly claimed or 
simply present by implication. 
Asymmetry 
From a constructionist perspective, any authority that a person has is not something pre- 
existent and intrinsic to an individual, but rather something that is worked up as relevant 
during the course of an interaction. In the previous section I recapped on some of die key 
issues relating to truth construction. The notion of 'cultural authority' (Starr 1982: 13) 
proposes that medical professionals have more right to make judgments about a client, than 
lay persons, so that what they see as 'real' is more likely to be accepted as such. This 
phenomenon is known as 'medical reality. This concept is based on the presumption that 
those who have more 'power', by virtue of expert knowledge in some area arc in a stronger 
position to say what constitutes reality. One of my arguments in this regard was the idea 
that a professional stranger may have greater entitlement to claim 'knowledge' of a clictit's 
psyche than the client does him/herself. As an example of this, in chapter 6,1 Showed 
evidence that in terms of whose topic gets the floor, there is a considerable disjuncture 
between what the therapist thinks is important to discuss and what the client wants to 
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discuss, with the therapists' priorities winning out. The interesting concern here was about 
who gets to say what is or isn't important in the context of a family group, especially where 
there are adolescent members. 
In chapter 6,1 demonstrated that the use of the mental concept 'not understanding' is not 
simply an expression of the speaker's inability to grasp a matter, but a notion deployed in a 
given situation for the sake of its rhetorical effect. The use of the concept 'understanding' 
in this environment was shown to have more to do with alignment and legitimisation than 
about cognition. I demonstrated that in claiming to 'understand' a position or a line of 
argument, a speaker simultaneously aligns him/herself with it. Consequently, by claiming 
not to understand, a person can demonstrate that he/she does not agree with that position. 
In addition to the cultural norms that produce category bound assumptions of types of 
knowledge prescribed to various social roles, there is also the issue of asymmetry that is a 
function of the distribution of conversational turns. Taking the simple example of the 
question/answer sequence, I have shown that the person doing the asking is in a stronger 
position conversationally in terms of his/her ability to control the topic and flow of die 
conversation. Therefore, purely from a sequential point of view in the therapeutic situation, 
we can see that an asymmetry between therapist and client is created in the talk simply by 
virtue of the fact that the majority of the client's turns (predominantly second part turns) 
are constrained by their conditional relevance to the first part turns of the therapist. 
Similarly, using evidence from other research on invited stories, I demonstrated that the 
person who invites a telling (predominantly the therapist) has similar conversational 
advantages in terms of keeping the respondent (the client) 'on track' by telling the kind of 
(-story' that the requester had asked for. I have shown to some extent how asymmetry is a 
discursive achievement, affected by the differing potential that participants have to enable 
or constrain one another's actions, and an 'asymmetric relationship' is a construct that is 
located within specific instances of talk. 
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Reported Speech 
One of the most common uses of reported speech by therapists is what is known as 
(reflecting back' on what the client has previously said in the current or prior session. I 
showed that reported speech is used by the speaker selectively and for the reporting 
speakers own purposes, and how, especially where difficult or controversial topics are 
being discussed, the use of reported speech enables a speaker to distance themselves from 
being the 'principal' and 'author' of the belief, and position him/hersclf as merely the 
animator. The speaker can present the prior utterance in an assumed role as 'mere 
. ator' and leave the evaluative implication to be made by the hearer. Therefore, footing 
provides a way of saying the words without being held accountable for the beliefs assumed 
to be 'behind' the words. Also, because footing is so often bound up with issues of fact 
construction and accountability, a display of footing can be an attempt to show who should 
be blamed and whose version is at stake. 
Furthermore, I argued that the reporting of someone else's words, even if done via direct 
reported speech is still a way of producing a version which is designed for the current 
interaction. In chapter 5,1 examined the use of the phrase 'you said' and found that these 
quotes were produced as indexically sensitive, and that the content of die quoted material 
formed a basis for proceeding. I showed in this analysis that the use of you-quotation 
within both the core sequence and the extended sequence has a role as what I refer to as a 
'secondary' action. For example, where a you-quotation turn is found in a turn-initial 
position, and thus acts as a preface, it is projected that there will be a follow-up question 
which is actually the primary action in the sequence. 
Construction of 'Mind' 
The final analytic chapter of the thesis is an investigation of the way that constructs of 
'mind' and 'thought' are used as a resource for both clients and therapists alike. I'llis 
chapter in particular takes a closer look how other person's states of mind can be 'known' 
by others. However related mental concepts such as remembering, importance, truth and 
reality have also been covered throughout the other chapters. I began by questioning the 
assumption that there is a discretely separate and pre-existent 'mind' and 'heart' that can 
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be reached. The constructivist approach to this issue is to look at how these mental 
predicates are actually the result of social interaction, rather than the pre-requisite for it. As 
we do not have the same kind of privileged access to other people's thoughts as we do to 
our own, we cannot say that we actually 'know' for defmite what anyone else thinks or 
feels. In this respect we have 'limited access'. What we tend to do, is to infer things about 
other people's 'inner' world from external evidences such as that person's expression, their 
words or actions. This thesis has provided some clear empirical evidence to show how such 
inferences are made. 
I have shown that in seeking to give reasons for making claims about someone else's state 
of mind, two forms of evidencing appear to be recurrent, both in making claims about what 
someone else thinks, and in accounting for not knowing what someone else's thoughts are. 
One is the use of reports about what that person has said, and the second is to report on 
what that person has done. In making claims about someone else's inner processes or 
'-psyche', clients were seen to attempt to evidence such claims with pieces of reported 
speech. In some of the analysis I borrowed the therapy term 'circular questioning' to look 
at a practice whereby therapists use certain kinds of questions to ask about what a client 
thought that another person thought or felt. My primary analytic interest in this technique 
was in its role as a method of eliciting mental-state ascriptions. 
Ile concept of 'expert other' was identified as being important when considering issues of 
evaluation which routinely attach themselves to any situation in which persons are asked to 
discuss matters about which someone else who is present (actually or virtually) may bc 
more knowledgeable about than themselves. One way that clients were found to managc 
this problem was to make subjective rather than objective claims. Often these claims were 
presented as something that they 'thought' or 'felt'. I argued that one way to think of these 
subjective modifiers was as a form of 'epistemic downgrades'. In order to moderate an 
outright knowledge claim down to the level of a subjective opinion, speakers were 
observed to frame their comments as not specifically 'known', but 'thought'. In other 
words, the knowledge claims were downgraded from objective fact to subjective opinion. 
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Accounts 
Morally, we tend to accept that a person is always 'in the right' so to speak if their intention 
was to do the right thing (or not to do the wrong thing), whether they did or not. It is die 
combination of positive intent with negative ability which provides a basis for a 'no fault' 
verdict to be imputed to the speaker. The phrases 'I dunno' and 'my mind goes blank' were 
both examined in this aspect of the analysis. At face value these terms are 'cognitive 
representations', ways of talking that imply that they are reflections of some inner 
cognitive activity. In Chapter 4,1 showed that, to validate a claim of lack of intent, the 
client used the discursive repertoire of cognitive activity. Another cognitive representation 
highlighted in this analysis was that of 'realisation'. In the case of the data I presented, die 
client mobilised this resource of realisation as the second part of a retrospective description 
of a series of events. The contrast created in this second part simultaneously formulated the 
first part of the statement as having been done without a realisation of what he was doing. 
In both instances, these cognitive repertoires were utilised to excuse blame for a particular 
act on the basis that if you are not actually aware, or don't realise what you are doing, you 
cannot be held accountable for it. In conclusion, I demonstrated that inability accounts can 
be used to resist the implied change that conceding an unwilling account would demand, 
Doing Tberapy 
In therapy and counselling, a person's everyday actions are not open to the scrutiny of the 
therapist in the same way that they are to their family members, and consequently the 
therapist must rely on other people's descriptions of a client's actions as a kind of second- 
hand form of inferential evidence. Where there may be competing claims about an 
individual's state of mind, it is largely these descriptive evidential reports that Ole therapist 
uses to inform her diagnosis. Part of the process of the therapeutic encounter is to 
investigate possible internal causal explanations for outward behaviour. A measurement of 
success is the evidencing of some extent to which clients have made positive change in 
how they think or feel during their course of treatment. However, without direct access to 
see inside a person, therapists, like everyone else, must rely on external evidences, such as 
what a person says or how they act as indices which represent inner activity. I have shown 
in this thesis that a person's speech and actions are treated as reflections of the inner world 
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of thoughts, feelings, desires, motivations and attitudes. Whilst claims and ascriptions of 
this nature need not be justifled or supported by a speaker, it is common that some form of 
evidencing will either precede or follow a claim. This is particularly true in contentious 
environments, where competing versions are rife. The therapeutic environment, whilst 
perhaps not quite as contentious as a courtroom for example, is still a fertile location for 
justified ascription claims. In my analysis, the therapists in my data treat the feelings of 
their clients as being actual, identifiable, and reportable, and as having been caused by 
something or things that are also identifiable and reportable. 
I also showed that the therapist, by virtue of her incumbency within the category 'expert' 
has certain category bound expectations attached to this role which may entitle her to a 
greater claim to knowledge about the psychological causes of her client's behaviour than 
the client himself. In this particular context, there is a slight difference in what might 
normally be expected in terms of who has privileged access to knowledge. I showed that in 
the case of therapy, and perhaps other institutional environments, the categories 'self' and 
'other' are no longer adequate, but that an additional institutional category of 'expert other' 
becomes necessary. 
The issue of 'epistemic downgrading that has been discusses here and elsewhere has 
particular relevance to how therapy is conducted. In order for clients to be able to make 
comments about things that they may not have absolute 'knowledge' of, the use of tllcsc 
downgrades is a way of moderating an outright knowledge claim to the level of a subjcctive 
opinion. Speakers in these instances were observed to frame their comments as not 
specifically 'known', but 'thought'. Therefore, I showed that although in some situations 
this kind of downgrading would be heard as a 'put down', for example 'what do you think 
you're trying to doT in therapeutic situations, the use of epistemic downgrading can have a 
positive role to play in facilitating the opportunity for potentially unsubstantiated 
propositions to be ventured. 
In Chapter 5,1 discussed how you-quotation is used in therapy, and in Particular its use as 
an indirect elicitation device. In considering the need for therapists to elicit information 
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from their clients about all manner of things, often personal, potentially embarrassing or 
accountable (maybe illegal), direct methods of questioning may be inappropriate, and may 
even be perceived as confrontational. Therefore, indirect techniques such as this may have 
an important role to play. I showed in this analysis that the therapist can lead his/her client 
into a particular area of discussion by using you-quotation, and to a large extent, allow the 
client to elaborate further on that topic without too much direct questioning. Thus, I have 
shown that 'You said' quotes can can be used by a therapist to present what a client has 
said as a way of managing topic as a client's concern rather than a therapist's imposed 
interest 
In a client-centred environment, this is therefore a useful tool for the counsellor or therapist 
to use. 'You said' provides a practical way for the therapist to channel the conversation in a 
particular direction, and yet at the same time ensure that the topics discussed remain client- 
initiated, rather than therapist imposed. So, a piece of a prior conversation brought in and 
used by the therapist can be a way of addressing a current problem that is being discussed. 
From my data, I showed that the therapist weaves together different 'strands' of therapeutic 
talk, so that prior information is utilized in the current context, to assist with providing an 
explanation for a problem. Another way that prior conversation can be used, is to focus die 
discussion. In other words, I showed that the therapist can use the you-quotation device to 
return to a previous point in the conversation. In this way, the therapist almost 're-winds' to 
a place earlier in the session, from where she/he can move forward again. However, by 
quoting the client's words, the therapist is able to keep the issue as not just his agenda or 
interest, but also and more importantly one which was originally the client's, which they 
are now returning to. 
In Summary, the therapeutic relevance of the use of you-quotation in the main is that they 
provide an ideal position for the therapist to produce 'client centred' topic-transitions. 
Furthermore, they also assist the therapist by operating as an indirect elicitation device, 
where agreement and elaboration is projected from you-quotation. 
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CONTRIBUTION OF TMS THESIS TO PSYCHOLOGY 
Psychology is the study of how inner processes can be reliably identified and predicted, 
although there are many within the profession who would claim that this is an impossible 
and ultimately futile enterprise. My interest throughout this thesis has been to investigate 
how 'psychology' is constituted by and through talk. As I discussed in chapter 3, the job of 
the psychologist is purported to explain what humans do and why they do it. According to 
Hebrew psychology, a 'logos' word can exist inwardly in the form of reason, and be 
expressed outwardly on the form of speech. Thus, the 'word' can exist in both realms, 
either as something that is thought, or as something that is thought and subsequently 
verbalised. Vygotsky frequently used the term 'verbal thought', indicating the 
interdependent complexity of the relationship between the two, the word and the thought 
not existing as separate entities, but finding their meaning in being inextricably connectcd. 
I also discussed how ethnomethodology is the study of ordinary people's methods, or 
mundane practices; a seeking to describe methods that ordinary people use to 'do' social 
life. The ethnographer therefore seeks to identify those methods that people themselves 
use, and to describe that world of social order, that culture, from the members' point of 
view. This approach is largely what this thesis has attempted to achieve. 
In Chapter 5,1 demonstrated how participants themselves orient to the indexical nature of 
talk. A particular example in this analysis was that of the therapist who treated an answer 
given 'in front of the children' as potentially designed just for that company. When the 
children left the room, she re-asked the question with explicit reference to the fact that flicir 
answer may be now be different in the children's absence. In this instance, the therapist 
clearly treats their first answer as provisional because of recipient design factors in flic 
original context of the question. This example demonstrates an important 
ethnomcthodological concern, that as analysts we are to discover members own sense- 
making practices. In this instance, those practices clearly indicate sensitivity to recipient 
design and to the indexical nature of talk; that it is designed for the current interaction, and 
is subject to change under different circumstances. 
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Discursive psychologists focus their analysis on the actions that speakers' talk achieves in 
the course of their discourse, and how they produce versions of external reality and of 
psychological states. There is a common-sense notion already prevalent that what we say is 
reflective of how we think, indeed of who we are. However, as Sacks exhorted us, in order 
to 'see' the mechanisms of social life we need to focus relentlessly on what people do and 
analyse how they do it. It is this kind of empirical rigor that is necessary if we are to move 
from common-sense notions to scientific explication. In this thesis I have shown that other 
people's thoughts are not treated as completely unknowable, mysterious or out of bounds. 
They are treated as in some way accessible. For this to be so, there has to be some socially 
shared understanding of a mechanism of how this might be possible. I have shown that 
both in making claims about what someone else thinks, and in accounting for not knowing 
what someone else's thoughts are, the use of reports about what that person has or hasn't 
said is a common way of evidencing those claims. 
This research demonstrates empirically that people themselves orient to other people's talk 
as action-oriented. By that I mean that the participants themselves appear to recognize and 
treat one another's talk not just as a straightforward and honest reflection of what they 
'really' think, but as context sensitive, designed for the particular content and possible 
trajectory of the current interaction. 
FUTURE RESEARCH IWLICATIONS 
In keeping focused on a limited number of avenues or themes within this thesis, I have had 
to curtail other interesting lines of inquiring that have begim to emerge in the process. One 
of those is to make a closer examination of the use of the word 'just'. In particular, as a 
result of the analysis in Chapter 4 on 'it just happened', I have noticed many instances in 
other situations where 'just' is used as a minimiser. I would be interested to collect further 
data that is not institutionally situated so that I can examine some of the features that I have 
identifies in this thesis in a different setting. One of the advantages of doing this would be 
to identify more clearly what aspects are specifically 'therapy' or 'institutional' in nature, if 
that is so. 
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One of the advantages of having the opportunity to study in California with Emmanuel 
Schegloff and others was that I developed a greater appreciation of the wealth and depth of 
interest within even the tiniest fragment of data. With this in mind, I think that in future 
studies I would like to feel less encumbered with a sense of obligation to collect large 
amounts of data to make a meaningful analysis, and rather to take the CA approach which 
is to look in greater depth at a smaller corpus. 
In attempting to be objective in my appraisal of what I might have been done better or 
differently, or may do differently in the future, one thing I have discovered, is that there is 
not so much a need to find really 'good' data, but rather to do 'good' analysis. By this I 
mean that I would put less effort into gathering data from particularly difficult sources. In 
my case, gaining ethical consent from various departments, from clinicians and from 
clients themselves took up a huge amount of my allotted time. As my primary interest 
throughout has been on the mundane practices of talk-in -interaction, in future I plan to 
restrict myself to more mundane examples of talk, rather than to try to address the issues of 
instititionality as well. 
INTLICATIONS FOR CLINICAL PRACTICE 
Whilst there may be aspects of my work that can be a catalyst for others in their own work 
into many different areas, I see the most Rely practical application of my work to be into 
clinical practice. Whilst there is not a vast amount of specific findings that could practically 
be utilised in a clinical setting I think that there are a few. I think that the analysis of the use 
of circular questioning, and the issues raised about how it can be a way of helping clients to 
provide subjective-type rather than objective-type responses could be helpful. Also, die 
analysis of how conversational turn structures can limit the access of certain participants in 
a conversation, may help clinicians to be aware of their own role in directing the topic and 
focus of therapeutic exchanges. Finally, I believe the most easily transportable observation, 
is my explication of the phrase 'you said', which as a mode of what might be called 
'reflecting back' in therapy terms, is quite a useftd device for topic management and die 
management of chents' concerns. 
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APPENDIX 
Transcripfion Symbols 
JO: In awhile, [about] 10.30 Brackets indicate the beginning and end 
Fred- [Okay. ] of overlapping speech. 
JO: I think you should= Equal signs indicate no gap between 
Fred. =Of course I will. speakers. 
JO: Well (03) alright then. Numbers in parenthesis indicate timed 
pauses to the nearest tenth of a second. 
Fred. I'm not () sure A dot in parenthesis indicates a pause less 
than one tenth of a second. 
A: Please don't do that Underlining indicates contrastive emphasis 
on particular words or parts of words. 
Fred. Do what? A question mark indicates rising 
intonation. 
JO: That. A full stop indicates a fall in tone or 
finishing intonation. 
Fred: 0:: kay Colons indicate prolongation of the 
immediately prior sound. The more 
colons, the longer the sound. 
Jo: I said DON'T Capital letters, apart from the beginning 
of lines, indicate a rise in volume. 
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Fred. hhhh hhhh 
JO: Let's go to the () now 
Fred. I'H get my (coat) 
JO: >Let's go quick< 
Fred: THey ýwait for me 
JO: One, two, three 
((sound of door banging)) 
A dot in front of a row of h's indicates 
an inbreath, without a dot in front 
indicates an outbreath. The nwnber 
of h's reflects the length. 
Empty parentheses indicate the 
transcriber's inability to hear what 
was said. 
Parenthesised words are possible 
hearings. 
Indicates talk that is noticeably quicker 
than the surrounding talk. 
Up and down arrows indicate rising 
and fafling intonation. 
Commas indicate continuing 
intonation. 
Double parentheses contain author's 
descriptions or comments. 
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